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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters in development economics which inves-
tigate questions related to intergroup contact and the consequences of civil conflicts.
In the first chapter, I study how refugee networks influence social integration in
the host community in the context of Turkey, a country that has been profoundly
impacted by the arrival of more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees since 2011. Using
a rich dataset on the mobile phone communications of Syrian refugees, I construct
village-level measures of refugee presence and social integration. In villages with a
larger refugee population, refugees made significantly more phone calls to locals and
other refugees, and a higher proportion of their calls were placed to locals. I argue
that refugee networks made it easier for their members to interact with locals by
sharing information on local norms and creating new opportunities to meet locals.
The second chapter examines how the cost of inter-ethnic contact influences inter-
ethnic relations. The study uses the staggered improvements of the Indonesian road
network during the 1990s and shows that it lowered the cost of intergroup contact.
The resulting enhancement in access to other ethnic groups led to increasing rates of
interethnic marriages.
v
The third chapter investigates the long-run effects of civil conflicts on human
capital that owe their impact to family structure. Specifically, I study how the loss
of a sibling during the 1994 genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda affected surviving
children. The loss of a sibling had positive effects on human capital and negative
effects on wealth. I argue that these results are consistent with standard models of
fertility choice, although other mechanisms could also have played a role.
vi
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Refugee Settlement and Social
Integration: Evidence from Turkey
1.1 Introduction
Immigration is increasingly seen as a key public policy issue. In 2019, there were
more than 272 million international migrants worldwide. This number has steadily
increased in the last decade, both in absolute terms and in proportion to the world
population (IOM, 2020).1 Immigration has the potential to generate considerable
economic gains for host countries. However, barriers to integration of new arrivals
often constrain these benefits.
These challenges are even more pronounced when it comes to forced displacement.
Indeed, refugees face unique barriers to integration and often live in protracted situa-
tions with little prospects of returning to their home country in the short or medium
run. Moreover, the arrival of large flows of refugees can cause significant political
difficulties in the host societies (Dustmann et al., 2017; Hatton, 2020). Fostering
social integration, understood as new arrivals’ ability to interact with locals, has the
potential to improve refugees’ well-being and to mitigate these challenges. Among
the multiple policies that could promote refugees’ social integration, those affecting
their settlement patterns are especially relevant from a policy point of view.2
1An even larger number of individuals migrate within the borders of their country. In 2009, there
were an estimated 740 million internal migrants. In addition, there were around 25 million refugees
and 41 million internally displaced persons in 2018 (IOM, 2020).
2Indeed, multiple countries make use of resettlement policies of asylum seekers and refugees,
2
This chapter shows that refugee networks play an essential role in shaping their
members’ social integration in the host community. How refugees interact with natives
is crucial for their broader economic integration, as locals could help find employment
or housing opportunities, and obtain livelihoods. Moreover, it could also foster long-
run cultural integration. Indeed, whether refugees adopt the norms of the host country
could critically depend on the frequency and quality of their interactions with natives.
While several papers have looked at the relationship between refugee networks and
both economic and cultural integration, less is known about their social integration.3
This is largely due to the lack of reliable data on the social interactions of refugees.
I use data on the mobile phone communications of refugees living in Turkey to
develop village-level measures of refugee presence and social integration. Since the
onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Turkey has faced a massive inflow of Syrian refugees,
hosting more than 3.5 million of them as of August 2018. Most of these refugees live
outside of temporary camps in villages and towns mixed with the local population.
This makes Turkey an ideal setting to study whether the size of a co-refugee network
influences its members’ social integration. Because of the widespread use of mobile
phones among Syrian refugees, the ability to directly observe their calling and texting
behavior is a unique opportunity to study whom refugees interact with without relying
on self-reported measures. Indeed, mobile phones are an essential asset for refugees.
They help them in their settlement choice, allow them to reconnect with acquaintances
from their home country, and gather information on the host society. For this reason,
most refugees in the world, and especially in Turkey, own a mobile phone (AFAD,
2013; UNHCR, 2016).
sometimes with the explicit goal of fostering social integration (OECD, 2016; Dustmann et al.,
2017).
3For the relationship between refugee networks and refugees’ economic integration, see for exam-
ple Munshi (2003); Edin et al. (2003); Damm (2009, 2014); Beaman (2012); Eriksson (2020). For the
relationship between refugee networks and cultural integration, ee Edin et al. (2003); Damm (2009,
2014); Beaman (2012); Eriksson (2020).
3
How the size of a refugee community influences the social integration of its mem-
bers is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, having access to a larger co-ethnic
network reduces refugees’ incentives to interact with locals to the extent that com-
municating with more similar individuals is easier (Danzer and Yaman, 2013). On
the other hand, co-ethnic networks share information on local norms and customs,
therefore providing informal training on how to interact with locals (Portes, 1995).
Moreover, co-ethnic networks could also create new opportunities to meet locals in
safe environments (Nannestad et al., 2008; Pendakur and Mata, 2012). I develop a
simple theoretical model that suggests that the positive effects of refugee networks
are more likely to dominate when the refugee population’s size is small relative to
natives and when the cultural gap between the host and the refugee communities is
wider.
I test these predictions by using a dataset containing information about the mobile
phone communications of more than 1 million individuals, including 180,000 Syrian
refugees living in Turkey in 2017 (Salah et al., 2018).4 The spatial granularity of
mobile phone data has three main advantages. First, it allows observing refugees’
exact location, down to the cell tower level. This improves upon the existing research
on the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, which uses official data that often only has
information on the province of first registration. Second, it allows to exploit the
heterogeneity of refugee settlement: while most of the localities in my final sample
host few refugees, Syrian refugees represent more than 10% of the total population
in 25% of these localities, and they represent more than 50% of the total population
in 4% of them. Third, the granularity of the data also allows me to implement an
4The use of mobile phone data has become increasingly popular in economics, mostly because it
allows researchers to address questions that would otherwise be difficult to answer. For examples,
mobile phone data have been used to analyze poverty and economic activity (Kreindler and Miyauchi,
2020; Blumenstock et al., 2015), decisions to migrate (Blumenstock et al., 2019), informal insurance
networks (Blumenstock et al., 2016), segregation (Athey et al., 2020), or the Covid-19 crisis (e.g.,
Goolsbee and Syverson (2020); Couture et al. (2020); Barrios et al. (2020)).
4
instrumental variable strategy to circumvent endogeneity issues.
I show that in villages that host a higher share of refugees, the refugees tend to
have more calls with other refugees and the local population. Moreover, the share
of communication with the local population also tends to be higher. These positive
associations are stronger in areas with a lower share of refugees and hold for areas
with a larger share of refugees. These results suggest that having access to a more
extensive co-ethnic network may help refugees create new connections with the local
population in areas with fewer refugees. More generally, the idea that immigrants
living in ethnic enclaves are less integrated is inconsistent with the facts in Turkey.
To bring us closer to a causal interpretation, my main identification strategy uses
a measure of detour to instrument for the share of refugees living in a village. The
intuition of the instrument is that we expect there to be more refugees along roads
connecting the main Turkish economic centers to Syria, as compared to roads that
connect these Turkish economic centers to other points of interest. This instrumental
variable approach is motivated by causal identification strategies in the urban litera-
ture on transportation infrastructure (Black et al., 2015; Donaldson, 2018; Sequeira
et al., 2020). More precisely, I identify the main economic centers in Turkey (defined
as cities with a population larger than 200,000 in 2010) and the main refugees’ cities
of origin in Syria. I then match each village v to the closest main economic center in
Turkey (tv) and the closest city in Syria (sv). I compute the travel distance from the
Syrian city sv to the Turkish city tv using two different routes: the shortest one and
the route that goes through the village v. Finally, I construct a measure of detour for
each village, which is equal to the ratio between the travel distance via the village,
and the travel distance using the shortest path.
I show that conditional on city fixed effects and the distance from the closest
main road and the closest main economic center, this detour variable can plausibly
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be excluded from the second stage. In addition to being uncorrelated with proxies for
economic activity before the Syrian civil conflict (such as night-lights intensity, pop-
ulation, or vote shares for the ruling party), the detour instrument strongly predicts
refugees’ share in a village. The positive associations between the share of refugees
and the number of interactions with co-refugees, locals, and heterophily are robust
to using this instrumental variable strategy. Note that this instrumental variable
approach generates variation across villages and small-sized to medium-sized cities
located around the same major city in Turkey.
Syrian refugees who are more likely to have contacts with non-refugees might
still be more likely to live in villages associated with a short detour. This might be
the case if, for example, an inflow of refugees leads to an increase in housing prices,
pushing more impoverished refugees to move to villages where inflows of refugees
were relatively small. However, such biases induced by selective migration should be
weaker when using a unit of observation that is more aggregated than villages, such
as districts. I show that my main results hold even when the refugee community’s
size is defined at a more aggregated level. Moreover, this violation of the exclusion
restriction is likely to lead to a downward bias in my estimates. Therefore, I interpret
my estimates as a lower bound of the true effect of co-refugee networks on social
integration.
I argue that my results are in line with the hypothesis that refugee networks make
it easier for their members to interact with locals. Interacting with members of the
local population could be a source of stress and anxiety for refugees. This is especially
the case if they do not share the same culture and language. Therefore, it might be
difficult for refugees to interact with the local population without external help. As
suggested by sociological studies, an important source of support might come from
their co-refugee network. These could provide informal training on local norms or
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create new opportunities to meet locals in safe environments.
I provide two pieces of evidence in support of this hypothesis. First, we should
expect the positive correlation between the size of the co-refugee network and social
integration to be stronger when the cultural gap between the local and the refugee
communities is wider. Indeed, suppose the cultural distance between the two com-
munities is relatively low. In that case, the help of their co-refugee network will be
less useful for refugees to have contacts with the local population. In contrast, if the
cultural distance between the two communities is large, it might be prohibitively dif-
ficult for refugees to interact with locals without the guidance of a better-connected
or better-informed refugee.
To verify this, I proxy for cultural distance by a measure of religious distance.
First, I use the mobile phone data to calculate a religiosity index for each community
in each village. I do this by comparing the average number of calls during the Friday
prayer to the average number of calls at the same time on Thursdays (Bozcaga et al.,
2019). I then construct a measure of religiosity distance between refugees and non-
refugees. The positive association between the size of refugee network and social
integration is significantly larger in villages characterized by greater cultural distance
between the refugee and the local communities. This result is robust to using a
measure of ethnic distance as a proxy for cultural distance.
Second, we would expect a small subset of refugees who have interacted a lot with
natives to pass information to other refugees. If most refugees make their decisions
based on information coming from the same individuals, we should then expect them
to interact with the same set of locals. Consistent with this, an increase in the refugee
community’s size has heterogeneous effects on the number of interactions that locals
have with refugees. While locals have, on average, more interactions with refugees, a
few individuals who have many more contacts with refugees drive this result. On the
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contrary, most locals do not interact more with Syrian refugees as their share in the
population increases.
I contribute to several strands of the literature. First, I contribute to the litera-
ture on ethnic enclaves by exploring a new channel through which co-ethnic networks
could help their members. A large body of work has studied how own immigrant
group size affects labor market outcomes (Munshi, 2003; Edin et al., 2003; Damm,
2009, 2014; Beaman, 2012; Eriksson, 2020). Fewer studies focus on other dimensions
of integration. While enclaves can have a positive effect on political mobilization
(Shertzer, 2016), immigrants living in larger enclaves are also less likely to be cultur-
ally assimilated (Lazear, 1999; Danzer and Yaman, 2016; Laliberté, 2019; Abramitzky
et al., 2020). Although labor market outcomes and cultural integration may well de-
pend on social integration, little is known about the relationship between enclaves
and the nature of social interactions that refugees have with locals. A notable excep-
tion is Danzer and Yaman (2013). Using a worker resettlement program in Germany
during the 1960s and 1970s, they show that immigrants who live in a region with a
higher share of own-ethnicity co-residents report having fewer German friends. On
the contrary, the chapter’s main result is that having access to a more extensive own-
ethnicity network leads Syrian refugees to interact more with locals. Several factors
could explain the apparent discrepancy between my results and those of Danzer and
Yaman (2013). First, I use directly observed measures of social interaction instead
of a self-reported measure of friendship. Second, the Syrian refugees in my sample
have been in Turkey for at most 6 years.5 In contrast, the average number of years
since migration in Danzer and Yaman (2013) is above 14. Third, while I work at a
very disaggregated level (down to the village level), Danzer and Yaman (2013) work
at the regional level.
5For most of the refugees, this number is probably much lower given that the majority of them
arrived before 2015. According to UNHCR data, there was a total of 3.4 million Syrian refugees
living in Turkey as of December 2017, compared to 1.5 million in January 2015.
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Second, I contribute to the growing literature on the determinants of immigrants’
integration in their host society. While some papers identify obstacles to integration
(Bleakley and Chin, 2010; Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2020; Fouka, 2020), others have
discussed the effectiveness of policies aimed at helping immigrants in their integration
process (Lochmann et al., 2019; Mazumder, 2019). More closely related to my work
is the literature that identifies migrants’ social networks drivers of integration (Edin
et al., 2003; Eriksson, 2020). While these papers typically use long-term assimilation
measures (such as inter-ethnic marriage, nationalization, or names of children), I can
study social integration more directly by observing the actual social interactions that
refugees have with both the local population and the refugee community.
Third, I contribute to the literature on social capital. Since Putnam (2000), it
became frequent to distinguish between bridging social capital, which ”encompasses
people across diverse social cleavages”, and bonding social capital, which ”tends to
reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups” (Putnam, 2000; Akkaymak,
2016). Other sociological works have challenged this view and argued that bonding
social capital does not necessarily crowd out bridging social capital (Portes, 1995;
Nannestad et al., 2008; Pendakur and Mata, 2012). I add to this literature by pro-
viding systematic evidence in support of this latter hypothesis.
Fourth, I add to the growing body of empirical work on the strategic formation
of social networks in development settings. While a growing literature exists on
how social networks shape economic development6, only a few recent studies provide
causal evidence about the drivers of network formation. These include experiments
that exogenously vary access to insurance and credit (Cecchi et al., 2016; Banerjee
et al., 2018), information (Barsbai et al., 2020), or development projects (Heß et al.,
2020). I add to this literature by showing that refugee settlement how an increase
in access to one type of individual can make it easier to create connections with
6See Breza et al. (2019) and Jackson et al. (2017) for reviews.
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individuals of another type.
Finally, this project relates to the recent literature that tries to identify the im-
pact of the Syrian refugee flows in Turkey on local economic and political outcomes.
This literature has mostly focused on prices and labor market outcomes for the na-
tive population (Akgündüz et al., 2018; Altındağ et al., 2020; Ceritoglu et al., 2017;
Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Balkan and Tumen, 2016; Rozo and Sviatschi, 2018;
Erten and Kesken, 2021) and political outcomes (Altındağ and Kaushal, 2020). I add
to this literature by looking specifically at the outcomes of refugees themselves.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a simple conceptual frame-
work to guide the empirical analysis. Section 3 provides background on the Syrian
refugee population in Turkey. Section 4 describes the main data sources and vari-
ables of interest. Section 5 presents the core OLS results, the instrumental variable
strategy and other robustness checks. Section 6 explores mechanisms and testable im-
plications derived from the conceptual framework, while section 7 explores alternative
mechanisms. Finally, section 8 offers concluding thoughts.
1.2 Conceptual framework
In this section, I use insights from standard models of matching and social interactions
to guide the empirical analysis (Currarini et al., 2009, 2016). I present a simple
example to highlight how the effects of refugee network size on social integration
critically depends on the cost of interacting with refugees and locals. On the one hand,
an increase in the number of refugees in a locality might hurt the social integration of
refugees by decreasing their probability of meeting locals. On the other hand, refugee
networks could also reduce to cost of interacting with locals by providing informal
training on local norms or by allowing refugees to meet locals in safer environments.
Suppose a society is comprised of α refugees and (1−α) locals. We are interested
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in a refugee who needs to make a decision over the numbers tr and tn of refugees and
locals to interact with. Interacting with a refugee has a cost of cr(α), while interacting
with a local has a cost of cn(α, γ), where γ ≥ 1 refers to the cultural distance between
a refugee and the local population. In this context, cultural distance can be thought of
as language barriers, or difference in norms that make communication more difficult.
The refugee is assumed to have a CES utility function with a substitution parameter
ρ ≤ 1, and defined over the number of refugees and locals he interacts with. The







ρ − cr(α)tr − cn(α, γ)tn.
We are interested in the relationship between the share of refugees α and the social
integration of a refugee. Social integration is defined by a heterophily index H, which
measures the fraction of their interactions the refugee has with locals: H = tn
tr+tn
.












Indeed, the elasticity of cr(α), the cost of interacting with refugees, should be smaller
in absolute terms than the elasticity of cn(α), the cost of interacting with locals.
A useful benchmark scenario to consider is the case of random matching. In such
a case, the probability for a refugee to meet an individual of type i will be equal to
the relative share of type i in the population. In a search model, the expected waiting
period before meeting an individual of type i is the inverse of the relative share of
type i in the population. Therefore, a random matching process can be described in
our setting by cr(α) =
1
α
and cn(α, γ) =
1
1−α . In such a case, an increase in the share
of refugees α will decrease the cost of interacting with refugees and will increase the
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cost of interacting with locals, so that ∂H
∂α
< 0.
While a random matching process might be an appropriate way to describe how
individuals meet in some contexts, it might be a poor way to describe how Syrian
refugees form their social networks in Turkey. First, the extensive use of social media
significantly decreases the search costs of co-ethnics, especially in settings where the
share of refugees is relatively low.7 Second, random matching does not reflect the
positive externalities that interacting with co-ethnics could have on the probability
of interacting with locals.
To incorporate these dimensions in the cost functions, suppose that refugees use
two search devices to meet other refugees. They spend a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of their
time using a device that allows them to meet other refugees at a constant unit cost,
and a fraction (1− β) of their time meeting other refugees with a probability α. The
parameter β could be interpreted as the time spent on social media, where meeting
other refugees is relatively easy even when the size of the refugee community is small.
That is, cr(α) =
1
β+(1−β)α , the expected number of periods a refugee has to wait for
before meeting another refugee. In this case, the lower the β, the more an increase in α
will reduce the cost of interacting with a refugee. The case where β = 0 corresponds to
random matching, while β = 1 corresponds to a scenario where the cost of interacting
with other refugees is relatively cheap and constant in α (for example, refugees only
use social media to meet other refugees).
When it comes to interacting with locals, refugees can benefit from the help of
their co-refugee network, and from having a low cultural gap with the host population.








is the efficiency of cultural proximity at creating links with locals relative to
refugee networks. Therefore, θ could be interpreted as the quality of the co-refugee
7For more information about the use of mobile phones by refugees in different settings, see GSMA
(2019) or Miconi (2020).
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network (e.g., presence of a well-connected co-refugee who knows several locals, or
tenure of network as in Munshi (2003)). An increase in α will have two counter-
balancing effects: first, it will reduce the probability for the refugee to meet a local;
second, it will also facilitate the interaction with the said local conditional on meeting
him. The special case where θ = 0 corresponds to a scenario where refugees are not
able to benefit from their co-refugee networks to interact with locals. The special
case where θ = 0 and γ = 1 corresponds to random matching.
Lemma 1.2.1 Suppose cr(α) =
1






1. if β ≥ 1
2





, then ∃!α ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂H
∂α
> 0 ∀α < α and
∂H
∂α




The first part of Lemma 2 states that if refugee networks are sufficiently useful in
helping refugees connecting with locals (high θ), that cultural distance γ is sufficiently
large, and that the cost of interacting with other refugees doesn’t depend too much
on α (high β), then the relationship between integration and the share of refugees will
have an inverted-U shape. The second part states that if this condition on (β, γ, θ)
is violated, then heterophily will be decreasing in the share of refugees α.
The following lemma states that when the relationship between heterophily and
α has an inverted-U shape, as cultural distance increases, the value of α at which
heterophily reaches its maximum will increase.
Lemma 1.2.2 Suppose cr(α) =
1





, β ≥ 1
2
and





. Then γ′ > γ ⇐⇒ α(γ′) > α(γ).
This example highlights how the relationship between the size of a refugee commu-
nity and the social integration of its members into the host society crucially depends
on some key parameters. While random matching predicts a negative relationship
13
between these two variables, this is not necessarily the case when refugee networks
have the potential to help refugees interacting with locals. In particular, the relation-
ship between the size of the refugee community and social integration is more likely
to be positive in environments that are characterized by a wider cultural gap between
refugees and locals is wider.
1.3 Context
Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Turkey has faced a massive inflow
of Syrian refugees, hosting more than 3.5 million of them in August 2018. As a
result, Turkey is currently the country hosting the largest refugee population in the
world. By comparison, Lebanon was hosting around 1 million Syrian refugees and
Jordan around 670,000 in that same year (UNHCR). While the number of Syrian
refugees steadily increased from 2012 to mid-2014, their number rose by more than
70% in less than four months from October 2014 to March 2015, to reach more than
1.7 million. This number rose again sharply from August 2015 to April 2016. In
January 2017 (the start of the study period), Turkey was hosting more than 2.85
million refugees, the majority of them having arrived in the country less than three
years before (Figure 1·1).8
Until 2013, most of the refugees having fled to Turkey were living in camps along
the Syrian border funded by the Turkish government and NGOs. However, as the
flows of arriving refugees increased, the proportion of refugees living outside of refugee
camps increased, to reach more than 95% in 2018 (Akar and Erdoğdu, 2018). The
vast majority are now residing in urban areas, mainly in the South-East provinces
of Hatay, Gaziantep, or Sanliurfa, and in large metropolitan areas such as Istanbul,
8For a more general overview of the history of migration and forced displacement in Turkey and
the Ottoman Empire, see Kirişci (2008).
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Bursa, and Izmir (Figure 1·2).9 While Syrian refugees represent around 4% of the
total Turkish population, this proportion is much higher in regions along the Syrian
border, to reach a number close to 100% in a city like Kilis (DGMM 2018). While these
settlement patterns may provide much room for refugees to have frequent interactions
with locals, high levels of residential segregations could render social integration more
difficult (Bertoli et al., 2019).
The Turkish government initially treated refugees as guests, providing aid and
assistance in camps, and trying to facilitate access to education and health care. In-
vestments in these domains lead to encouraging outcomes. For example, enrolment
rates in primary education reach 96% (Özler et al., 2020). However, access to educa-
tion and health care is uneven and important challenges remain (Akar and Erdoğdu,
2018; Çelik and İçduygu, 2019; Alan et al., 2020).
Access to employment remains precarious, and the large majority of Syrian refugees
are either unemployed, or employed in low-skilled jobs in the informal sector (İçduygu,
2015; Erdoğan, 2017a). In a survey covering 19 provinces hosting a large number of
refugees, 47% of respondents report working in irregular jobs. Sectors that employ a
large proportion of refugees include unskilled services, the textile industry, the con-
struction sector, and the agricultural sector.10 While 46% of respondents referred to
a lack of proficiency in Turkish as an important barrier to employment, 24% of them
also mentioned the lack of information (TRC and WFP, 2019). Because of these dif-
ficult conditions, refugees rely heavily on the Turkish government’s help in ensuring
their sustenance and, to a lesser extent, on NGOs’ support (Erdoğan, 2017a).
With the increasing number of refugees living in Turkey and the increasing length
of their stay in the country, the Turkish public has started to express increased con-
9The majority of the Syrian refugees cite ease of transportation as the most important factor in
their choice to settle in Turkey (AFAD, 2013).
10According to the same survey, these are also among the most represented sectors of employment
prior to refugees’ arrival in Turkey.
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cerns about how Syrian refugees should be welcomed (İçduygu, 2015). For example,
locals increasingly blame refugee presence for crowded classrooms or rising rents (Akar
and Erdoğdu, 2018). Symptomatic of these concerns, refugees face discrimination and
racism (Erdoğan, 2017a), and tensions between refugees and locals are frequent (IGC,
2018). In a survey covering 2089 Turkish citizens across provinces, more than 50% of
the respondents described Syrian refugees as lazy, rude, and non-trustworthy, while
only a third of respondents described refugees as trustworthy or friendly (Erdoğan,
2017a).
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Mobile phone data
The lack of fine-grained data on both the geographic distribution of refugees within
the country and refugees’ characteristics makes it important to think about alternative
data sources. Using mobile phone data can help to circumvent these challenges, given
the widespread use of phones among refugees,11 and the efforts made by the leading
Turkish telecom companies to reach Syrian customers.12
In this chapter, I rely on mobile phone data collected from 992,457 customers of
Turk Telecom, one of the major Turkish telecom companies in the country.13 These
data were collected for the Data for Refugees (D4R) Challenge, which aimed at helping
the scientific community produce research that could improve the living conditions of
Syrian refugees (Salah et al., 2018).14
11For example, more than 90% of the Syrian refugees living in Turkey report using mobile phones
to interact with their family in Syria (AFAD, 2013). Similarly, 99% of the Syrian refugees living in
Jordan report having a phone. Moreover, 98% of them use it for calls and 79% for SMS (GSMA,
2019).
12The largest mobile phone operators in Turkey have launched special programs for refugees and
have invested in new infrastructure in the South-East of the country to reach the refugee population.
For example, see https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/How-Turkish-mobile-operators-
are-helping-the-vast-Syrian-refugee-population-to-help-themselves.
13Turk Telecom had a market share of 24.7% for the first three months of 2017.
14For other examples of how the D4R Challenge dataset has been used, see Salah et al. (2019).
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Structure of the main dataset
Each of these 992,457 customers was followed for one year, from January to December
2017. Importantly, each individual appearing in the database is assigned a tag that
indicates with a high probability whether he is a refugee or not. A total of 184,949
customers are tagged as refugees.15 The refugee tag is assigned to customers that
have ID numbers given to refugees and foreigners in Turkey, registered with Syrian
passports, or use special tariffs reserved for refugees (Salah et al., 2018).16 There-
fore, the refugee tag is not perfectly accurate, and the set of individuals tagged as
refugees in the dataset might also include migrants, asylum seekers, or foreigners with
a temporarily protected foreign individual ID number in Turkey. For simplicity, any
customer who is assigned the refugee tag is someone I will consider to be a refugee.
Customers who are not tagged as refugees will be interchangeably referred to as non-
refugees, locals, or natives. This interpretation is backed by several tests presented
in the following paragraphs.
To protect these customers’ anonymity, I do not have access to the raw database
with all of their communications. Instead, three datasets are made available to re-
searchers. In this study, I use two of these datasets: the first one provides aggregated
data between any pair of antennas in the country on an hourly basis, while the second
one provides individual data. The latter is the primary dataset that I will use in this
study.
Most closely related to this work, Boy et al. (2019) also note a positive relationship between the size
of a refugee community in a locality and the number of contacts with locals.
15While customers tagged as refugees constitute a random sample of the refugee customer base
of Turk Telecom, this is not the case for non-refugee customers. Indeed, customers tagged as non-
refugees are over-sampled in a few provinces where the refugee population was especially high in
2017 (such as Istanbul, Hatay, or Gaziantep). In provinces where only a handful refugees live, none
(or very few) non-refugees were sampled. Moreover, non-refugees are sampled in order to match the
demographic characteristics of refugee customers (more details about the sampling of the customers,
and some basic descriptive statistics about them can be found in Salah et al. (2018)).
16Based on e-mail exchanges with the authors, the first group has 75.411 customers, the second
group 1.861, and the last group 98.620, respectively.
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The second dataset of the D4R Challenge makes available fine-grained mobility
data for random groups of users for a period of two weeks. Every two weeks, from
January 2017 to December 2017, a new identifier is generated for each customer,
and a new random sample of customers is drawn. If a customer is drawn, I will
observe their refugee status (this is the only personal characteristic of the customer
that is observed) and all of their calls and SMS messages during the 2-week period
that the customer appears in my dataset.17 For each call, three pieces of information
are observed: the geographic coordinates of the cell tower that treated the call, the
timestamp of the call (down to the hour level), and the refugee status of the receiver
of the call.18 Therefore, it is possible to infer from this dataset where refugees live,
and how frequently they communicate with other refugees and with non-refugees.
In Figure 1·3, I show the geographic distribution of cell towers in Turkey that
treated at least one refugee call during the study period. As we can see, I have a
large coverage of the country, although there are many more antennas in more densely
populated areas.
External validity
Measurement errors might occur if the market share of Turk Telekom among refugees
differs across regions or if there is geographic heterogeneity in how refugees use their
mobile phones. I provide evidence that the calling activity that can be observed using
the mobile phone data is in line with what official data show at the provincial level,
and accurately predict where refugees live at a more fine-grained level.
At the provincial level, the number of refugee customers of Turk Telekom strongly
17To provide an additional layer of anonymity, different types of communications are included in
four different datasets (incoming texts, outgoing texts, incoming calls, outgoing calls), and I am not
able to match identifiers across those datasets. I therefore have a total of 104 datasets (26 two-weeks
periods times 4 types of communications) that cannot be matched together based on identifiers.
18If the receiver of the call is not a customer of Turk Telecom, or if the receiver of the call is not
in Turkey, his refugee status is unknown.
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correlates with the official number of refugees registered (Figure 1·11). Relative to
estimates obtained from the mobile phone data, official data seem to systematically
overestimate the number of refugees in provinces along the Syrian border and to
underestimate the number of refugees in other provinces (and especially the large
urban centers hosting a large fraction of refugees, such as Istanbul or Bursa). This is
consistent with previous research using alternative data sources to estimate refugee
presence in Turkey. For example, ? uses the Turkish Household Labour Force Survey
to estimate the number of Syrian refugees in each NUTS-2 region and reaches the same
conclusion. He argues this might come from refugees first registering in a province
along the Syrian border and moving to another province afterward, away from the
Syrian border.
At a more fine-grained level, the mobile phone data also detects refugee presence
in places where we should expect a lot of refugee activity. For example, within the
city of Istanbul, there is a lot of call activity from refugees around the district of Fatih,
which hosts a large number of Syrian refugees (Figure 1·12). Moreover, when focusing
on the South-East provinces of Gaziantep, Kilis, and Sanliurfa, which host most of
the refugee camps in the country, we can easily see that relatively few locals make
calls around refugee camps. However, refugee presence is much more pronounced in
the immediate neighborhood of these camps (Figure 1·13).19
Refugee settlement
To estimate the size of refugee communities at the village level across Turkey, all the
cell towers that are within a same village or neighbourhood are merged together.20,21
19See Hu et al. (2019) for another descriptive analysis of calling behavior of refugees around refugee
camps in Turkey using the D4R datasets.
20Since I do not have a map with the boundaries of villages and neighbourhood, I first geocode
them using Google API, and I then match each antenna to the closest village/neighbourhood.
21Given that some neighbourhoods are very small (such as one block) compared to some villages,
I also merge villages that are in the same 0.01’×0.01’ cell (which corresponds more or less to a 700
by 700 meters grid cell).
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In what follows, I will use the term village to refer to both villages and neighbour-
hoods. In order to proxy for the geographic distribution of refugees in the country,
each refugee i is assigned to a home-village homei, which is the village where most of
the calls of i occurred.22 Then, refv =
∑N
i=1 1{homei = v} is the number of refugees
whose home is village v.
The main measure of the size of a refugee community in village v is the share of
the population of v that is refugee. The size of the non-refugee population comes from
official population count data at the village/neighbourhood level (obtained from the
Turkish Statistical Institute). Let pop2010v be the 2010 population of village v, and w
be a weight such that w ∗
∑
v refv = 3.5million (the total number of Syrian refugees
living in Turkey in 2017). The share of refugees in village v is defined as
Sharev =
w × refv
w × refv + pop2010v
.
The settlement patterns of Syrian refugees are represented in Figure 1·4. While
villages that are along the Syrian border tend to host more refugees relative to their
population, important urban centers, such as Istanbul, also host a relatively high
share of refugees. This is in line with what official figures show (DGMM, 2017), and
with the conclusions about settlement patterns of refugees when using alternative
data sources, such as labour force surveys (?). While most Turkish villages host a
relatively low number of refugees, around 4% of the villages host a Syrian community
which is estimated to represent more than half of the village population, and Syrian
refugees account for more than 10% of the total population in more than a quarter
of the host villages (Figure 1·6).
22In subsection 1.7.1, I define the home-village of refugee i as the village where most of his calls
occurred during weekends, and from Monday to Friday between 6PM and 6AM.
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Social integration
For each refugee i living in village v, nrefi,v and n
nonref
i,v are the number of calls i had
with other refugees and with non-refugees, respectively. A heterophily index Hiv is
also defined, and represents the share of their calls refugee i living in village v had





. Since the D4R datasets do not
provide any personal characteristics beside the refugee status of a customer, all of the
controls that will be used in the main specification are defined at the village level.
Similarly, my main explanatory variable, the share of refugees living in a village,
is also defined at the village level. For this reason, measures of social interactions
are aggregated at the village level. The main outcomes of the chapter are therefore
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of the average number of calls refugees




Finally, all of these measures are also calculated by taking into account only
calls that happened during work-time hours (8AM-6PM from Monday to Friday) and
during home-time hours (rest of the time).24
1.4.2 Other data sources
In addition to the mobile phone data described above, I also use additional data that
come from a variety of sources. First, the 2010 DMSP night-lights data are used as
a proxy for local economic activity. In addition to this, three different datasets were
scraped from the Turkish Statistical Institute: 2010 population at the village and
neighbourhood level, electoral outcomes at the village and neighbourhood level for
the 2011 elections, and yearly construction permits at the municipality level for the
23All of my results on the number of communications with other refugees and non-refugees are
robust to the use as outcomes of ngv and log(1 + n
g
v), where g ∈ {ref, nonref}
24Similarly, Kreindler and Miyauchi (2020) also use a hard rule to distinguish between home and
work locations.
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years 2002-2011. All the villages, neighbourhoods, and municipalities were geocoded
using Google’s API, and matched to cell towers based on shortest distance. Finally,
the road network comes from Open Street Maps.
1.5 Size of co-refugee community and contacts
In this section, I show that refugees who have access to a larger network of co-refugees
tend to have more contacts with other refugees, but also with the local population.
Moreover, I show that these positive associations are stronger the lower the share of
refugees in a village. I leave the discussions about causality and mechanisms to the
following sections.
1.5.1 Specification
I am interested in understanding how the social interactions of refugees living in
village v are shaped by a possibly nonlinear function g(.) of the size of the refugee
community in v. I therefore estimate
yv = α + g(sharev) + X
′
vβ + εv (1.1)
where sharev captures the share of village v population that are refugees. The vector
of control Xv includes the share of antennas in village v that are classified as being in
a rural, sub-urban, urban, industrial, or seasonal areas, night-lights intensity in 2010,
population in 2010, latitude and longitude, a dummy taking a value of 1 if the village
is less than 10 kilometres away from the Syrian border, a dummy taking a value of 1
if the village is less than 10 kilometres away from a refugee camp, distance from the
closest main road, and distance from the closest city with at least 200,000 inhabitants.
I also include province fixed effects, of which there are 81, to account for broad regional
differences. Standard errors are clustered at the province level, although inference is
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robust to spatial HAC (Conley, 1999), and wild-cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al.,
2008).
Of course, the share of refugees observed in a village may reflect sorting of refugees
based on proximity from the Syrian border, economic opportunities, or their pref-
erences for integration with Turks. To circumvent these challenges, I use several
strategies (section 1.5.3). First, I show that my results are unlikely to be driven by
unobservable characteristics of refugees and destination villages. Second, I use an
instrumental variable approach to argue that my results are unlikely to be driven by
sources of endogeneity related to the characteristics of the destination village. Third,
I argue that my results are unlikely to be explained by refugees having preferences
directly defined over the size of the refugee community in a village. Finally, I present
additional robustness checks.
1.5.2 Results
I first estimate Equation 1.1 by OLS, assuming that the function g(.) is linear. In
Table 1.1, I explore how the size of the refugee community in a village is associated
with the number of contacts of each type that refugees have. Unsurprisingly, there is
a significantly positive correlation between the size of the refugee community living
in a village and the number of calls refugees living in that village have with the local
population (column 1).
The conceptual framework suggested that the effect of an increase in the size of
the refugee community in a village on contacts with locals is ambiguous. While it
might reduce the probability that refugees interact with locals, refugee networks could
also help their members interacting with locals at a lower cost. The results presented
in columns 3 and 5 show that this second effect might dominate. Indeed, there is a
significantly positive correlation between the size of the refugee community in a village
and the number of calls refugees living in that village have with locals (column 3).
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Moreover, an increase in the size of the refugee community is also associated with
an increase in the share of their calls refugees have with locals (column 5). Indeed,
an increase of 1 percentage point in the share of the village population that are
refugees is associated with an increase of slightly more than 0.1% in the share of their
interactions that refugees have with locals.
As the reported results could be biased because of omitted variables, columns
2, 4, and 6 present how the size of the refugee community correlates with measures
of social integration when controlling for a vector of village characteristics and for
province fixed effects. When doing so, the estimated coefficients remain surprisingly
stable in both panels. Coupled with the large increase in the R2, the stability of
the estimators suggest that unobservables are unlikely to drive the results. This
diagnostic is confirmed by the fact that |δ| > 1 in all the specifications (Oster, 2019).
The baseline approaches clusters standard errors at the province level. However,
as shown in Table 1.11, inference is robust to the use of spatial clustering (Conley,
1999) or wild-cluster bootstrapping (Cameron et al., 2008).
The common view that ethnic enclaves have a negative effect on the integration
of immigrants could be driven by only a few enclaves with an especially high share
of immigrants. Ruling out that refugees living in ethnic enclaves are less integrated
than refugees living outside of enclaves would therefore require to show that the
relationship between share and integration is monotonically weakly increasing.
In order to capture potential nonlinearities in the relationship between share
and the type of interactions refugees have, I estimate a semiparametric version of
Equation 1.1 using the approach coming from Robinson (1988).
Figure 1·7 presents the non-parametric relationship between the share of the pop-
ulation that are refugees and the different measures of social integration, controlling
parametrically for the vector of control X. Three important observations can be made
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about these graphs. First, the number of contacts with both refugees and non-refugees
are monotonically increasing in the share of refugees. Even when focusing on villages
with very high shares of refugees, the associations between the share and the num-
ber of contacts of any type remain positive. Second, the relationships between the
share of refugees and the number of interactions that they have with both refugees
and non-refugees are both non-linear, with networks appearing to offer diminishing
marginal returns. Interestingly, this is especially true for the number of contacts with
non-refugees. Indeed, the positive correlation between the share of refugees and the
number of interactions with locals is driven by villages where less than 10% of the
population is refugee. Third, the relationship between the share of refugees in a vil-
lage and heterophily has an inverted-U shape, with a global maximum achieved when
share is around 30%.
These results are confirmed by a re-estimation of equation Equation 1.1, including
a quadratic term for the share of refugees. The results are presented in Table 1.2.
When I include a quadratic term for the share of refugees, share2 is negatively asso-
ciated with the number of contacts with other refugees (column 1), with non-refugees
(column 2), and with integration (column 3).25
The results presented so far show that refugees who live in localities hosting a
larger refugee population have more social interactions with both refugees and non-
refugees. Moreover, the share of all of their calls with non-refugees is also higher.
This is in line with networks of refugees helping their members to interact with
the local population, by providing informal training on local norms, or by creating
new opportunities to meet locals. Moreover, as shown by the non-linearities in the
correlations presented above, refugee networks appear to be more important for social
integration when the refugee population is small relative to natives.
25Villages in the lowest decile and quartile of the distribution of the share of refugees host respec-
tively 3.1 and 7.5 customers tagged as refugees in the dataset, while villages in the top decile and
the top quartile host an average of 736 and 454 customers tagged as refugees.
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1.5.3 Robustness checks
The interpretation of the OLS results presented in the previous section is difficult
for two main reasons. First, refugees could have preferences that are directly defined
over the share of refugees in destination villages. Researchers studying the effects of
ethnic enclaves are typically worried that immigrants who are unwilling or unable to
interact with locals (because of language barriers for example) would be more likely
to live in an enclave (Bauer et al., 2005). In my setting, such a problem would most
probably mean that refugees who live in an enclave face, on average, higher costs of
social integration, which would lead to a downward bias in my estimates. Second,
unobserved attributes of the destination villages could also bias my estimates. For
example, villages that are culturally closer to Syrian refugees will be more likely to
host a larger refugee community, and refugees will find it easier to make contacts with
the local population in such settings, which would lead to an upward bias in the OLS
estimates. Similarly, reverse causality could occur since refugees might be more likely
to stay in villages where integration is easier.
In this section, I first present an instrumental variable approach that is designed
to address the concern caused by the second source of endogeneity. I also provide
additional tests to argue that my results are unlikely to be explained by the first
source of endogeneity. I finally present additional robustness checks.
Instrumental variable approach
Papers studying the causal effects of immigration typically use resettlement programs
(Edin et al., 2003) or shift-share strategies (Card, 2001). Most of the papers studying
the effects of the Syrian crisis in Turkey have so far opted for this second approach in
order to identify causal effects, due to the lack of individual data on refugees and to
the lack of resettlement programs. The cross-sectional variations used in the literature
26
has typically been at the provincial or sub-regional level.
Since my main dataset doesn’t contain any personal characteristics other than
the refugee status and phone usage, and only presents data for 2017, I develop a
cross-sectional identification strategy that relies solely on the fine-grained geographic
component of my data. The basic intuition of my empirical strategy boils down to
the following observation: towns and villages that are along a road connecting Syria
to a given Turkish city should host more refugees than villages that are along a road
connecting that same Turkish city to another point of interest.
More formally, denote c(a) the closest large Turkish city (population greater than
200,000) from antenna a, and s(a) the closest Syrian city (among Aleppo, Raqqa,
Idleb, and Latakia) from a. I propose to instrument for the share of refugees around
antenna a by the detour needed to go from Syria to city c if a refugee wants to stop
by a. Denoting TDi,j the travel distance between i and j (obtained from Google’s
API), I define the detour for going from the Syrian city s(a) to the Turkish city c(a)





Then, Detoura = 1 if antenna a is on the way from Syria to the closest city, and
Detoura > 1 if the antenna is not on the way.
As specified above, we could be worried that the detour instrument mixes up
different kinds of variations. Indeed, a village could be associated with a high detour
value either because it is located in a remote area, or because it is along an important
road that doesn’t go in the direction of Syria. While the latter is not problematic
to the extent that villages with a low detour value are also likely to be along an
important road, the former is more problematic since this might lead my instrument to
be systematically correlated with remoteness and economic development. I therefore
systematically control for the distance from a village to the closest main road. For the
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same reason, I also control for the distance to the closest main Turkish city. Given
that the source of variation of the instrument is at the city level, I cluster the standard
errors at the the city level as well.26
The approach is illustrated in Figure 1·8 for the region of Kahramanmaras, a
large urban center in the South-East of Turkey. The first subfigure represents the
detour value for each village and neighbourhood. Villages that are along a main
road connecting the city of Kahramanmaras to Syria are assigned to a small detour
value compared to other villages. This subfigure makes it immediately apparent that
villages that are either along a main road or that are relatively close to the city
center are systematically assigned to a smaller detour value. For this reason, all the
specifications control for these two variables, so that the comparison of interest is
between two villages in the region of Kahramanmaras that are equidistant from the
city center, but also from a main road. The second subfigure represents the share
of the population in each village and neighbourhood that is refugee. The mobile
phone data suggests important refugee presence within the city center, but also along
the main roads connecting the city of Kahramanmaras to Syria. However, villages
that are not directly on the way from Kahramanmaras to Syria appear to host fewer
refugees. Note that this is the case even for villages that are along the main road
spanning North from Kahramanmaras, so that this assessment is not only coming
from remoteness.
The exclusion restriction therefore states that given the vector of controls X (which
crucially includes city fixed effects, the distance from a village to the nearest city, and
to the nearest road), the detour variable should only affect the different types of
contacts through its effect on the share of refugees living in a village. To support
this claim, I show in Table 1.10 that the detour variable is uncorrelated with some
predetermined outcomes that proxy for economic development and social distance
26See Table 1.11 for alternative inference procedures.
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between the local population and the refugee population, such as night-lights intensity
in 2010, population in 2010, or the vote share obtained by different political parties
at the 2011 elections. Note that my instrument does not generate variations across
large cities, but only across villages and small cities in the same region.
Because my instrument is defined at the village level, violation of the exclusion
restriction could still occur because of self-selection. To the extent that refugees
could have preferences defined directly over the share of refugees living in the same
village as them, and that my instrument is correlated with the share of refugees,
it is impossible for me to exclude with certainty the possibility that my instrument
violates the exclusion restriction. This issue is addressed in section 1.5.3.27
Table 1.3 shows that detour is a strong predictor of the size of the refugee com-
munity living in a village. Indeed, as we can see in column 1, villages that are on
a path that would double the travel time needed to go from the nearest large city
to Syria have, on average, a refugee share that is around 7 percentage points lower
than villages that are on the way from the nearest city to Syria. Reassuringly, this
coefficient remains stable when controlling for additional village level characteristics,
including the distance to the closest main road and to the closest main city (column
2). In Table 1.4, we can also see that the detour variable is negatively correlated
with the number of calls refugees have with other refugees (columns 1 and 2), non-
refugees (columns 3 and 4), and with the share of all of their calls they have with
locals (columns 5 and 6).
Table 1.5 documents the effect of refugee network on various forms of social in-
tegration, when the share of a village population that is refugee is instrumented by
detour. As the F-statistic associated with the first stage is around 17, the table also
reports the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin test for robust inference on the coefficient
27I later check whether my results are robust to slight violations of the exclusion restrictions
(Conley et al., 2012; Clarke and Matta, 2018).
29
of the endogenous variable in presence of a weak instrument (Finlay and Magnusson,
2009).
The IV estimates confirm the OLS results. Indeed, while column 2 documents a
noisy but positive effect of the size of refugee community on the number of interactions
with other refugees remains positive, column 4 documents a significantly positive
effect of refugee network on the number of interactions with non-refugees. Finally,
column 6 also confirms the OLS findings by documenting a (non-significant) positive
effect of refugee network on heterophily. While the OLS and IV estimates are not
statistically different in columns 2 and 6, the IV estimate for the effect of share on
the number of interactions with locals is significantly different from the OLS estimate.
Note that we could expect detour to generate more variations along the border.
Indeed, refugees who decide to leave the border region might be more likely to actually
reach their destination instead of ”stopping” on the way. In Figure 1·9, I investigate
this by excluding one by one the deciles that are the farthest from Syria. As we
can see in the first sub-graph, the coefficient of the first stage tends to increase as I
drop villages that are far away from the border, which confirms the intuition that the
instrument works better along the border. In the rest of the chapter, I keep the whole
sample for my baseline results, although all of my results are robust to the exclusion
of villages that are further away from the border.
Self-selection
The geographically disaggregated dimension of the analysis comes at the cost of strong
assumptions regarding the selection process of refugees. Indeed, while I allow refugees
to move freely across neighbourhoods of a same village, I am assuming that they
do not move across different villages. However, the selection patterns of refugees
could be correlated with the size of the refugee community living in a village. For
example, an increase in the number of refugees living in a village could lead to an
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increase in housing prices. This could in turn lead refugees who are less wealthy
to leave such villages, and to move out to areas with fewer refugees, where housing
is more affordable. This kind of selective migration could explain my main results
since wealthier refugees have more resources to have calls with both refugees and
non-refugees. On the contrary, we could also think that tenured refugees might be
more likely to eventually leave ethnic enclaves as they become less reliant on refugee
networks to find employment opportunities. This would lead more integrated refugees
to leave enclaves, leading to a downward bias in both the OLS and IV estimates.
Nevertheless, the bias induced by selective migration should be weaker when using
a more aggregated unit of analysis, such as districts. The assumption on the migration
process would become substantially weaker, as refugees sorting across villages within
a same district would now be allowed. In Panel A of Table 1.13, I show that the
correlation between the size of the refugee community and social integration is robust
to the use of different geographic units. In columns 1 to 3, I present the baseline
estimate, where the level of aggregation is the village. In columns 4 to 6, I aggregate
data at the 0.1 degree by 0.1 degree grid cell level.28 Finally, in columns 7 to 9,
I aggregate data at the district level. As we can see, the correlation between the
dependant variables and the size of the refugee community remains stable across
these different specifications. In Panel B, I show that these results are also true when
using the IV strategy described above.
The stability of the coefficients across the specifications suggests that my results
are unlikely to be driven by refugees who have difficulties to interact with locals to
self-select into villages and towns that host a relatively small number of refugees.
28In Turkey, this is approximatively equivalent to a 7 by 10 kilometers grid cell.
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Additional robustness tests
Number vs share of refugees. Theoretically, the number of refugees living in a locality
might be as important as the share of the population that is refugee in explaining
the social integration patterns of refugees.29 Table 1.14 shows that the main results
of the chapter hold when using the hyperbolic sine transformation of the number
of refugees in a village as the main explanatory variable of interest instead of the
share of refugees. Indeed, an increase of 1 percent in the number of refugees living
in a village approximately leads to an increase of 0.14% and 0.33% in the number of
contacts with other refugees and with non-refugees, respectively, and to an increase
of 0.2% in the share of contacts refugees have with locals.
Alternative controls. Table 1.15 shows that the main results are robust to the
inclusion of additional controls. First, column 2 shows that both the OLS and IV
results are robust to the inclusion of a polynomial of population and of population
density as controls. Second, the IV strategy crucially depends on correctly controlling
for the distance from a village to the closest road and city. In columns 3 and 4, I
show that the results hold when controlling for polynomials of distance to the closest
main road and to the closest main city, respectively. In columns 4 to 6, I interact
each of these additional sets of controls with the city fixed effects, therefore allowing
population, and distance to the closest road or city, to affect even more flexibly my
results. Again, both the OLS and the IV results are robust to the use of these
alternative specifications.
Distance from road and city. This paragraph provides additional evidence that the
remoteness of a village is unlikely to affect my results through another channel than
the detour variable. Figure 1·14 presents the first stage, reduced form, IV, and OLS
29While most theories of friendship formation take the share of co-ethnics as the reference variable
(for example, Currarini et al. (2009)), others use the absolute number of co-ethnics instead (Currarini
et al., 2016).
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results obtained when excluding, decile by decile, the villages that are the farthest
from a main road. The column on the extreme right represents the results when
using the full sample, while the first column represents the results obtained when
only using villages that are close to a main road. As we can see, results remain stable
as I drop villages that are far away from a main road, although they also become
noisier. Similarly, Figure 1·15 presents the results obtained when excluding, decile by
decile, the villages that are the closest from a main city. Again, the results remain
stable as I only keep villages that are far away from a major city.
Alternative samples. One might be worried that some types of interactions could
be less likely than others to convey a credible signal about integration. For example,
outgoing calls could be more likely than incoming texts to represent a desired attempt
to create a link with someone. In Table 1.19, I show that my results remain unchanged
when considering only incoming calls, outgoing calls, incoming texts, and outgoing
texts.
1.6 Mechanisms: Refugee networks and the cost of interact-
ing with locals
In the previous sections, I documented a positive correlation between the size of
the refugee community living in a village and the social integration of its members.
Moreover, I claimed that this correlation is likely to be causal. In this section, I argue
that my results are consistent with refugee networks decreasing the cost of interacting
with locals, by providing information on local norms, or by creating new opportunities
to meet locals in safe environments.
To support this hypothesis, I provide several pieces of evidence. First, if refugee
networks share experiences and information, we should expect their benefits to be
especially large in villages where search costs are higher. Indeed, in villages where
33
refugees who want to connect with the local population do not face any search costs
(because of low cultural distance for example30), a larger co-refugee network should
be less helpful for having intergroup contacts. Second, I show that as the size of the
refugee community increases, the dissimilarity of refugees’ and locals’ social networks
become more similar. Third, if the members of a same network make their decisions
based on information shared by a few refugees who act like intermediaries, we should
expect the members of a same network to interact with the same set of locals as the
intermediary refugee does.
1.6.1 Cultural distance
The conceptual framework suggested that refugee networks should be more likely to
have a net positive impact on social integration in villages that are characterized by
a wider cultural gap between the refugee and local communities.
To test this prediction, I use the number of mobile phone communications during
the Friday prayer to obtain village level measures of religiosity for both the local
population and the refugee population. I then construct an index of cultural distance
based on the difference between measured religiosity of the two groups and estimate
the equations
yv = α + β1sharev + β2sharev × distancev + β3distancev + X
′
vγ + εv (1.2)
and




where distancev is the measure of cultural distance between the refugee and the local
30This is in line with the finding that political discontent in response of European immigration to
US cities between 1910 and 1930 tended to be increasing in the cultural distance between natives
and immigrants (Tabellini, 2020).
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population, and κi indexes the upper bounds of quintiles of distance across villages.
I expect β1 > 0 and β2 > 0.
Measuring cultural distance
The first dataset of the D4R Challenge provides aggregate data at the antenna level
about the total number of calls from customers in the dataset. In particular, it
provides the number of calls that involved no refugees, and the number of calls that
involved at least one refugee31. As shown in Bozcaga et al. (2019), the call volume
decreases significantly for both the refugee and the non-refugee populations during
the Friday prayer (see Figure 1·16). It is therefore possible to infer local religiosity
by comparing the volume of calls during the Friday prayer (from 12PM to 2PM)
to the volume of calls during non-prayer hours32. For each village and community
(non-refugees and refugees), I compute a difference-in-means estimate of religiosity
by taking the difference between the average number of calls occurring in village v for
group g on Thursdays between 12PM and 2PM (nThursdayv,g ), and the average number of
calls occurring in village v on Fridays between 12PM and 2PM (nFridayv,g ). I normalize










31I use the first dataset instead of the second dataset in order to have more observations. Indeed,
while the second dataset presents detailed information for a different sub-sample of customers every
two weeks, the first dataset presents aggregated information at the antenna level for all of the
customers in the database.
32My results are robust to the use of a difference-in-difference estimate of religiosity instead,
where the first difference is day ∈ {Friday,NotFriday}, and the second difference is hour ∈
{Noon,NotNoon} where Noon corresponds to call happening between 12PM and 2PM, and
NotNoon corresponds to call happening from 11AM to 12PM and from 2PM to 3PM. Hence,
religiosityv,g =
(nNotFriday,NotNoonv,g − nNotFriday,Noonv,g )− (nFriday,NotNoonv,g − nFriday,Noonv,g )
nNotFriday,NotNoonv,g
where nday,hourv,g is the average number of calls in village v for group g during the year at a specific
time period.
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I finally compute a measure of cultural distance, which is equal to the absolute
distance between the observed religiosity level of refugees and non-refugees in village
v:
CulturalDistancev =| religiosityv,ref − religiosityv,nonref |
Results
In Table 1.6, I show that the coefficient for the interaction term between share and
religious distance is not significantly different from zero when I look at the number
of interactions with other refugees as the outcome (column 1). Similarly, the effect
of share is not significantly different for the 25% of the villages where the cultural
distance between refugees and the local population is the highest (column 2). How-
ever, when I turn to the effect on the number of bridging contacts, I find that the
interaction between share and religious distance is significantly positive (column 3).
This finding is confirmed in column 4, where I use the interaction between share and
the top quartile for religious distance. All in all, I find that the positive effect of the
size of co-refugee network on social integration tends to be higher in villages where
the religious distance between refugees and the local population is higher. When us-
ing the diff-in-diff definition of religious distance, I obtain qualitatively similar results
(see Table 1.16).33
To get a better insight of how cultural distance affects the relationship between
the size of a refugee community and the social integration of their members, I estimate
33In Table 1.17, I investigate whether the positive association between share and social integration
is stronger in villages where ethnic distance between refugees and locals is larger. Both the South-
East of Turkey and the North of Syria host an important Kurdish population. Given the long history
of interactions between Turks and Syrians, and to the extent that Syrian members of these minority
groups might be more likely to seek refuge in Turkish villages where members of their community
are more numerous, I expect to observe a smaller cultural distance between refugees and natives in
such villages. Since there is no recent and fine-grained official data about the ethnic composition
of Turkey at the village level, I use the vote share obtained by candidates who are not affiliated to
ethnic-based parties as a proxy for ethnic distance. Consistent with the results obtained for religious
distance, I find that the positive effect of share on social integration is weaker in villages where the
cultural distance between refugees and the local population is smaller (columns 5 and 6).
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separately for villages characterized by a low and high cultural gap the effect of refugee
networks on social integration using the semiparametric method due to Robinson
(1988). A village is considered to be characterized by a low (high) cultural gap
between refugees and locals if the village is in the bottom (top) two quintiles of the
distribution of religious distance. The results are presented in Figure 1·10.
As we can see in subfigure (e), in villages that are characterised by a small religious
gap between refugees and locals, the positive effects of refugee networks on heterophily
seem to be relatively small, and become negligible in villages where the share of
refugees is higher than 20 %. On the contrary, as shown in subfigure (f), the positive
effects of refugee networks on heterophily appear to be much larger, and to fade out
only in villages where the share of refugees is higher than 60 %.
1.6.2 Which locals do refugees have contacts with?
Dissimilarity of refugee and native social networks
As refugees start interacting more with locals, do the social networks of these two
communities start looking more alike?
The first dataset of the D4R Challenge provides aggregate data on the hourly
volume of calls between any two pairs of antennas that involve at least one refugee,
and the hourly volume of calls that do not involve any refugee.
For each pair of village v and antenna i, I define tv,i as the total number of calls
in 2017 from village v to antenna i, and pv,i the proportion of the calls from village v
to antenna i that involved at least one refugee. Similarly, let Tv be the total number
of calls from village v, and Pv the proportion of these Tv calls that involve at least
one refugee. Following Massey and Denton (1988), I define two measures of network





i=1(ti | pi − P |)
2TP (1− P )
which can be interpreted as the proportion of refugee calls that should be moved to
another antenna to achieve the exact same geographic distribution of calls from both





j=1[titj | (pi − pj) |]
2T 2P (1− P )
,
which represents the area under the Lorenz curve plotting the cumulative proportion
of the refugee calls against the cumulative proportion of the non-refugee calls across
antennas.
I investigate how share influences the dissimilarity between refugees’ and locals’
networks in Table 1.9. In column 1, we can see that there is a significantly negative
correlation between the size of the refugee community and the geographic dissimi-
larity between the social networks of refugees and locals. This result is confirmed in
column 3, where the Gini index is used as an outcome instead of the dissimilarity
index. While this result could indeed be indicative of greater social assimilation of
refugees, it could also be an artefact of less residential segregation between refugees
and locals. However, I show in columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.18 that there is no signifi-
cant correlation between the size of the refugee community and residential segregation
within districts (as measured by the dissimilarity index and the Gini index).
In columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.9, I also confirm that the effect of refugee community
on the geographic dissimilarity of refugees? and locals? social networks are likely
causal. Moreover, I confirm in Table 1.18 that this last result is unlikely to be driven
by changes in residential segregation levels.
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Communications of non-refugees
If refugees of a same network share information together, and most refugees rely on
information passed on by a few central refugees, we should expect them to interact
with the same set of locals. I confirm this intuition by showing that when the size
of the refugee community increases, only a small minority of locals start having sig-
nificantly more interactions with refugees. In Table 1.20, we can see that share is
positively correlated with the number of contacts that locals have with non-refugees
(columns 1-3). Moreover, share is also positively associated with their number of con-
tacts with refugees (columns 4-6). This could mean that refugees self-select in areas
with better economic prospects (more calls in richer villages), or that refugees lead
to more economic activity. Again, the coefficient is much smaller than the baseline
coefficient.
However, these results hide substantial disparities. In Table 1.22, I use the upper
bound of the 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles of the distribution of calls of the local
population in each village with refugees (columns 1-3) and non-refugees (columns 4-
6). We can see that while the positive correlation between share and contacts with
non-refugees impacts the whole local population in a similar way (columns 4-6), the
increase in the number of contacts with refugees is mostly driven by a few locals who
have a high number of bridging interactions (columns 1-3).
Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 1.20 and Table 1.22 should be inter-
preted with caution since IV estimates are too noisy to be able to reach a definitive




1.7.1 Social integration and employment
The empirical literature in economics on the effects of enclaves on labour market
outcomes of immigrants has shown that a larger co-ethnic network can be beneficial
to immigrants by providing a greater access to information about job opportunities,
and by providing access to insurance networks. If refugees who have access to a larger
co-refugee network are more likely to be employed, this could influence my results in
two ways. First, being employed could also lead to an increase in the number of
professional interactions that refugees have. Second, being employed might lead to
a positive income shock, which would allow refugees to have more mobile phone
communications with both refugees and non-refugees.
In Table 1.7, I show that co-refugee network size is unlikely to affect social integra-
tion through formal employment. First, refugees having access to a larger co-refugee
network could be more likely to be employed, and to have more professional contacts
with locals. In columns 1 and 2, I show that there is no significant difference in the
correlation between the share of refugees and the number of calls to non-refugees
when I focus on calls happening during home-time hours (between 6pm and 8am
during week-days, or at any time during the weekend) and work-time hours (between
8am and 6pm during week-days). The same is true when looking at the number of
calls to other refugees (columns 3 and 4). If my results were mostly driven by profes-
sional contacts, we should expect the correlation to be stronger for calls made during
work-time hours.34
34More generally, the correlation between the share of refugees living in a village and the number
of interactions that refugees have with non-refugees and other refugees is stable across the different
days of the week. Within a same day, although these correlations tend to be weaker during the night,
they tend to be stable the rest of the time (Figure 1·17 and Figure 1·18). This suggests that the
relationship between the share of refugees and social integration is unlikely to be driven by specific
events that occur on a regular basis.
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Second, I do not find a positive correlation between the share of refugees and
formal employment, as proxied by whether the home-time anchor-point is different
from the work-time anchor-point. Actually, I find a significantly negative association
between these two variables (column 5). In Table 1.8, I instrument for share by
detour, and I find that the share of refugees has a non-significant positive effect on
the probability for refugees to have different work-time and home-time anchor points.
Taken together, these results suggest that the main findings of this chapter are
unlikely to be explained by networks of refugees increasing the probability of their
members to be employed.
1.7.2 Social integration and the reaction of locals
An increase in the size of the refugee community might decrease the cost of interacting
with locals because of a reaction of locals (or a reaction of local institutions). Indeed,
a larger refugee presence in a locality could influence the social integration of refugees
by changing access to public goods for refugees, by influencing the view of locals
toward refugees, or by modifying the incentives of local governments.
Local government can provide direct help to refugees. A lot of heterogeneity
exists across Turkish municipalities in their efforts to provide support to refugees
(Betts et al., 2017; Erdoğan, 2017b). It could be the case that an increase in the
size of the refugee community in a locality could influence the social integration of
their members by affecting their access to public resources. On the one hand, local
government could have more incentives to increase spending in programs and policies
aimed at helping refugees as their number increases. On the other hand, an increase
in the size of the refugee community could lead to local public goods, such as schools
or hospitals, to become overcrowded. Although no definitive conclusion has been
reached on this matter, existing research suggests that Syrian refugees who live in
localities that host a large number of other refugees have less access to local public
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goods (Bozcaga et al., 2019).
In particular, refugees living in localities with a higher share of refugees could
spend more time calling aid providers or municipal help services. However, my results
suggest that this is unlikely to happen. As shown in Table 1.22, larger refugee presence
in a locality not only leads the top percentile of locals in terms of calls to refugees to
have more interactions with refugees. It also leads the top decile of the distribution
of locals to interact more with refugees. As it is unrealistic that 10% of the phone
numbers from locals appearing in my dataset are used by municipal agents or NGO
workers to interact with refugees, I interpret these results as evidence that my results
are not solely driven by refugees interacting more with local institutions and aid
agencies.
The presence of a higher number of refugees in a locality could also have important
effects on the attitudes of locals toward them. For example, while refugee presence
didn’t lead to any significant effect on electoral outcomes in Turkey (Fisunoğlu and
Sert, 2019), it lead to more polarization (Altındağ and Kaushal, 2020).35 Recent re-
search has also shown that more refugee presence could positively affect the attitudes
of locals toward refugees, in line with what is suggested by the contact theory (All-
port, 1954).36 Such mechanisms could also lead to a decrease in the cost of interaction
with locals, and could therefore also play a role in explaining my results.
35In other countries, the 2015 refugee crisis has led to an increase in support for the extreme right in
Greece (Vasilakis, 2018; Dinas et al., 2019), while opposite effects have been found in France (Vertier
et al., 2019) and Austria (Steinmayr, 2020). Other studies have looked at the effects of immigration
on support for the extreme right in alternative settings (Dustmann et al., 2019; Calderón et al.,
2019).
36In the recent years, several papers have provided both experimental and non-experimental ev-
idence to support this hypothesis (Paluck et al., 2019; Lowe, 2019; Bazzi et al., 2019; Rao, 2019;
Dustmann et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2020; Mousa, 2020; Albrecht et al., 2020).
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1.7.3 Substitutability between different means of communication
Some other papers using mobile phone data observe internet connections in addition
to calls and texts (for example, see Kreindler and Miyauchi (2020)). However, in this
chapter, only refugees who use their phone to send or receive a call or a text message
appear in the dataset. Therefore, communications made on free applications, such as
WhatsApp or Messenger, are not observed. This could lead to potential biases in my
analysis if the choice of refugees to use free applications instead of calling or texting
is systematically correlated with the size of the refugee community living in a village.
In order for the substitutability of different calling and texting services to ex-
plain my baseline results, I would need free applications to be less popular in areas
with more refugees, where most of the communications would therefore happen by
call/text. However, it seems more likely for the opposite to be true. For example,
refugees living in an enclave might find it relatively cheaper to use WhatsApp because
it is easier for them to share an internet connection. In this case, refugees living in en-
claves would have fewer calls with other refugees and non-refugees, not because they
interact less with them, but because the D4R datasets do not allow me to observe
these interactions. This scenario would lead to a downward bias in my estimates for
the number of interactions with refugees and locals, while it is unclear how it would
bias the results on heterophily.
1.8 Conclusion
How the size of co-ethnic networks affect the ability of their members to interact with
locals is theoretically ambiguous. While it might have a negative effect by decreasing
the probability of meeting locals, co-ethnic networks could also provide invaluable
help to their members by providing informal training on local norms, or by creating
opportunities to interact with locals in a safe environment. This chapter provides
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evidence that the net effect of refugee networks on refugees’ social integration can
be positive. Indeed, Syrian refugees who live in a Turkish locality hosting a large
number of refugees make significantly more phone calls to locals compared to other
Syrian refugees in the country.
Co-refugee network size exhibits diminishing marginal returns. That is, the pos-
itive effects associated with larger networks are concentrated in localities with a rel-
atively low share of refugees. In terms of policy implications, these results suggest
that countries hosting refugees should make sure that they are not physically isolated
from individuals with a similar background. Indeed, excessive efforts at dispersing
refugees across different geographic regions might be counter-productive, by making
it more difficult for refugees to interact with locals.
Several questions remain open and call for future research. First, why do co-ethnic
networks help their members to contact locals in the context of Syrian refugees in
Turkey, while previous papers studying similar questions in historical settings (Danzer
and Yaman, 2013) or in U.S. high schools (Currarini et al., 2009) have found an oppo-
site effect? One possibility is that the aforementioned research focus on environments
where the matching technology might be very different from the one used by refugees
in Turkey. Another possibility is that the types of links I observe in this study might
reveal other aspects of the social life of individuals, which might not be fully captured
by studies focusing on the self-reported number of local friends. Finally, cultural dis-
tance between the different communities studied in the aforementioned papers might
be lower than in the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Second, what specific
mechanisms drive the results presented in this chapter? While I presented suggestive
evidence in line with refugee networks decreasing the cost of interacting with locals,
my results could be partly explained by responses from the local population, or from
local institutions. While important advances have been made in this direction re-
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cently, being able to study in a unified setting how the presence of a larger co-ethnic
network could influence the actions and attitudes of both locals and natives would
be very useful. Third, it remains unclear what are the downstream consequences
of refugees’ social integration on local economic development. This question is the






































Figure 1·1: Number of Syrian Refugees in Turkey
Sources: UNHCR (2020).
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Figure 1·2: Number of Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Provin-
cial Breakdown (2017)
Notes: This map represents the number of Syrian refugees registered in each Turkish
province in 2017, expressed as a share of the 2010 population. Sources: DGMM (2017).
Figure 1·3: Geographic distribution of cell towers
Notes: Each dot represents a cell tower.
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Figure 1·4: Geographic distribution of refugees
Notes: This figure represents the geographic distribution of Syrian refugees in Turkey at
the village level. The share of refugees in a locality is the estimated refugee population













Figure 1·5: Geographic distribution of refugees and main
roads in the South-East
Notes: This figure represents the geographic distribution of Syrian refugees in the South-























Figure 1·6: Histogram of refugees’ share
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Figure 1·7: Semiparametric OLS (Robinson, 1988)
Notes: These figures report semiparametric estimates for the relationship between the
share of refugees and the number of contacts that refugees have with (a) other refugees,
(b) non-refugees, and (c) heterophily. The shaded lines represent the 95 % confidence

























(b) share of refugees
Figure 1·8: Illustration of the IV approach - Region of
Kahramanmaras
Notes: Each dot represents a village, which closest city with a population of at least 200,000
habitants is Kahramanmaras. Subgraph (a) represents the detour of each village, while
subgraph (b) represents the share of refugees in each village. The green lines represent the
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Figure 1·9: Baseline results, considering the n closest
deciles to Syria
Notes: These graphs represent the baseline results when considering only observations that are
among the n closest deciles to Syria. That is, the coefficient on the extreme right of each sub-
graph is obtained by using the full sample, while the coefficient on the extreme left of each sub-
graph is obtained by dropping all observations that are not along the Syrian border. Vertical
bars correspond to the 95% intervals. The dependent variables and the explanatory variables of
interest are, respectively, share and detour (panel A), IHS callsnon−ref ) and detour (panel B),
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Figure 1·10: Semiparametric estimation, by religious dis-
tance
Notes: These figures report semiparametric estimation for the relationship between the
share of refugees and the number of contacts that refugees have with (a) other refugees,
(b) non-refugees, and (c) heterophily. The method is due to Robinson (1988). More
details about the estimation method are given in Figure 1·7. In subfigures a, c, and e,
only villages in the bottom two quintiles of the distribution of religious distance are in the
sample. In subfigures b, d, and f, only villages in the top two quintiles of the distribution
of religious distance are in the sample. The shaded lines represent the 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Size of refugee community and social integra-
tion, OLS
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref heterophily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
share 1.644*** 1.368*** 2.412*** 1.989*** 0.130*** 0.111***
(0.121) (0.111) (0.200) (0.238) (0.0235) (0.0256)
Observations 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054
R-squared 0.063 0.206 0.056 0.259 0.005 0.078
Mean dep. var. 0.609 0.609 2.767 2.767 0.589 0.589
δ (Oster, 2019) 11.46 12.28 182.4
Village controls X X X
Province FE X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of regressions exploring the relationship between the
size of the refugee community in a village and the given column’s dependent variable. The
size of the refugee community is measured by the share of the population that is refugee. In
columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4), the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the average
number of calls refugees living in a village had with other refugees (non-refugees). In columns
5 and 6, the dependent variable is defined as the average share of their calls refugees living in
a village have with non-refugees. Village controls include latitude, longitude, the proportion of
antennas in the village of a given type (urban, sub-urban, rural, industrial, university, seasonal),
land use in 2006, 2010 population, 2010 night lights, a dummy indicating whether 2010 night
lights intensity is top-coded, distance to the nearest major Turkish city, distance to the nearest
primary road, a dummy taking a value of 1 if the village is near a refugee camp, and a dummy
taking a value of 1 if the village is along the Syrian border. Standard errors are clustered at
the province level.
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Table 1.2: Non-linear correlation between share of
refugees and social integration, OLS
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref heterophily
(1) (2) (3)
share 3.089*** 5.907*** 0.365***
(0.240) (0.557) (0.0620)
share2 -2.865*** -6.524*** -0.424***
(0.331) (0.774) (0.0771)
Observations 6,054 6,054 6,054
R-squared 0.219 0.286 0.082
Mean dep. var. 0.609 2.767 0.589
Village controls X X X
Province FE X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports estimates of regressions exploring the non-linearities between the
share of refugees in a village and the given column’s dependent variable. The specifications are
the same as in Table 1.1, except for the inclusion of share2 in the list of regressors. All the
regressions include village controls and province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the province level.
Table 1.3: First stage - Detour predicts the size of refugee
community
(1) (2)





Mean dep. var. 0.062 0.062
City FE X X
Village controls X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the correlation between the detour measure
and the share of refugees. The detour measure is the travel distance between Syria and
the closest large city to village v, (via village v), divided by the travel distance between
Syria and the closest large city to village v (shortest path). All the regressions include
city fixed effects and controls for the distance to the closest city and to the closest road.
The specification presented in column 2 includes village controls. Standard errors are
clustered at the city level.
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Table 1.4: Reduced form - Correlation between detour
and measures of social integration
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref heterophily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
detour -0.170 -0.202 -0.408** -0.442*** -0.0153 -0.0296
(0.158) (0.135) (0.194) (0.148) (0.0292) (0.0334)
Observations 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054
R-squared 0.085 0.154 0.097 0.213 0.035 0.057
Mean 0.609 0.609 2.767 2.767 0.589 0.589
City FE X X X X X X
Village controls X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the reduced form estimates for the correlation between the
detour measure and the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of interactions with other
refugees (columns 1 and 2) and non-refugees (columns 3 and 4), and the share of all their
calls refugees have with locals (columns 5 and 6). All the regressions include city fixed
effects, as well as controls for the distance between a village and the closest city as well as
the closest road. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
Table 1.5: Effect of share on integration, IV
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref heterophily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
share 1.380*** 2.794* 1.998*** 6.102*** 0.107*** 0.409
(0.0862) (1.186) (0.189) (1.955) (0.0194) (0.334)
Observations 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054
Mean 0.609 0.609 2.767 2.767 0.589 0.589
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 17.86 17.86 17.86
H0: β = 0, AR p-val 0.181 0.005 0.353
Test of endogeneity, p-val 0.441 0.041 0.500
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I report the OLS and IV estimates for the effect of share on different measures
of social integration, where the instrument for the endogenous variable is detour. I also report the
p-value of the Anderson-Rubin test for robust inference on the coefficient of the endogenous variable
in presence of a weak instrument (Finlay and Magnusson, 2009).
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Table 1.6: Size of network and contacts, with varying cost
of bridging contacts (religion)
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref heterophily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
share 1.151*** 1.172*** 1.118*** 1.500*** 0.0412* 0.0702***
(0.120) (0.105) (0.177) (0.178) (0.0221) (0.0201)
share × religious distance -0.0432 3.568*** 0.273**
(0.453) (0.872) (0.127)
share × religious distance (4th quartile) 0.104 2.837*** 0.221*
(0.376) (0.834) (0.119)
religious distance -0.104*** -0.352*** -0.0202*
(0.0230) (0.0477) (0.0120)
religious distance (4th quartile) -0.0866*** -0.306*** -0.0246*
(0.0289) (0.0544) (0.0126)
Observations 5,191 5,498 5,191 5,498 5,191 5,498
R-squared 0.192 0.197 0.244 0.255 0.079 0.077
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I interact share with a measure of religious distance. The specification
used is the same as in the previous table, except that I control for religious distance (columns
1, 3, and 5), and for a dummy taking a value of 1 for the top quartile of religious distance
(columns 2, 4, and 6). Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
Table 1.7: The correlations don’t seem to be driven by
formal employment
Dep. Var. IHS calls to non-ref IHS calls to ref heterophily
home work home work home work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - OLS
share 0.733*** 0.622*** 1.485*** 1.438*** 0.0918*** 0.129***
(0.0606) (0.0615) (0.175) (0.170) (0.0259) (0.0254)
R-squared 0.175 0.159 0.244 0.258 0.072 0.086
Panel B - IV
share 1.184 1.891** 4.395** 4.983*** 0.358 0.447
(0.895) (0.874) (1.878) (1.648) (0.473) (0.515)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 17.86 17.86 17.86 17.86 16.66 15.35
Observations 6,054 6,054 6,054 6,054 5,851 5,796
Mean 0.327 0.276 1.791 1.581 0.613 0.589
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In columns 2, 4, and 6, I only consider communications occurring from Monday to
Friday, 8am to 6pm. In columns 1, 3, and 5, I consider all of the communications occurring at
another time of the week. All the regressions include village controls and province fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
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Table 1.8: Share of refugees and labour market outcomes
of refugees








*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the home-time anchor-point is
the same as the work-time anchor-point. The home-time anchor-point is defined as the village
where most of the calls of a refugee happened during work-time hours (Monday to Friday,
8am-6pm). The home-time anchor-point is defined similarly for home-time hours (weekends,
and weekdays after 6pm and before 8am).
Table 1.9: Dissimilarity between the social networks of
refugees and natives
Dep. Var. Dissimilarity index Gini index
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
share -0.294*** -1.175** -0.249*** -0.976**
(0.041) (0.519) (0.038) (0.404)
Observations 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575
Mean 0.776 0.776 0.882 0.882
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 10.49 10.49
H0 : β = 0, AR p-val 0.023 0.015
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports OLS and IV estimates for the relationship between share and the dis-
similarity the social networks of refugees and natives. The outcome variable is the dissimilarity
index (columns 1 and 2) and the Gini index (columns 3 and 4). The dissimilarity index and the
Gini index are computed using the number of calls originating from refugees and non-refugees
in a same village to the different cell towers in the country. Villages with less than five calls
from either refugees or non-refugees are excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 1·11: Share of refugees by province, estimates from
official and mobile phone data
Notes: Official data were obtained from DGMM and provide the total number of refugees registered
in a province in 2017. This number is divided by the sum of the population of a province by 2010 and
the refugee population. Estimates from mobile phone data are obtained by estimating the number
of refugees living in each province (I assume a refugee lives in province p if the majority of his calls
were treated by a cell tower in province p), and dividing it by the sum of the province population
in 2010 and the refugee population. The following provinces are categorised as being part of the
South-East: Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kahramanmaras, Kilis, Mardin, Osmaniye, Sanliurfa, and
Sirnak.
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Figure 1·12: Calling activity of non-refugees and refugees
in the region of Istanbul
Notes: These maps represent the total number of calls from non-refugees (left) and refugees
(right) by cell tower in Istanbul. Compared to calls from non-refugees, calls from refugees
























































Figure 1·13: Calling activity around refugee camps
Notes: These maps represent the calling activity of non-refugees (above) and refugees
(below) in the provinces of Kilis, Gaziantep, and Sanliurfa.
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Figure 1·14: Baseline results, considering the n closest
deciles to a main road
Notes: These graphs represent the baseline results when considering only observations that
are among the n closest deciles to a main road. The estimate for the first decile in panel C
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Figure 1·15: Baseline results, considering the n farthest
deciles to a major city
Notes: These graphs represent the baseline results when considering only observations









































Figure 1·16: Average number of calls per hour, Thursday
vs Friday
Notes: In this figure, I replicate Figure 12.3 from Bozcaga et al. (2019). Using the first
dataset from the D4R Challenge, I plot the average number of calls by hour and community
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Figure 1·17: Correlation between share of refugees and z-
score for the number of contacts with non-refugees, by day
and hour
Notes: This figure represents the OLS estimates for the correlation between the share of
refugees living in a village, and the z-score of the average number of interactions refugees
living in that village have with non-refugees. The set of controls included is the same as
in Table 1 (columns 3, 6, and 9). A separate regression is estimated for each day and
hour of the week. 95% confidence intervals are presented in grey or red, depending on the

















































































































































































































































Figure 1·18: Correlation between share of refugees and z-
score for the number of contacts with refugees, by day and
hour
Notes: This figure represents the results from replicating Figure 1·17, using as an outcome
variable the z-score of the average number of interactions refugees living in a village have
with refugees on specific days and hours.
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Table 1.10: Validation Checks - Detour and Pre-
Determined Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES pop 2010 NLT ruling party (%) nationalists (%) independents (%)
detour 788.6 -0.968 -0.0585 0.0299 -0.00399
(642.8) (4.197) (0.0512) (0.0273) (0.0351)
Observations 6,179 6,838 6,179 6,179 6,179
R-squared 0.355 0.662 0.301 0.318 0.639
Mean 3948 25.38 0.434 0.123 0.0602
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I show that detour is not correlated with pre-
determined outcomes, such as the population in 2010 (column 1), night-
lights intensity in 2010 (column 2), and the vote share obtained at the 2011
general elections by different political parties (columns 3 to 5).
Table 1.11: Robustness of Baseline Estimates to Alterna-
tive Inference Procedures
Dep. var. IHS calls to non-ref IHS calls to ref heterophily
(1) (2) (3)
OLS estimates, Columns 2, 4, 6 of Table 1.1 1.989 1.368 .1108
95% confidence interval
1. baseline, clustering by province ( 1.522, 2.455) ( 1.151, 1.586) ( .0606, .1609)
2. Conley (1999), 50km bandwidth ( 1.513, 2.464) ( 1.161, 1.575) ( .0561, .1654)
2. Conley (1999), 150km bandwidth ( 1.53, 2.447) ( 1.181, 1.556) ( .0729, .1486)
4. Cameron et al. (2008) wild cluster bootstrap ( 1.467, 2.592) ( 1.146, 1.614) ( .0594, .1744)
IV estimates, Columns 1, 2, 3 of Table 4 6.102 2.794 .4087
95% confidence interval
5. baseline, clustering by province ( 1.465, 10.74) (-.4127, 6.002) (-.5642, 1.382)
6. Conley (1999), 50km bandwidth ( 1.451, 10.75) ( .1559, 5.433) (-.4765, 1.294)
7. Conley (1999), 150km bandwidth ( .4802, 11.72) ( .549, 5.04) (-.7638, 1.581)
8. Cameron et al. (2008) wild cluster bootstrap ( 1.415, 13.27) ( -1.49, 6.508) (-.5221, 1.81)
Notes: The baseline OLS and IV approaches cluster standard errors by provinces (of which there
are 81) and cities (of which there are 34) respectively. In this table, I show that my conclusions are
robust to alternative approaches to inference. The 95% confidence interval for the baseline approach
is in row 1 for the OLS, and in row 5 for the IV. In rows 2-3 (OLS) and 6-7 (IV), I allow for arbitrary
spatial correlation across all villages within a certain distance of the given village (Conley 1999).
In rows 4 (OLS) and 8 (IV), I use the wild-cluster bootstrap approach to account for small-cluster
biases (Cameron et al. 2008).
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Table 1.12: IV, drop top deciles in terms of share
Sample (decile of share) All ≤ 9 ≤ 8 ≤ 7 ≤ 6 ≤ 5 ≤ 4 ≤ 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A Dep. Var.: IHS calls to ref
share 1.431 1.406 0.516 0.129 -1.335 -11.847 -15.045 -17.087
(1.186) (2.713) (4.537) (8.574) (11.463) (16.251) (30.646) (32.901)
Mean 0.611 0.563 0.523 0.487 0.443 0.399 0.347 0.310
Panel B Dep. Var.: IHS calls to non-ref
share 4.528** 11.006** 16.529** 39.074** 69.407** 97.671** 192.509** 254.951**
(1.955) (4.834) (7.959) (15.191) (28.483) (38.657) (85.964) (103.920)
Mean dep. var. 2.779 2.711 2.636 2.552 2.457 2.343 2.210 2.097
Observations 6,179 5,562 4,944 4,326 3,708 3,091 2,472 1,854
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 9.585 10.72 13.76 16.60 10.77 14.93 9.417 16.31
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Column 1 reports the baseline IV estimates for the effect of share on the number
of calls to other refugees (panel A) and to non-refugees (panel B). In column 2, I exclude
the villages that are in the 10th decile of the distribution of share (so that I only keep the
9 deciles with the lowest value of shaare). In the following columns, I keep dropping one
by one the highest deciles of the distribution of share.
Table 1.13: Baseline results are robust to the use of alter-
native aggregation levels
Unit of observation village (= baseline) 0.1’ × 0.1’ grid cell district
Dep. var. ref non-ref integration ref non-ref integration ref non-ref integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A - OLS
share 1.368*** 1.989*** 0.111*** 1.278*** 2.192*** 0.125*** 1.639*** 1.534*** 0.0294
(0.111) (0.238) (0.0256) (0.150) (0.316) (0.0437) (0.296) (0.372) (0.0723)
R-squared 0.206 0.259 0.078 0.197 0.238 0.088 0.276 0.338 0.198
Panel B - IV
share 2.794* 6.102*** 0.409 1.024 8.285** 0.637 0.492 10.695 1.127
(1.636) (2.366) (0.496) (1.760) (3.879) (0.715) (2.594) (6.782) (0.967)
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 17.86 17.86 17.86 10.49 10.49 10.49 3.597 3.597 3.597
Mean 0.609 2.767 0.589 0.448 2.489 0.571 0.590 2.900 0.611
Observations 6,054 6,054 6,054 2,316 2,316 2,316 764 764 764
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports OLS and IV estimates for the effect of share on IHS transformations
of the number of calls to refugees (columns 1, 3, and 7) and non-refugees (columns 2, 4, and
8), and heterophily (columns 3, 5, and 9). In columns 1-3, I report the baseline estimates,
where the level of aggregation is the village. In columns 4-6, I group together all the villages
that are in the same 0.1’ × 0.1’ grid cell (0.1’ is equivalent to around 7 kilometres in Turkey).
In columns 7-9, the level of aggregation is the district. OLS and IV estimates are reported in
Panels A and B respectively.
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Table 1.14: Using the number instead of the share of
refugees as the dependent variable
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref heterophily
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IHS number of refugees 0.174*** 0.146 0.393*** 0.461*** 0.0230*** 0.019
(0.00665) (0.116) (0.0189) (0.171) (0.00270) (0.034)
Observations 6,179 6,179 6,179 6,179 6,179 6,179
R2 0.267 0.433 0.088
Mean 0.611 0.611 2.779 2.779 0.594 0.594
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 11.36 11.36 11.36
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I replicate the results obtained in Table 1.1 and Table 1.5 but using
the IHS transformation of the number of customers tagged as refugees living in a village
as the main explanatory variable, instead of the share of refugees.
Table 1.15: Alternative controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimation method & Outcome
OLS, IHS calls to ref 1.377*** 1.534*** 1.377*** 1.378*** 1.318*** 1.370*** 1.408***
(0.112) (0.119) (0.112) (0.112) (0.116) (0.112) (0.115)
OLS, IHS calls to non-ref 2.004*** 2.357*** 2.004*** 2.005*** 2.003*** 1.994*** 2.090***
(0.232) (0.245) (0.232) (0.232) (0.237) (0.231) (0.230)
OLS, heterophily 0.109*** 0.137*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 0.114***
(0.0254) (0.0289) (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0255)
IV, IHS calls to ref 2.804* 2.834* 2.804* 2.653 1.137 2.322 2.306
(1.664) (1.686) (1.664) (1.647) (2.539) (1.804) (1.447)
IV, IHS calls to non-ref 6.175*** 6.244*** 6.175*** 6.047*** 12.223* 8.078*** 5.659***
(2.344) (2.258) (2.344) (2.260) (6.443) (3.064) (1.984)
IV, heterophily 0.419 0.423 0.419 0.382 1.678* 0.777 0.422
(0.480) (0.479) (0.480) (0.470) (0.989) (0.595) (0.427)
Additional controls
population polynomial X
distance to city polynomial X
distance to road polynomial X
distance to city * city FE X
distance to road * city FE X
population * city FE X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The endogenous explanatory variable is the share of refugees. The instrument is
detour. Column 1 reports baseline estimates. In the following columns, I also control more
flexibly for population, distance to the closest main city, and distance to the closest main
road. Standard errors are clustered at the province level (OLS), and at the city level (IV).
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Table 1.16: Size of network and contacts, with varying
cost of bridging contacts (diff-in-diff difinition of religion)
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
share 1.146*** 1.182*** 1.453*** 1.523*** 0.0752*** 0.0747***
(0.120) (0.108) (0.185) (0.178) (0.0225) (0.0210)
share × religious distance 0.227 1.073*** 0.00623
(0.439) (0.386) (0.0666)
share × religious distance (4th quartile) -0.0842 1.793** 0.0780
(0.397) (0.682) (0.0842)
religious distance 0.00265 -0.0579* -0.00590
(0.0159) (0.0299) (0.00488)
religious distance (4th quartile) -0.0733*** -0.317*** -0.0333**
(0.0272) (0.0575) (0.0133)
Observations 5,295 5,498 5,295 5,498 5,295 5,498
R-squared 0.190 0.197 0.242 0.255 0.077 0.078
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I replicate Table 1.6 using an alternative measure of religious distance.
Instead of using the diff-in-means definition presented in the main text, I use the diff-in-diff
definition presented in footnote 14.
Table 1.17: Size of network and contacts, with varying
cost of bridging contacts (ethnicity)
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref heterophily
(1) (2) (3)
share 1.337*** 1.789*** 0.101***
(0.128) (0.230) (0.0268)
share × ethnic distance 0.205 1.122*** 0.0256
(0.452) (0.404) (0.0728)
ethnic distance -0.000304 -0.0597** -0.00573
(0.0145) (0.0263) (0.00474)
Observations 5,830 5,830 5,830
R-squared 0.202 0.253 0.079
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications are the same as in the Table 1.6, except that religious distance is
replaced by ethnic distance.
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Table 1.18: Share of refugees and segregation, IV
(1) (2)





Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 9.591 9.591
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The unit of observation is the cell. Only cells with at least two
villages are included in the regression. SE clustered at the city level.
Table 1.19: Alternative samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Incoming call outgoing call incoming text outgoing text
Estimation method & Outcome
OLS, IHS calls to ref 1.269*** 1.461*** 0.282*** 0.350***
(0.0947) (0.0929) (0.0711) (0.0782)
OLS, IHS calls to non-ref 1.092*** 1.365*** 1.338*** 1.040***
(0.113) (0.134) (0.178) (0.138)
OLS, heterophily -0.0243 0.0241* 0.0268* -0.0479**
(0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0200)
IV, IHS calls to ref 1.981 2.383 0.539 0.691
(1.887) (1.854) (0.444) (0.656)
IV, IHS calls to non-ref 3.194* 4.318** 2.622 4.235**
(1.894) (1.967) (1.790) (2.059)
IV, heterophily 0.115 0.177 -0.184 -0.303
(0.190) (0.246) (0.304) (0.338)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Notes: This table replicates the main OLS and IV specifications, using
only incoming calls (column 1), outgoing calls (column 2), incoming texts
(column 3), and outgoing texts (column 4).
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1.12 Appendix B - Additional Results on Local Population
Table 1.20: Correlation between share of refugees and
interactions, OLS
Dep. Var. IHS calls to ref IHS calls to non-ref) heterophily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
share 0.0441*** 0.0392*** 0.0360*** 0.456*** 0.373*** 0.330*** 0.000621 0.00351 0.00623**
(0.00727) (0.00704) (0.00714) (0.0438) (0.0366) (0.0392) (0.00381) (0.00324) (0.00243)
Observations 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893
R-squared 0.019 0.031 0.048 0.019 0.121 0.158 0.000 0.011 0.036
Mean 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 3.623 3.623 3.623 0.976 0.976 0.976
Village controls X X X X X X
Province FE X X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the correlation between the share of refugees in a
village and the given column’s dependent variable. In columns 1-3 (4-6), the dependent variable
is the average log number of interactions non-refugees living in a village had with refugees
(non-refugees). In columns 7-9, the dependent variable is defined as the average share of their
calls non-refugees living in a village have with non-refugees. Village controls include latitude,
longitude, the proportion of antennas in the village of a given type (urban, sub-urban, rural,
industrial, university, seasonal), 2010 population, 2010 night lights, distance to the nearest
major Turkish city, distance to the nearest primary road, a dummy taking a value of 1 if the
village is near a refugee camp, and a dummy taking a value of 1 if the village is along the Syrian
border. Standard errors are clustered at the province level.
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Table 1.21: Effect of share on interactions of the local
population, IV
Dep. Var.: ref non-ref integration
(1) (2) (3)
share -0.158 0.473 -0.039
(0.234) (0.729) (0.051)
Observations 5,893 5,893 5,893
Mean 0.0103 3.623 0.976
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 6.257 6.257 6.257
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I report the IV estimates for the effect of share on
different types of communications of the local population, where the instru-
ment for share is detour.
Table 1.22: Distributional effect of enclaves on interac-
tions of the local population, OLS
Dep. Var. log(1 + upper-bound κth percentile of X)
X = n. calls to ref X = n. calls to non-ref
κ = 90 κ = 95 κ = 99 κ = 90 κ = 95 κ = 99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
share 0.0203** 0.0632*** 0.375*** 0.408*** 0.455*** 0.556***
(0.00912) (0.0142) (0.0807) (0.0535) (0.0623) (0.0736)
Observations 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893
R-squared 0.024 0.029 0.094 0.189 0.212 0.274
Mean 0.00707 0.0174 0.107 4.271 4.436 4.655
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Instead of using log(1+E[x]) as the dependant variable (where x is the average number of
calls of non-refugees with either refugees or non-refugees in a given village), I use log(1+UBκ[x])
(where UBκ is the upper-bound of percentile κ of the distribution of x).
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Table 1.23: Distributional effect of enclaves on interac-
tions of the local population, IV
Dep. Var. log(1 + upper-bound percentile κ of X)
X = n. calls to ref X = n. calls to non-ref
κ = 90 κ = 95 κ = 99 κ = 90 κ = 95 κ = 99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
share -0.392 -0.393 0.389 0.756 1.122 1.717
(0.333) (0.495) (0.751) (0.847) (1.008) (1.313)
Observations 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893 5,893
Mean 0.00707 0.0174 0.107 4.271 4.436 4.655
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 6.257 6.257 6.257 6.257 6.257 6.257
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I report IV estimates for the effect of share on the number of interactions
the local population has with refugees and non-refugees..
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Chapter 2
Transportation Networks and Interethnic
Contact
2.1 Introduction
Large-scale infrastructure projects have profoundly reshaped the economies of entire
regions of the world. Of particular importance, the improvement of road networks
has affected the living conditions of millions by easing trade (Donaldson, 2018) and
migration (Morten and Oliveira, 2016). While transportation networks have the po-
tential to bring individuals closer to new markets, they could also increase interactions
between heterogeneous communities.
This paper studies how the improvement of the Indonesian road network influenced
interethnic relationships. Hosting more than 1340 different ethnic groups, Indonesia
is one of the world’s most diverse countries and has longstanding nation-building
challenges. At the same time, its complex geography has also made the construc-
tion of transportation infrastructure historically difficult. As a result, the Suharto
regime (1967-1998) quickly launched important infrastructure projects to unleash the
country’s development potential. In particular, the Indonesian government invested
massively in improving the national road network during the 1990s. For example,
the share of asphaltic roads in Sumatra increased from 37% to more than 85% in less
than a decade. These transformations stopped only a few years later when the Asian
financial crisis of 1997-1998 and Suharto’s fall affected the country’s public finances
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and forced the government to reduce its investments in public infrastructure (Rothen-
berg, 2013). The rapid progress and sudden stop in the road network’s improvement
during the 1990s provide a unique opportunity to study how transportation networks
shape interethnic contact.
While the improvement of the road network had a profound effect on local de-
velopment (Rothenberg, 2013; Gertler et al., 2015), it could also have reduced the
interaction cost between the numerous ethnic groups in the country. Indeed, In-
donesia is a mosaic composed of more than one thousand ethnic groups. However,
significant segregation between communities greatly hampers the potential for in-
tergroup contact. In this context, we show that the construction of new roads can
significantly increase individuals’ exposure to ethnic groups other than their own.
To study how road networks influence exposure to different ethnic groups, we
construct a measure of social access to one’s own ethnic group (SAsame) and other
ethnic groups (SAother). We do so by calculating the population of each ethnic group
in villages that satisfy the following two conditions: being less than 20 kilometers away
from the village of interest, and less than 2 kilometers away from a road. We start
by showing that from 1990 to 2007, the relative size of SAother compared to SAsame
increased significantly in Indonesian outer islands. Indeed, the ratio of SAother on total
social access (SAother + SAsame) increased from 0.34 to 0.4 during that period. This
provides prima facie evidence that the improvement of the road network might provide
new opportunities to villagers to connect with a more diverse pool of individuals in
terms of ethnicity.
We then show that social access to other ethnic groups strongly correlates with
interethnic marriage rates. Indeed, we estimate a generalized difference-in-difference
equation with village fixed-effects and time fixed-effects, and find a strong positive
correlation between the share of interethnic marriages at the village level in a given
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year, and social access to other ethnic groups in that year. Estimates suggest that
around 4% of the increase in interethnic marriage rates in the 1990-2007 period could
be explained by increased access to other ethnic groups following the improvement of
transportation networks. This finding suggests that the improvement of road networks
could indeed have an important effect on interethnic relations by reducing the cost
of interaction between ethnic groups.
We propose to address possible endogeneity in road placement using an instru-
mental variable strategy that relies on topography and variation in annual spending
allocated to road improvements (Burgess et al., 2015). Moreover, we propose to bor-
row the market access approach from the trade literature and apply it in our setting
by decomposing market access into two components: market access to one’s own eth-
nic group and other ethnic groups. Indeed, the improvement of the road network
could also lead to important spatial spillovers as the improvement of a road section
on a network could influence all of the villages connected to that network (Donaldson
and Hornbeck, 2016).
Finally, we discuss several ideas we plan to pursue to understand better the effects
of road network improvements on interethnic contact. First, we propose several ways
to test how internal migration could shape our results. Second, we offer to exploit the
Indonesian institutional setting to test several predictions of the contact hypothesis,
which states that intergroup contacts should decrease prejudice under some conditions
(Allport, 1954). Third, we also discuss how the economic effects of transportation
networks could affect interethnic contacts. Moreover, we discuss why understanding
the impact of road networks on interethnic contacts could be essential for the broader
literature on infrastructure and local economic development. Fourth, we propose
using our setting to understand better how different dimensions of diversity, such as
fractionalization and polarization, matter for interethnic contacts. Finally, we discuss
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how our results could shed light on the functioning of the marriage market.
This paper is directly related to three broad literatures on transportation net-
works, intergroup contact, and nation-building. First, this paper contributes to the
literature on transportation networks and local development. An extensive litera-
ture has linked the improvement of transportation networks to local development
(Jacoby and Minten, 2009; Bosker and Garretsen, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2020) and
falling poverty (Khandker et al., 2009; Emran and Hou, 2013).1 Recently, significant
advances have been made in considering the general equilibrium effects of road and
railroad construction by using a market-access approach (Donaldson and Hornbeck,
2016; Donaldson, 2018). Outside of economics, scholars have also highlighted that
beside linking communities to national markets, roads that connect isolated regions
to the rest of the nation can play an important role in nation-building by uniting a
country (Gruffudd, 1995), facilitating centralization (Bel, 2011), improving security
(Dobbins et al., 2007), or facilitating contact between distant communities (Ekamper
et al., 2011). We contribute to the trade literature on transportation networks by
showing that alongside these important economic benefits of transportation infras-
tructure come a number of possible shifts in culture, identity, and national integration.
Second, we contribute to the literature on intergroup contacts. In his seminal
work, Allport (1954) stated that contact could decrease prejudice under some con-
ditions. In recent years, this hypothesis has been extensively tested in both experi-
mental (Paluck et al., 2019; Lowe, 2019; Mousa, 2020) and non-experimental settings
(Bazzi et al., 2019; Dustmann et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2020). We innovate by extend-
ing this literature to a broader macro-setting consisting of 18,400 villages in one of the
world’s largest countries and using the improvement of the road network to induce
changes in the cost of having interethnic contact. Moreover, we plan to borrow the
1See Berg et al. (2015) and Redding and Turner (2015) for more comprehensive reviews of trans-
portation networks and development.
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market access approach from the trade literature to inform our analysis of intergroup
contact.
Third, we contribute to the literature on nation-building. While diversity is often
seen as detrimental to nation-building (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), a growing body
of the literature investigates how ethnic cleavages can be overcome. For example,
studies have examined the role of shared experiences (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020),
mass-schooling (Bandiera et al., 2019), resettlement programs (Bazzi et al., 2019),
or development projects (Isaksson, 2020) in shaping national identities. We add to
this literature by exploring the effects on nation-building of improving transportation
networks, a widely used development policy across low-income countries.
2.2 Conceptual framework
The expansion in the road network could affect interethnic contact in two ways:
directly, by changing the ethnic composition of the pool of individuals one might
expect to interact with on a daily basis, and indirectly through economic development.
2.2.1 Composition effect
Direct effect. Improvements and extensions to existing road networks decrease
travel time and increase the number of villages that individuals can reach within a
day’s drive. Similarly, individuals coming from a larger set of villages could have the
opportunity to visit frequently the home-village of an individual.2 For these reasons,
the construction of new roads could directly affect the ethnic composition of the
pool of individuals one might reasonably expect to interact with daily. While the
construction of new roads could theoretically decrease diversity in some villages, we
should nevertheless expect it to lead, on average, to increase diversity given the high
2For evidence that distance between a pair of individuals decreases the frequency of interactions
between them, see for example Wellman and Wortley (1990) or Mok and Wellman (2007).
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segregation levels in Indonesia.
Indirect effect through migration. Moreover, the direct effects that transporta-
tion networks have on experienced diversity could be reinforced or attenuated by
internal migration (Morten and Oliveira, 2016). By reducing travel costs, the im-
provement of the Indonesian road network in the 1990s could have affected the dis-
tribution of different ethnic groups across villages, and it could have changed the
composition of individuals staying in connected villages.
First, new roads could have a direct effect on segregation, polarization, and frac-
tionalization through migration.3 For example, following the decrease in travel cost
induced by the opening of new roads, minorities might be more likely to migrate to
areas where their co-ethnics constitute the majority group. Such a process would
lead transportation networks to increase segregation by making it easier for differ-
ent communities to relocate and form clusters, and the potentially positive effects
of transportation networks on intergroup contact would be hampered. On the other
hand, internal migration could also reinforce the effects of transportation networks
on intergroup contact if reduced travel costs lead individuals of different ethnicities
to regroup in regions with high economic potential that would become multicultural
centers.
Second, the improvement of the road network could also change the composition
of individuals staying in newly connected villages. For example, more open-minded
individuals might be more likely to migrate to large multicultural urban centers fol-
lowing a decrease in travel cost. Such a process would lead transportation networks
to make interethnic relationships more conflictual.
We come back to the question of internal migration in subsection 2.7.1 and pro-
pose several ways to test its importance empirically in explaining how road networks
3We present formal definitions for some of these concepts in subsection 2.7.3.
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influence intergroup relationships.
From the composition effect to interethnic relations. Whether an increase
in experienced diversity translates in turn into improved interethnic relationships is a
complex question. While the contact hypothesis would predict a decrease in prejudice
(Allport, 1954), mere exposure to other groups might increase prejudice if these inter-
actions are not sustained (Hangartner et al., 2019; Albrecht et al., 2020; Steinmayr,
2020).Importantly, the effects of diversity on interethnic relationships could crucially
depend on whether diversity takes the form of polarization or fractionalization.(Bazzi
et al., 2019).
In subsection 2.7.2, we describe multiple ways to exploit the Indonesian institu-
tional context to test the contact hypothesis. Moreover, while our baseline analysis
focuses only on access to one’s own ethnic group and other ethnic groups, we discuss
how we could extend our framework to study polarization and fractionalization in
subsection 2.7.3.
2.2.2 Economic development
Improvements in the road network could also indirectly affect interethnic relationships
by first affecting local economic development. For example, interethnic relationships
could become less conflictual as the increased market access translates into higher
living standards (Ray and Esteban, 2017). However, the construction of new roads
could also create new opportunities for corruption and ethnic favoritism, which could
in turn antagonize different ethnic groups (Burgess et al., 2015).
More generally, how improvements in the road network affect interethnic relation-
ships might ultimately depend on whether different ethnic groups compete against
each other to grasp the new economic opportunities resulting from the enhanced mar-
ket access. We return to this question in subsection 2.7.4, where we propose different
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empirical tests to evaluate how economic development and interethnic relationships




Indonesia had a total population of 237 million in 2010 according to the population
census. With 1,340 recognized ethnic groups, Indonesia is one of the world’s most
diverse countries. While the inner islands of Java and Bali tend to be relatively
homogeneous in terms of ethnic diversity, the Outer Islands are considerably more
diverse. For example, more than 1000 ethnic groups are present in Sumatra, which
had a population of 50 million in 2010. Not surprisingly, this ethnic diversity comes
hand in hand with important linguistic and religious diversity, although the latter is
less pronounced.4
Rich of more than 17,000 islands, the archipelago was ruled by different kingdoms
and empires for most of its history. As we know it in its current political boundaries,
Indonesia didn’t exist before the colonial period during which the Dutch used a divide-
and-rule strategy and prevented the emergence of a common Indonesian identity. It
is not before the independence from the Dutch in 1945 that the unity of the country
became a political priority. Along with policies that had the explicit goal of promoting
the emergence of an Indonesian identity (such as the use of a common language), the
improvement of the transportation network in the second half of the 20th century
could also have had a deep influence on nation building by facilitating interactions
between heterogeneous communities.
4For example, around 87% of the population in Sumatra is Muslim, although there is important
geographic heterogeneity in the presence of other religious groups. While Muslims account for 98%
of the population in Aceh and West Sumatra, their share falls to 60% in North Sumatra (36% of
the province population being Christian).
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2.3.2 Improvements in the road network
Indonesia hosts a rich network of roads, partly constructed and maintained by the
Dutch during the colonial area. In the 1990s, the Indonesian government invested
massively in improving the existing national road network and building new road
segments. The total budget allocated to road improvements increased by more than
85% between 1984-1989 and 1989-1994, to become the largest item of the development
budget (Rothenberg, 2013). As the authorities explicitly aimed at connecting sparsely
populated areas and infrastructure improvements outside of the major islands, these
spendings translated into important improvements in the network throughout the
1990s. For example, in less than a decade, the share of asphaltic roads in the island
of Sumatera increased from 37% to more than 85%. These transformations ceased
a decade later when the Asian financial crisis of 1997- 1998 and Suharto’s fall af-
fected the country’s public finances and forced the government to reduce its public
infrastructure investments (Rothenberg, 2013).
2.4 Data
In the following section, we describe the primary datasets we use. These datasets
cover the whole country, although we exclude the islands of Java and Bali to focus on
outer islands, where ethnic diversity is much more pronounced and where the road
network expansions and upgrades were more intensive during the study period.
Road network. We use road data from Indonesia’s Integrated Road Management
System (Rothenberg, 2013). From 1990 to 2007, road quality measures were collected
annually on the whole national and provincial road network by the Department of
Public Works (DPU). For each kilometer-post interval, rich data was collected on
surface type, width, or road roughness. The final dataset we are using corresponds to
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a panel of quality measures at each kilometer-post along major roads between 1990
and 2007. The main quality measure we use is the International Roughness Index
(IRI), which is calculated as the total vertical movement a vehicle makes in meters
divided by the distance travelled in kilometers.
Because data was collected only for national and provincial roads, we do not
observe the evolution in the span of local road networks. While the placement of
national and provincial roads is more likely to be exogenous to local considerations
related to ethnic diversity, local roads’ omission might lead us to underestimate access
to other ethnic groups. To assess our dataset’s reliability and understand how the
omission of local roads could affect our results, we plan to use the triennial PODES
village census that records rich information on transportation. For example, all of
the PODES waves between 1990 and 2011 ask whether the majority of inter-village
traffic goes through land and whether the widest road is asphaltic. These questions
can be directly used to corroborate the quality of the dataset coming from DPU that
we use in the paper.
We use this dataset to construct the complete network of roads each year in all
of the outer islands. For example, Figure 2·1 maps the road network for the island
of Sumatra in 1990 and 2007. We also create two additional road networks for each
year, with all the roads on which one could drive at more than 30 and 50 kilometers
per hour. To determine the maximum speed at which one can drive on a road, we use
the correspondence established by Yu et al. (2006) to associate different IRI levels to
a maximum speed.
Panel (a) in Figure 2·2 plots the evolution in the total number of kilometer-posts
in the island of Sumatra,by type of road. From 1990 to 2000, this number increased
by more than 20%. At the same time, important investments were made to improve
the quality of existing roads and the share of asphaltic roads increased from 37%
85
to more than 85%. These investments in the construction of new roads and the
improvement of the existing network drastically decreased in the 2000s, leading the
volume of roads and the volume of asphaltic roads to remain stable from 2000 to
2007. Similar patterns occur in Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and remaining outer islands
(Figure 2·2 and Figure 2·3). These observations are confirmed in Figure 2·4, where we
plot the density of the international roughness index for Indonesian roads by region
in 1990, 2000, and 2007.
Ethnic diversity. We use the complete-count 2000 population census to obtain
the population by ethnic group at the village level.5 As it can be seen in Figure 2·6,
Figure 2·7 and Figure 2·8, outer islands are characterized by an extremely rich ethnic
diversity, while inner islands are much more homogenous (Figure 2·5). For example,
a total of 1,087 different ethnic groups are present in the island of Sumatra, with 100
different ethnicities being the main ethnic group in at least one village. However,
while ethnic diversity across villages is rich, ethnic diversity within villages is less
pronounced (Figure 2·9). Indeed, in 52% of the villages, more than 90% of the
population is from the main ethnic group within that village. On the contrary, the
majority ethnic group accounts for less than half of the local population in only 11%
of the villages. In the future, we will consider alternative aggregation procedures
based on linguistic similarity (Fearon, 2003).
Interethnic relationship. Our main outcome of interest is the share of interethnic
marriages in village v in year t. The 2010 population census classifies individuals into
households, which allows us to observe interethnic couples. However, since we do not
directly observe the year of marriage, we date marriages based on the birth year of
a couple’s first child. In our baseline analysis, we assume that a couple gets married
5Because of the insurgency in the Northern province of Aceh, the census could not be adequately
conducted in many villages of the region.
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in the year preceding the birth of their first child.6 As the gap between the age
at first marriage and the age at first birth might depend on several demographic
characteristics such as education, we plan on using more flexible methods to date
marriages in future work.
This method leads us to exclude all the couples that do not have a child living
in the same household in 2010. Moreover, we might wrongly assume that the eldest
child living in the household is the first child a couple had if the real first child already
left the household by 2010 to live independently. 7 Figure 2·12 represents the stark
increase in the proportion of interethnic marriage from 1990 to 2007, which is in line
with the existing literature on ethnic endogamy in Indonesia (Utomo, 2020). While
only 11.7% of couples were interethnic in 1990, this proportion had reached 17% by
2007 (Table 2.1).
We also use the 2010 population census to construct three interrelated measures of
national language use at home. First, we look at the share of couples living in village
v and married in year t who speak Indonesian at home. Then, we look at the share
of interethnic couples and the share of endogamous couples who use Indonesian at
home. Slightly less than 20% of the households that got married in 1990 are speaking
Indonesian at home (Table 2.1). Unsurprisingly, this proportion is much higher for
interethnic couples (45%) compared to mono-ethnic couples (17%).
In the future, we also plan to use the 2010 population census to construct alterna-
tive measures of interethnic relationship based on children’s name choices. We plan
to follow Bazzi et al. (2019), who associate children’s names with speaking Indone-
6According the the 1991 wave of the Indonesian DHS, the median age of women aged 25-29 and
living in outer-islands at their first marriage and at their first birth was, respectively, 19.4 and 21
years old.
7In addition, the census only provides the relationship of each household member to the house-
hold head. For this reason, we are unable to identify the mother of children living in polygamous
households and exclude polygamous households (polygamous households representing less than 1%
of households in 2017 according to DHS).
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sian at home. For each firstname n, we will calculate the relative likelihood that n is
associated with someone who speaks Indonesian at home:
IndoScoren =
P (name = n | homeIndo = 1)
P (name = n | homeIndo = 1) + P (name = n | homeIndo = 0)
where homeIndo takes a value of 1 if an individual speaks Indonesian at home, and
0 otherwise. Similarly, we plan to calculate the relative likelihood that any name n
is associated with someone who lives in an interethnic household.
Finally, we also plan to exploit the fact that the 2010 population census reports
information on the district of birth and the district of residence five years before the
interview. We plan to use these variables to identify inter-district migrants, and we
plan to examine whether our results remain stable when excluding these individuals.
Moreover, we also plan to use this information to get a better understanding of how
internal migration could drive our results. We discuss this question more extensively
in subsection 2.7.1.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in understanding the relationship between being connected to vil-
lages of different ethnicities and the number of interethnic marriages. In this section,
we start by presenting our baseline measure of a village’s access to different ethnici-
ties. Then, we present our baseline specification. We finally present two alternative
approaches we plan to pursue in future work: a market-access approach and an in-
strumental variable approach.
2.5.1 Basic measures of connection to different ethnic groups
We defineNv,t, the connected neighborhood of village v at time t, as the union between
v and all the villages v′ that satisfy the following two conditions:
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(a) v′ is less than 2 kilometers away from a road in year t
(b) v′ is less than 20 kilometers away from v
As the different threshold values used in this definition are arbitrary, we plan to use
different values in future work as robustness checks. Note also that the connected
neighborhood Nv,t is time-dependent, as the construction of a new road could increase
the number of villages that satisfy condition (a).
Let E be the set of ethnicities in Indonesia. Define pev the population of ethnicity
e ∈ E in village v and e∗v ≡ argmaxe pev the main ethnic group in village v.8 Then,
the social access of v at t to the other ethnic groups is the total population of other







Similarly, the social access to the same ethnic group is defined as the total population







Note that SAsamev,t will always be strictly positive since we assumed that a village v
will always be part of its own connected neighborhood Nv,t.











This approach is illustrated in Figure 2·10. The upper figure represents the neigh-
borhood of a given village of interest (Sekayu I, in the kecematan of Sekanu and
kabupaten of Musi Banyu Asin), of which the centroid is highlighted in dark green.
In 1990, this village was connected to a wider network of villages by a highway (in
8We assume that pev is time-invariant since in our empirical analysis, we only observe population
counts at the village level in 2000.
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blue). The villages that are less than 2 kilometers away from that road and less
than 20 kilometers away from the village of interest are depicted in light green and
constitute the so-called connected neighborhood of the village Sekayu I. The second
figure represents the neighborhood of that same village in 2007. Because new roads
were constructed in the meantime (in red), this village is now connected to additional
villages to the South (in yellow). More than 80% of the individuals living in the
village of interest are of the same ethnicity (Melayu Musi Sekayu). In 1990, there
were 71,132 individuals of that group (SAsame1990 ) and 5,215 of other groups (SA
other
1990 ) in
the green villages. In 2007, these numbers increased to 85,598 and 8,530. Therefore,
the share of other ethnic groups in the total social access of the village (Shareother)
increased from 6% in 1990 to 9% in 2007.
In Figure 2·11, we document the general increase in access to other ethnic groups
between 1990 and 2007. While the average value of Shareother was around 0.34 in
1990, it increased to 0.40 in 2007 (Table 2.1). This suggests that improvements in the
road network can increase the ethnic diversity of the pool of individuals one might
expect to get exposure to on a daily basis.
Since the population by ethnic group at the village level is measured in 2000 while
the study period starts in 1990, our measures of social access might be influenced by
internal migration following the improvement of the road network.9 For this reason,
we also define SA
same
v,t as the total number n ∈ Nv,t of villages whose main ethnic
group is the same as in village v. Similarly, SA
other
v,t is defined as the number m ∈ Nv,t
of villages whose main ethnic group is different from the main ethnic group in village
v. The underlying assumption of this alternative approach is that the main ethnic
9In order to evaluate the extent to which our measures of social access might be influenced by
internal migration, we plan to study how the expansion of the road network affects the number of
inter-district migrants in each village. Indeed, while the 2000 and 2010 waves of the census do not
ask individuals the village they were living previously, it still report the district of birth and the
district the respondent was living in 5 years ago.
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group of a village is time-invariant.
2.5.2 Baseline specifications
We are interested in understanding the relationship between being connected to vil-




v,t + β2 lnSA
total
v,t + δv + γt + εv,t (2.1)
where yv,t is the share of interethnic marriages in village v and year t, SA
total
v,t is the
total social access of village v in year t, and Shareotherv,t is the share of the total social
access which is from other ethnicities. While village fixed-effects account for time-
invariant village characteristics, time fixed-effects account for temporal shocks that
affect all the villages. In the baseline specification, standard errors are clustered at
the district level (of which there are 199).11
We also test a closely related equation, where the main coefficient of interest is
ρ1:
yv,t = ρ1 lnSA
other
v,t + ρ2 lnSA
same
v,t + δv + γt + εv,t (2.2)
where SAotherv,t is the measure of social access of village v at time t to different ethnic
groups than the majority ethnic group of v. Similarly, SAsamev,t is a measure of social
access to the same ethnic group as the majority group in village v.
10For the moment, we focus on the instantaneous effect of being connected to other ethnic groups
on interethnic marriages, although we present some preliminary evidence of dynamic effects in
section 2.6. In the future, we plan to adopt a more flexible approach that would allow for dynamic
effects.
11Inference is robust to the use of wild-cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008). We also plan to




The approach developed in the previous subsection has two main advantages: it is
easily implementable, and it allows for an easy interpretation of how access to other
ethnic groups influence interethnic contact. However, this approach also comes with
two important shortcomings. First, measuring social access in the way we currently
do could induce significant measurement errors, as some villages could be included in
the connected neighborhood Nv,t despite being difficult to reach (for example, because
of a natural barrier). Moreover, the choice of the different cutoff values used to define
connected neighborhoods is intrinsically arbitrary. Second, this method also ignores
spatial spillovers that could follow the creation or the improvement of a road. Indeed,
the access of a village to different groups not only depends on whether the village is
connected to the network, it also depends on the structure of the whole network.
For these reasons, we propose to borrow the market access approach from the trade
literature Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). In particular, we plan to decompose the
market access term into two components: market access to one’s own ethnic group,
and market access to other ethnic groups. Market access for village v to group







where τv,d,t is trade cost between village v and village d in year t, Pop
j
d is the popu-
lation of group j in village d, and θ is the trade elasticity.
We will calculate trade costs τv,d,t between pairs of villages {v, d} in year t in
the following way.12 First, we will construct the road network for each year based
on existing roads in that year. Second, we will assign a maximum speed to each
12This procedure is adapted from Gebresilasse (2020).
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road segment. To do so, we will map the roughness index of a road to a maximum
speed following the conversion rule defined in Yu et al. (2006). Third, we will draw
a straight line from the centroid of each village to the closest road. Finally, we will
calculate the cheapest way to connect v to d in at time t based on this road network
and associated maximum speed limits. The market access of village v to group j will
then be calculated as a weighted sum of the population of group j in all of the other
villages, where weights will be a function of trade costs.
The present formulation suggests that interethnic contact mainly follows from
interethnic trade. Indeed, market access is typically derived from a general equilib-
rium trade model. In the future, we hope to relax this assumption by exploring how
standard trade models could be modified in order to tackle more directly the ques-
tion we are interested in: how trade costs influence intermarriage rates. In such a
setting, trade costs between an origin and a destination would represent the inverse
probability for an individual of the origin village to meet a potential match from
the destination village. Such an interpretation of a trade model poses additional
conceptual challenges that come from the specifics of marriage markets.
Instrumental variable approach
In order to move toward a causal interpretation of our estimates, we propose to use
an instrumental variable strategy that relies on topography and variation in annual
spending allocated to road improvements.
Time variation. From 1969 to the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998, the govern-
ment implemented a series of five-year development plans, known under the acronym
of Repelita. While spending allocated to road infrastructure was limited to $2.1 bil-
lion during the 1984-1989 period (Repelita IV), this number increased to $3.9 billion
during the 1989-1994 (Repelita V) and 1994-1999 (Repelita VI) periods. However,
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1990 and the fall of Suharto’s regime lead to a sud-
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den decrease in spending allocated to road infrastructure in the middle of Repelita
VI (Rothenberg, 2013). These sudden shocks to planned spending dedicated to in-
frastructure in 1989 and 1997 provide us with an important opportunity to generate
variation in the timing of road construction and improvements.
Topography and conterfactual road network. The approach we propose to use is
directly inspired by Burgess et al. (2015). We will first determine the average number
of kilometers k of road that were actually constructed or improved between 1990
and 1997. The rest of the procedure consists in determining how to allocate these
kilometers in each year.13
We will first select the main urban settlements that existed in 1990 in Indonesia.
For each potential bilateral connection between these urban settlements that are
not yet connected by an asphaltic road, we will calculate two quantities: the sum
of the settlement pair populations and the distance in kilometers of the least-cost
path connecting them. We will calculate this least-cost path by using standard tools
in ArcGIS and creating a raster where each pixel is associated with a travel cost
determined by topography and the existing road network. We will then compute
the market potential of each bilateral connection, where the market potential of a
connection is defined as the sum of the populations of the urban settlement pairs
divided by the distance of the least cost path between them. We will finally rank
settlement pairs by market potential, and allocate k kilometers according to this
market potential ranking of settlement pairs. This procedure is repeated for each
year from 1990 until 2007.
This procedure will give us a predicted road network in each year, which is solely
based on topography and the original road network in 1990. We will then calculate for
13We also plan to follow Gertler et al. (2015) by exploiting variation in the yearly budgets allocated
to national, provincial, and district roads. Instead of allocating k kilometers of road in each year, we
would allocate a time-varying and province specific kt,p kilometers of road in year t and in province
p.
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each village the predicted social access (as well as market access) to different ethnic
groups, and use these predicted values to instrument for the actual ones.
2.6 Results
Intermarriage. In this section, we investigate how increased connectivity to other
ethnic groups correlates with ethnic intermarriage. Panel A of Table 2.2 reports
estimates for Equation 2.1 where social access to same and other ethnic groups is
defined based on population. Column 1 reports the raw correlation between Shareother
and the share of interethnic marriages when controlling for total social access (SAtotal).
As we can see, there is a significantly positive correlation between the share of the
social access which comes from other ethnic groups, and the share of interethnic
marriages. When including village fixed-effects (column 2), this correlation remains
significantly positive, although the size of the coefficient decreases from 0.25 to 0.01.
This sharp difference is consistent with villages hosting more open-minded individuals
being more likely to be connected to villages of a different ethnic group. When
controlling for both village fixed-effects and year fixed-effects, the correlation between
Shareother and the share of interethnic marriages remains significantly positive and
the associated coefficient remains stable.
As most of the road improvements occurred in the 1990s and we only measure
village population by ethnic group in 2000, measurement errors in social access mea-
sures could be induced by selective migration. Therefore, market access to a given
ethnicity is defined in Panel B as the number of villages of that ethnicity (instead
of its population) that are within a 20 kilometers radius and not further away than
2 kilometers from any road. When using these alternative definitions of Shareother
and SAtotal, we confirm the main take-aways from Panel A. Indeed, there is a strong
positive correlation between the social access to other ethnic groups and interethnic
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marriages. This correlation remains significantly positive (although smaller) when
including village and year fixed-effects. In column 3, an 1% increase in the share of
the social access that comes from other ethnic groups is associated with a 0.023%
increase in the share of interethnic marriages. This coefficient is surprisingly similar
to the coefficient presented in Panel A.
How large is a 0.023% increase in the share of interethnic marriages? From 1990
to 2007, the average value of Shareother increased from 20% to 29% in our sample.14
Extrapolating the results from Table 2.2, we expect this increase to be associated
with a rise of 0.2% in the share of interethnic marriages. For comparison, during that
same period, the average share of interethnic marriages in the whole sample increased
by from 11.6 to 17%.
These results are confirmed when testing Equation 2.2. Panel A of Table 2.3,
reports estimates for the correlation between social access to one’s own group and to
other groups with intermarriage rates. Column 1 reports a strong positive correlation
between SAother and the share of interethnic marriages, while the coefficient associated
with SAsame is significantly negative. Again, these coefficients become smaller when
including village fixed-effects (column 2) and year fixed-effects (column 3). Using
village counts instead of population counts to calculate social access to different ethnic
groups, as done in Panel B, leads to similar results.
As we should expect the improvement to have a slow effect on social capital and
interethnic relationships, we document dynamic effects of the access to other ethnic
groups on intermarriage rates. Table 2.4 presents estimates for Equation 2.1 with the
presence of 1-year and 2-years lagged effects. As we can see, the results provide us
with suggestive evidence that the effects of transportation networks on interethnic
marriage rates build up over time and are not immediate.
14When defined using village counts.
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Language. While having more opportunities to interact with different ethnic groups
is associated with higher rates of intermarriage, its association with the use of Indone-
sian at home is more nuanced. Table 2.5 reports estimates for Equation 2.1, where
social access is defined using village counts instead of population counts to avoid
measurement errors due to internal migration. Consistent with the results on inter-
marriage, there is a significantly positive correlation between Shareother and the share
of couples using Indonesian at home (column 1). Intuitively, two main channels could
explain this positive association: it could be driven by a general increase in the use
of Indonesian in the population, or it could be mechanically driven by the increased
share of interethnic couples.
Interestingly, this increase seems to be only partially coming from an increase
in the use of Indonesian among mono-ethnic couples (column 3), and is not driven
neither by an increase in the use of Indonesian among interethnic couples (column 2).
This suggest that our results on language use are primarily driven by the increase in
the share of of interethnic marriages following the improvement of a road network.
Indeed, while only 17% of endogamous couples were using Indonesian at home in
1990, this proportion rises to 45% for interethnic couples (Table 2.1). Therefore, an
increase in Shareother could naturally lead to an increase in the use of Indonesian at
home by increasing the share of interethnic couples.
Summary of findings. Taken together, the results presented in this section suggest
that the improvement of transport infrastructure could lead to important, although
complex, changes in interethnic relationships. As the results on intermarriage suggest,
the probability for an individual to marry outside of his or her own ethnic group
crucially depends on the ethnic composition of the potential spouses’ pool. Therefore,
the improvement of transportation networks could play a crucial role in the ethnic
mixing of the Indonesian society observed in the last decades. However, the results
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on language use suggest a more complex picture between social access to other ethnic
groups and interethnic relationships. While there exists a positive association between
the use of Indonesian and social access to other ethnic groups, it is unclear whether
this effect is only the result of an increase in the number of interethnic couples (who
are more likely to use Indonesian at home), or whether the choice to speak Indonesian
at home also becomes more popular in the general population.15 These results could
potentially be explained by the competing forces of diversity, such as polarization and
fractionalization. We come back to this question in the next section.
2.7 Discussion
So far, we have argued that the improvement of transport infrastructure could lead
to important changes in interethnic relationships. As discussed in section 2.5, much
remains to be done in order to move to methods that better incorporate general
equilibrium effects and dynamic effects. In addition, we also plan to implement a
variable instrumental approach in order to move closer toward a causal interpretation
of our main results. In this section, we leave these issues aside and we address some
additional hypotheses and questions we would like to address in future work.
2.7.1 Migration
In section 2.2, we explained two ways in which internal migration could influence
diversity. First, the improvement of the Indonesian road network in the 1990s could
have affected the distribution of different ethnic groups across villages by inducing
minorities to relocate. Second, it could have changed the composition of individuals
who decided to stay in connected villages within each ethnic group.
15To further investigate this question, we plan to estimate a multinomial logistic regression with
four potential outcomes: whether a couple is interethnic and Indonesian speaking, interethnic
and non Indonesian speaking, mono-ethnic and Indonesian speaking, and mono-ethnic and non-
Indonesian speaking.
98
Unfortunately, such theories are difficult to test in our setting as we do not observe
population counts by ethnic group at the village level before 2000. Nevertheless, we
plan to implement the following two tests in order to get a better understanding of how
migration following the improvement of the road network could influence intergroup
contact.
First, we plan to take advantage of the fact that the 2000 and 2010 population
census reports the district of birth and the district of residence five years prior to the
interview of respondents. We will use these to analyze whether villages experience
a large change in their number of inter-district migrants following a change in social
access to different ethnic groups. Moreover, since we observe each respondent’s eth-
nicity, we plan to conduct this analysis by ethnic group. This analysis can also teach
us about shorter distance inter-village migration by restricting the sample to villages
close to a district border.
Second, we plan to analyse how SAsame and SAother correlate with population
growth. We will use the different waves of PODES, the triennial village census, to
observe the evolution of population at the village level from 1990 to 2011. We are
particularly interested in understanding whether villages where intergroup contact
is the most responsive to changes in social access are also villages where population
growth is the most responsive to changes in social access.
2.7.2 Contact hypothesis
In his seminal work on intergroup contact, Allport (1954) lays out several necessary
conditions for contact to reduce prejudice: equal status, common goals, intergroup
cooperation, and support of authorities. This framework suggests the utilization of
Indonesian specific institutional characteristics to shed light on potential heterogene-
ity analysis.
Equal status. For contact to reduce prejudice, differences among the different
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groups should be minimized and groups should not be in a hierarchical relationship.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we propose to construct a measure of social distance
between different ethnic groups in 1990 by using the 2000 Census and using predeter-
mined outcomes that were likely fixed in 1990, such as educational attainments, oc-
cupational indices, or household composition for adults. We would then test whether
the interethnic marriage rates increase more rapidly after the construction of a new
road for ethnic-pairs that are characterized by a smaller social distance in 1990.
Intergroup cooperation. Contact is more likely to reduce prejudice when the
different groups need to cooperate together instead of being in competition. We
propose to test this by looking at whether the expansion of road network is more
likely to have a positive effect on interethnic marriage rates when connecting villages
that do not produce the same kind of crops and goods. We plan to do this by
constructing a suitability index at the village level for different types of crops using
land characteristics (Bazzi et al., 2016). We also plan to use the PODES surveys
to identify villages that host important markets or schools. We would then examine
whether increased access to other ethnic groups has different effects on such villages’
inter-ethnic contacts.
Support of authorities. Contact is more likely to reduce prejudice when an
authority supports the interactions between the different groups. To test this last
hypothesis, we propose to exploit the coexistence of both elected and appointed village
heads. The Village Law no. 5 of 1979 led to the classification of villages into desa and
kelurahan, with different modes of governance for both types of villages (Martinez-
Bravo, 2014). While desa villages have an elected head16, the head of kelurahan
villages is appointed by district officials.17 Therefore, appointed village heads might
be more likely to have aligned incentives and to support interethnic contacts after
16The village head is elected for eight-years terms (five-years terms after the implementation of
Law no. 22 of 1999), with a maximum of two terms in office.
17See Martinez-Bravo (2014) for more details on desa and kelurahan villages.
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the expansion of road networks. On the contrary, elected village heads might be less
likely to support interethnic contacts following the expansion of the road network for
electoral reasons.
We propose to use these institutional features to test whether the support of
authorities is necessary for contacts to reduce prejudice. The expansion of the road
network could lead to a larger increase in the share of interethnic marriages when
several kelurahan villages are connected to each other, while the connection of desa
villages should lead to a lower increase in the share of interethnic marriages.
2.7.3 Fractionalization and polarization
Diversity is multi-faceted and can take several forms. In particular, fractionalization
and polarization have been shown to have different effects on conflict (Esteban and
Ray, 2008; Amodio and Chiovelli, 2018) and nation-building (Bazzi et al., 2019).
While fractionalization is high when a society is divided between many small groups,
polarization is high when a society is divided between a few groups of similar size.
We plan to follow this strand of the literature by separately studying the effects of
fractionalization (F ) and polarization (P ) on intergroup contacts.
For each village v, we will calculate F and P in its connected neighborhood Nv,t
for all years between 1990 and 2007.18 For simplicity, we drop the time subscripts
in defining F and P . Let pe,j be the population of ethnicity e in village j. Then,







18As described in section 6, the connected neighborhood of a village v is the union between v itself
and the set of all other villages that are within a 20 kilometers radius from the centroid of v, and
less than 2 kilometers away from a road.
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We will then estimate
yv,t = β1Fv,t + β2Pv,t + δv + γt + εv,t (2.4)
where yv,t is the share of interethnic marriages in village v and year t. In the same
way that the placement of roads could induce variations in realized diversity, it could
also induce variations in F and P depending on the specific set of villages that a road
would connect.19
2.7.4 Diversity and local development
Transportation network expansions can have important positive effects on economic
activity and welfare by reducing trade costs (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016; Don-
aldson, 2018) and migration costs (Morten and Oliveira, 2016). However, it is unclear
how diversity affects the effectiveness of such efforts at promoting local development
by reducing travel costs. This is despite the fact that every year massive investments
are made to develop the transportation networks in ethnically diverse countries (Bank,
2007).
On the one hand, ethnic diversity might lead to suboptimal investments in public
goods following the expansion of a transportation network. Indeed, increased market-
access could lead some villages to reach a sufficiently large potential beneficiaries
base to launch new public services and new private enterprises. Implementing such
19This approach suffers from ignoring general equilibrium effects and from the arbitrariness of the
thresholds used to define Nv,t. Therefore, we also plan to use related measures of polarization and
fractionalization that weight population of ethnic group e in village j by the distance between villages



























investments might require the cooperation of multiple stakeholders across different
ethnic groups (Alesina et al., 1999). As such, ethnically diverse communities might
be constrained in their ability to benefit fully from the expansion of transportation
networks if they are not able to solve this coordination problem.
On the other hand, investments in an improved network might be particularly
beneficial for local development if different ethnic groups tend to specialize in dif-
ferent economic activities. In such a case, increased market access would translate
into a broader potential consumer base for local producers instead of a more intense
competitive environment.
We propose to empirically investigate how the effect of road network expansion
on local development depends on diversity. We plan first to use our baseline model to
estimate the effect of SAsame and SAother on local development by using yearly data on
night-lights intensity at the village level. Other measures for local development could
be obtained from PODES, a triennial administrative census of Indonesian villages.
However, constructing a balanced panel from 1990 to 2007 might be challenging.
In line with the existing literature, we expect SAsame to have a positive effect on
local development. In regions where different ethnic groups are similar in their eco-
nomic activities, we expect SAother to have a negative effect on development because
of the negative effect that diversity can have on the ability of communities to coop-
erate. However, in regions where different ethnic groups specialize in the production
of different products, we expect this effect to become significantly smaller or even
positive.
2.7.5 Marriage market
Current scholarship on the marriage market in Indonesia finds a positive correlation
between economic development and ethnic intermarriage (Utomo and McDonald,
2016). Consistent with these findings, our preliminary results show that there is
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a strong correlation between the rates of interethnic marriages and shocks on ethnic
diversity following the construction of new roads or the improvement of existing roads.
We propose to further investigate how market-access to different ethnic groups
affects the marriage market. First, we will investigate whether the rise in interethnic
marriage rates is driven by matches from the main ethnic group to newly connected
ethnic groups, to previously connected ethnic groups. or by matches between different
minority ethnic groups. Second, we also plan to investigate who are the individuals in
terms of demographic characteristics who decide to marry outside of their own ethnic
group following the improvement of the road network.
We also plan to examine how the effects of road network expansion on interethnic
contacts depend on pre-existing traditional customs related to marriage. To do so,
we will exploit the 1997 IFLS survey, where local customs (adat) experts from 273
villages were interviewed. These experts were asked about local customs according
to traditional law and current practice, including on the acceptable age at marriage,
or post-marriage residence of couple (Buttenheim and Nobles, 2009).
2.8 Conclusion
Transportation networks not only bring individuals closer to markets, they can also
get them closer to other communities. In this paper, we test this idea in the context of
Indonesia. We argue that improvements in the country’s road network in the 1990s
increased the opportunities for interethnic contact, and show that larger access to
other ethnic groups is positively correlated with the share of interethnic marriages
and with the use of the national language at home. These results suggest that trans-
portation networks can affect interethnic relations by reducing the cost of interacting
with other ethnic groups.
In the future, we plan to tackle issues related to general equilibrium effects and
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endogeneity. We finally plan to use this framework to explore questions related to
the contact hypothesis, the role of transportation networks for local development,
the different effects of fractionalization and polarization for nation-building, and the
relationship between development and kinship networks.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2·1: Road Network in Sumatera - 2007 vs 1990























































Figure 2·2: Type of roads by year in Sumatera and Su-
lawesi
Notes: These figures represent the evolution in the share and the total number of roads






















































Figure 2·3: Type of roads by year in Kalimantan and
other islands
Notes: These figures represent the evolution in the share and the total number of roads
by type (asphaltic, paved, unpaved, or other) from 1990 to 2007.
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(a) Sumatra (b) Sulawesi
(c) Kalimantan (d) other
Figure 2·4: Density IRI by major island in 1990, 2000 and
2007
Notes: These figures present the distribution of the intensity roughness index (IRI) of roads
in 1990, 2000, and 2007 in Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and remaining outer-islands
(excluding Java and Bali). Lower IRI values correspond to higher quality roads.
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Figure 2·5: Ethnic diversity
Notes: This map represents ethnic diversity at the village level. Each color represents
a different ethnic group, and villages are colored according to the most majority ethnic
group. The population by ethnic group at the village level is obtained from the 2000
Census.
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Figure 2·6: Ethnic diversity in Sumatra
Notes: This map represents ethnic diversity at the village level in the island of Sumatera.
Each color represents a different ethnic group, and villages are colored according to the
most majority ethnic group. The population by ethnic group at the village level is obtained
from the 2000 Census.
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Figure 2·7: Ethnic diversity in Sulawesi
Notes: This map represents ethnic diversity at the village level in the island of Sulawesi.
Each color represents a different ethnic group, and villages are colored according to the
most majority ethnic group. The population by ethnic group at the village level is obtained
from the 2000 Census.
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Figure 2·8: Ethnic diversity in Kalimantan
Notes: This map represents ethnic diversity at the village level in the island of Kalimantan.
Each color represents a different ethnic group, and villages are colored according to the
most majority ethnic group. The population by ethnic group at the village level is obtained
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Figure 2·9: Ethnic diversity within villages
Notes: This figure represents the distribution of the village population share which is from















desa (<2km from a road, 1990)
desa (<2km from a road, 2007
(b) 2007
Figure 2·10: Example - Sekayu I, Musi Banyu Asin
Notes: These figures represent the set of villages that are connected to the village of
Sekayu I (kabupaten of Musi Banyu Asin in Sumatera) in (a) 1990, and (b) 2007. The
blue dot at the centre of the two figures represent the centroid of Sekayu I, and the dotted
line represents the 20 kilometers radius around the centroid. The blue lines correspond to
existing roads in 1990, and the red lines correspond to existing roads in 2007 but not in
1990. Villages are part of the neighborhood of Sekayu I if they are within the 20 kilometers
radius, and if they are less than 2 kilometers away from a road.
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Figure 2·11: Evolution in the access to other ethnic
groups, 2007 vs 1990
Notes: This figure the distribution of Shareother in 1990 and 2007. Higher values corre-


























1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Birth year of first child
Figure 2·12: Evolution in the share of interethnic mar-
riages
Notes: This figure represents the evolution in the share of interethnic marriages between
1985 and 2010, assuming that the year of marriage is the same as the year of birth of the
eldest child living in the same household in 2010.
117
2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Year 1990 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES mean sd min max mean sd min max
Social access (population count)
Shareother (%) 0.347 0.281 0 0.999 0.401 0.293 0 0.999
SAsame (thousands) 50.07 102.6 0.004 1,030 92.39 157.5 0.027 1,078
SAother ( thousands) 30.15 51.64 0 849.0 91.01 250.2 0 2,606
SAtotal (thousands) 80.22 125.9 0.004 1,057 183.4 351.0 0.075 2,690
Social access (village count)
Shareother (%) 0.207 0.286 0 0.993 0.296 0.306 0 0.996
SAsame 23.38 29.97 1 214 38.60 41.16 1 272
SAother 9.217 16.57 0 197 17.79 30.10 0 273
SAtotal 32.59 35.41 1 214 56.39 51.58 1 303
Interethnic marriages (%) 0.117 0.170 0 1 0.171 0.207 0 1
Language use (%)
all 0.197 0.324 0 1 0.200 0.304 0 1
among mono-ethnic couples 0.179 0.315 0 1 0.157 0.284 0 1
among inter-ethnic couples 0.454 0.454 0 1 0.503 0.440 0 1
Number of villages 18,400 18,400 18,400 18,400 18,400 18,400 18,400 18,400
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in this paper. Ethnic
statistics used to calculate the different social access measures come from the 2000 census.
Variables related to intermarriage and language come from the 2010 census and were constructed
by only keeping couples that got married in 1990 and 2007. The unit of analysis is the village.
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Table 2.2: Social access and interethnic marriage (first
specification)
Dep. Var. share interethnic marriages
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A - Population Count
Shareother 0.250*** 0.0239*** 0.0129***
(0.0133) (0.00505) (0.00422)
lnSAtotal -0.00449*** 0.00367*** -0.000421
(0.00172) (0.000469) (0.000389)
Panel B - Village Count
Shareother 0.178*** 0.0268*** 0.0228***
(0.0118) (0.00400) (0.00341)
lnSAtotal -0.0138*** 0.00326*** -0.00189***
(0.00260) (0.000519) (0.000500)
Observations 324,846 324,846 324,846
Mean dep. var. 0.148 0.148 0.148
Number of villages 18,400 18,400 18,400
Village FE X X
Year FE X
Road quality >30 km/h >30 km/h >30 km/h
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The unit of observation is the village in a given year (18,400 villages times 18 years
from 1990 to 2007). The outcome is the share of interethnic marriages. The year of marriage is
assumed to be the year preceding the birth of the eldest child still living in the same household of
the parents. The main explanatory variable are the total social access and the share of the total
social access which comes from other ethnic groups. In Panel A, the (logged) full population
counts are used to calculate social access. In Panel B, the (logged) number of villages are used
to calculate social access. While column 1 doesn’t include any controls, village fixed effects are
included in columns 2 and 3, and year fixed effects are included in column 3. Standard errors
are clustered at the district level, of which there are 199.
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Table 2.3: Social access and interethnic marriage (second
specification)
Dep. Var. share interethnic marriages
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A - Population Count
lnSAother 0.0370*** 0.00150** 0.000672
(0.00178) (0.000663) (0.000536)
lnSAsame -0.0444*** 0.00262*** -0.000810
(0.00199) (0.00101) (0.000818)
Panel B - Village Count
lnSAother 0.0341*** 0.00801*** 0.00425***
(0.00301) (0.000763) (0.000618)
lnSAsame -0.0274*** 0.000374 -0.00317***
(0.00245) (0.000536) (0.000598)
Observations 324,846 324,846 324,846
Mean dep. var. 0.148 0.148 0.148
Number of villages 18,400 18,400 18,400
Village FE X X
Year FE X
Road quality >30 km/h >30 km/h >30 km/h
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications are the same as in the previous table, except for the regressors. The
main explanatory variables of interest are the social access to other ethnic groups and the social
access to the same-ethnicity ethnic group. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.4: Social access and interethnic marriage - Lagged
effects
Dep. Var. share interethnic marriages
(1) (2) (3)












Observations 324,818 306,868 288,857
Mean dep. var. 0.148 0.150 0.152
Number of villages 18,400 18,400 18,400
Village FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Road quality >30 km/h >30 km/h >30 km/h
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports estimates for Equation 2.1 with 1-year and 2-years lagged effects.
The social access variables are calculated using village counts instead of population counts.
The dependant variable is the share of interethnic marriages. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
121
Table 2.5: Social access and language use at home
Dep. Var. share households using Indonesian
all households inter-ethnic mono-ethnic
(1) (2) (3)
Shareother 0.0134** -0.00282 0.00650
(0.00602) (0.00750) (0.00624)
lnSAtotal -0.00347*** -0.00220 -0.00252**
(0.00123) (0.00136) (0.00122)
Observations 324,818 322,484 322,484
Number of villages 18,400 17,003 18,400
Mean dep. var. 0.224 0.485 0.197
Village FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Road quality >30 km/h >30 km/h >30 km/h
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports estimates for Equation 2.1. The social access variables are calculated
using village counts instead of population counts. The dependant variable is the share of couples
using Indonesian at home among all couples (column 1), inter-ethnic couples (column 2), and
mono-ethnic couples (column 3). Controls include village fixed-effects and year fixed-effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Chapter 3
The Long-Run Impact of Losing Siblings
During a Civil Conflict
3.1 Introduction
What are the long-run consequences of losing a relative during a civil conflict? While
the loss of a parent in such circumstances is known to have adverse consequences on
children (Dupraz and Ferrara, 2018; Kovac, 2017), less is known about the effects of
losing siblings during a conflict. We might expect this adverse event to have a lasting
impact on human development, although it is not clear in which direction the effect
should go. On the one hand, the standard quantity-quality framework of fertility
suggests that the loss of a sibling should have a positive effect on human capital by
reducing competition among surviving children for the resources of the family. On
the other hand, the loss of a sibling could have an adverse effect on human capital for
multiple reasons. First, if child labor is widespread in a society, this might translate
into a negative income shock, which could, in turn, reduce parental investments into
the surviving children. Second, the loss of a sibling could also have substantial adverse
psychological effects, as is the case in non-conflict settings (Fanos and Nickerson, 1991;
Machajewski and Kronk, 2013).
In this chapter, I study the long-run effects of losing a sibling during the 1994
genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda on the education of surviving children.1 In less
1I have to limit the scope of the study to women because of data limitations. Indeed, the
different waves of the Demographic and Health Survey used in this chapter only contain information
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than four months, from April to July of that same year, thousands of Tutsis were
systematically slaughtered across the country, along with moderate Hutu and political
opponents to the extremist Hutu faction in power. In total, around 0.5-1 million
individuals are believed to have died during the genocide (Prunier, 1996; Verpoorten,
2005). The sheer scale of the genocide and its relative brevity allow me to use Rwanda
as a case study to tackle this question.
To generate plausible exogenous variation in the number of siblings each woman
lost during the genocide, I rely on the specific patterns of excess mortality in 1994
compared to previous years (de Walque and Verwimp, 2010). While the excess mor-
tality rate is relatively low and constant for young children, it starts to increase with
age for teenagers and young adults. Excess mortality then becomes high and stable
for individuals who are older than 25-30 years old. Moreover, this pattern is more
pronounced for men than for women.
The intuition behind my empirical strategy boils down to the following obser-
vations. Consider two women who are similar in all dimensions except for the age
of their unique brother: the first woman has an older brother by five years, while
the second woman has a younger brother by five years. The only situation in which
we should expect the first woman to have a higher probability of losing her brother
during the genocide is if she is a teenager. On the contrary, having an older or a
younger brother by five years shouldn’t matter for a woman who was a young child
or an adult at the onset of the genocide.
More formally, I instrument for the number of siblings a woman lost during the
genocide by the expected number of siblings she should lose based on the age and sex
profile of her siblings, and the province she lives in. For each demographic group –
where a demographic group is defined as the intersection between an age group, sex,
on the birth and death history of all the ever-born siblings of female respondents. No comparable
information is provided for male respondents.
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and province – I compute an excess mortality rate in 1994 compared to an average
year. I then construct a Bartik instrument by taking the inner product between the
number of siblings of each demographic group a woman has, and excess mortality rates
for these demographic groups. The resulting variable corresponds to an expectation
of lost siblings based on the age and sex profile of the siblings, together with the
province the household lives in. This measure is a strong predictor of the actual
number of lost siblings.
I start by showing that the loss of a sibling has strong positive effects on human
capital. Indeed, when I use this instrumental variable strategy, I find that losing
siblings in 1994 leads to a substantial positive effect on education for women. Fur-
thermore, this effect is driven by women who were younger than 12 years old in 1994.
Estimates suggest that for women who were young enough to go to school in 1994,
the loss of a sibling leads to more than one extra year of schooling. These positive
effects on human capital are confirmed when I’m looking at alternative proxies. In-
deed, the loss of a sibling has a positive effect on the height-to-age z-score of women.
Additionally, I show that it leads women to get married later to a higher quality
husband.
To address potential concerns that this instrument might violate the exclusion
restriction, I show that those results remain unchanged when controlling for some
critical aspects of family structure, such as the woman’s rank in the family, the number
of older brothers and sisters she has, the average space between births, and age-group
fixed effects. The results are also robust when including a set of dummy variables
capturing characteristics of each sibling, as well as including interactions between
family characteristics and time trends. Additionally, the results also pass a series of
placebo tests. I start by showing that the loss of a sibling doesn’t affect pre-determined
variables (such as the number of children a woman had before the genocide, height
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for women who already reached their adult height, and age at marriage for women
who were already married in 1994). I proceed by showing that my empirical strategy
doesn’t work in Burundi, a country that is similar to Rwanda in many dimensions,
but didn’t experience a genocide in 1994. Indeed, the instrument is uncorrelated with
both the number of lost siblings (first stage) and education (reduced form). I finally
run a permutation test and show that the true coefficients are extreme events, and
that the test is correctly behaved.
Having gained confidence in the validity of the instrument, I proceed by showing
that the positive effects on human capital do not translate into greater physical capital
accumulation (the baseline measure of physical capital being the DHS wealth index, a
composite measure of households’ living standards based on selected assets ownership,
materials used for housing construction, and types of water access and sanitation
facilities.). In fact, the loss of a sibling increases the probability for a woman to be
poor. This result is consistent with multiple explanations: among which, the loss of
a sibling could lead to a negative income effect, or to a shift in preferences away from
physical assets and toward more mobile assets such as education.
While several mechanisms could be at play, I show that the results on human cap-
ital and physical capital accumulation are consistent with a quantity-quality frame-
work of fertility. Parents who lose a child in 1994 face a choice between two coping
strategies: having additional children after the genocide (replacement effect), or in-
creasing their investments in the human capital of the surviving children. In partic-
ular, whether parents go for the former or the latter strategy should depend on the
cost of having an additional child. In addition, we should expect the negative effects
of losing siblings on wealth to be partially offset in households that do not replace
the lost children: because increased human capital could translate into more wealth
in the long-run, and because of decreased competition among surviving siblings for
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the physical capital of the household.
To support this hypothesis, I provide two pieces of evidence. First, I show that
women become more educated after losing a sibling only if they don’t have a sibling
born after the genocide. This suggests that the decision to increase investments in
human capital of the surviving children depends on whether parents decide to replace
the lost children. As expected, the negative effect on wealth is significantly lower for
women whose parents decided not to have additional children after 1994. Second, I
argue that we can use the age of the youngest child in a family as a proxy for the cost
faced by parents to have another child. I provide some evidence that the replacement
effect and the negative effect on wealth are stronger in families that face lower costs
of having an additional child. On the other hand, in those same families, the positive
effect on education is weaker.
Another mechanism that could explain my results are relief programs. After
1994, many genocide survivors who were sufficiently young to go to school received a
scholarship. If the loss of a sibling was used to screen which children could receive a
scholarship, my results could be driven by such relief programs. In order to understand
if these relief programs are likely to explain the positive effects on education that I’m
observing, I use the fact that those programs are targeting Tutsi survivors. I show
that for my results to be solely driven by Tutsi survivors, I would need an effect
of scholarships on education that is unrealistically large. I therefore conclude that
while relief programs probably play an important role to explain my results, they are
unlikely to explain more than half of the size of the effects on education that I’m
documenting.
This chapter is closely related to three prior studies that document relationships
between the loss of household members during the genocide and socio-economic out-
comes. Verpoorten and Berlage (2007) use a small panel of households to look at the
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determinants of economic mobility between 1990 and 2002. Among other results, the
authors document a weak but significantly negative relationship between the loss of
a household member (not necessarily a sibling) and assets holding. Similarly, Justino
and Verwimp (2013), using the same dataset, do not find clear evidence for an effect
of violent death of a household member on movement in or out of poverty. Finally,
Kraehnert et al. (2019) use DHS data to investigate how different types of exposure
to violence during the genocide of 1994 impact fertility. Among other results, the
authors document a negative correlation between losing siblings during the genocide
and fertility, and they argue that this result might be driven by a psychological mech-
anism. My paper builds on these works by focusing on long-run consequences of losing
siblings (we could indeed expect the loss of a parent and the loss of siblings to have
different consequences on human capital accumulation) and human capital accumu-
lation. Additionally, my study differs from the aforementioned papers by proposing
a new identification strategy.
This chapter relates to several strands of the literature. First, I contribute to the
literature on how civil conflicts affect human capital. Researchers have shown that
civil conflicts have an impact on education (Blattman and Annan, 2010; Brück et al.,
2019; Shemyakina, 2011), the marriage market (Abramitzky et al., 2011; Bethmann
and Kvasnicka, 2013; Brainerd and College, 2007; Shemyakina, 2013), domestic vio-
lence (Gutierrez and Gallegos, 2016; La Mattina, 2017; Noe and Rieckmann, 2013),
risk aversion (Voors et al., 2012), and political mobilization (Bellows and Miguel,
2006). However, less is known about how civil conflicts could affect human capital
through the loss of relatives. Two studies that examine the effect of father loss are
particularly related to this chapter. Dupraz and Ferrara (2018) use historical records
to show that sons of soldiers who died during the U.S. Civil War had lower occupa-
tional scores relative to sons of soldiers who returned. Similarly, Kovac (2017) shows
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that paternal death during the 1991-1995 Croatian-Serbian war had negative effects
on educational attainments, and that those effects are largely driven by maternal
stress during the in-utero period. I add to this literature by showing that the loss
of siblings is an important mechanism through which civil conflicts can have lasting
consequences on human capital.
Second, my findings on the long-run economic consequences of losing siblings relate
to a broader literature on the effects of crises that drastically increased mortality.
Several papers argue that such shocks can have long-run growth-enhancing effects.
For example, mass killings and displacements of populations have been shown to
influence long-run growth by changing social structures (Acemoglu et al., 2011) and
by making more land available (Chaney and Hornbeck, 2016). Similarly, studies
show that the Black Death has caused a substantial structural transformation of the
European economy by raising wages (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013b) and making more
land available (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013a). Finally, Young (2005) also argues that
the AIDS epidemic in Africa most likely has a positive effect on human capital by
lowering fertility. Other scholars have argued that such shocks hurt the economy. For
example, Lorentzen et al. (2008) argue that higher mortality in Africa has an adverse
effect on growth by reducing incentives to accumulate capital. Similarly, Alfani (2013)
shows that the pervasiveness of the plague in Italy during the 17th century harmed
the economy.
Third, I contribute to the literature on the quantity-quality framework of fertility.
While there is a large body of empirical work testing for the relevance of the tradeoff in
developed countries (see Black et al. (2005); Bleakley and Lange (2009); Angrist et al.
(2010) for an example), Alidou and Verpoorten (2019) do not find supporting evidence
for that framework in Sub-Saharan Africa. I add to this literature by providing
evidence that the loss of a sibling has a strong effect on education in a Sub-Saharan
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African setting, and that these positive effects seem to be more important in families
that face a higher cost of having an additional child.
Fourth, this chapter relates to the literature that looks at the effects of child
mortality on surviving siblings. Indeed, the loss of siblings could have emotional
consequences (Fanos and Nickerson, 1991; Machajewski and Kronk, 2013) as well
as educational consequences (Fletcher et al. (2013) for the US; Thamarapani et al.
(2018) in Indonesia) on the surviving siblings. The fact that I’m looking at sibling
mortality during a civil conflict means that my paper differs in several dimensions
from those studies. First, these papers mostly rely on infant mortality to identify the
effect of losing siblings on surviving children. In this chapter, I mostly rely on the
loss of siblings who were already teenagers or adults. Second, losing a sibling from a
non-violent death might have very different consequences from losing siblings during
a genocide.
Finally, I contribute to the vast literature on the economic consequences of the
genocide in Rwanda. Several studies have documented that it had detrimental ef-
fects on education (Akresh and de Walque, 2008; Guariso and Verpoorten, 2018;
La Mattina, 2018), on malnutrition (Agüero and Deolalikar, 2012; Akresh et al., 2011),
on economic outcomes (Justino and Verwimp, 2013; Serneels and Verpoorten, 2015;
Lopez and Wodon, 2005; Hodler, 2019), on the marriage market outcomes of women
(Jayaraman et al., 2009; Kraehnert et al., 2019; La Mattina, 2017; Schindler, 2010),
and on mental health (Dyregrov et al., 2000; Schaal and Elbert, 2006; Brounéus, 2010;
Familiar et al., 2016).
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 The 1994 Genocide
According to the 1991 census, the last one before the 1994 events, Rwanda had a
population of around 8 million individuals, of which 85% was Hutu, and 12% was
Tutsi. When the country gained independence from Belgium in 1962, it soon became
the theatre of political tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, and multiple episodes
of ethnic violence occurred during the following decades.2 Those post-independence
events resulted in waves of Tutsi refugees to neighboring countries, and especially to
Uganda. This is where the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was created in 1987-8
by Tutsi refugees. In 1990, the RPF launched attacks in Rwanda, initiating a civil
conflict that will last until 1993 and the Arusha peace agreement.
On April 6, 1994, the plane of Juvénal Habyarimana, then President of Rwanda,
was shot down in the surroundings of Kigali. On that same day, an extremist Hutu
faction took power and executed a plan that had been cautiously prepared during
the last few years. During less than four months, from April to July 1994, thousands
of Tutsi were systematically slaughtered across the country, together with moderate
Hutu and political opponents to the extremist Hutu sect that took power right after
the airplane crash. In July 1994, the RPF stopped the genocide and seized power.
Around 0.8 million Tutsi and 6-60 thousand Hutus are believed to have died during
the genocide, in addition to soldiers from the RPF and the Rwandan Armed Forces
(Verpoorten, 2005).
3.2.2 Education
The 1994 genocide had a large and disruptive effect on the educational system in
Rwanda, with schools being ill-functioning because of the destruction of physical
2See Prunier (1996); Des Forges (1999); Mamdani (2001); Strauss (2006) for more details about
the history of the conflict.
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capital, the loss of teachers, and the disruption of the academic year in 1994. The
genocide significantly reduced the number of years of schooling in the short-run for
children who were school-aged in 1994 (Akresh and de Walque, 2008), mainly because
of grade-repetition (Guariso and Verpoorten, 2018). Consistent with this interpreta-
tion, the impacted children eventually caught up. Indeed, children who were more
exposed to the genocide were not significantly less educated than other individuals in
2005 and 2010 (La Mattina, 2018).
The lack of long-run effects of the genocide on schooling is in apparent contra-
diction with what has been observed in many different settings, where conflicts have
been shown to have negative effects on schooling in the long-run (Justino et al., 2014;
León, 2012; Singh and Shemyakina, 2016; Verwimp and Van Bavel, 2014). This could
be explained by different policies that were launched in the aftermath of the genocide.
Most importantly, many scholarships were distributed to the victims of the genocide,
and primary school became free and mandatory in 2003.
3.3 Data
The main data source used in this chapter are the 2005, 2010 and 2014-15 waves of
the Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey (DHS).3 Each wave of the DHS survey
contains rich demographic and health information about around 10.000 women, aged
16-49 at the time of the interview. I drop from my sample all the women who were
not born yet when the genocide started.4
The main explanatory variable I’m interested in is the number of siblings a woman
lost during the 1994 genocide. In all the waves of the DHS, female respondents are
asked to provide the birth history of all of their ever-born siblings. For each of those
3While another wave occurred in 2000, I do not use it since it is not geo-coded
4Indeed, there might be replacement effects that are endogenous to the genocide.
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siblings, they are also asked for their sex, and whether they are still alive or not.5. If
the sibling is not alive, they are asked to provide his date of death. This allows me
to know, for each woman, how many brothers and sisters they lost in 1994, and how
old they were at that time.6
In order to study what are the effects of losing siblings during the 1994 genocide,
I construct several outcome variables related to education (the number of years of
schooling), age at marriage (for the woman, for her husband, and the age gap between
the two partners), quality of husband (his education, his attitudes toward beating his
wife or his children, and whether he has several wives), to fertility (number of children
born after the genocide, ideal number of children for the woman and her husband,
and the gap between realised and ideal fertility), domestic and non-domestic violence,
and work.
While DHS provides a lot of informative variables about women, it also has im-
portant limitations. First, the data doesn’t contain any information about ethnicity.
Second, the data doesn’t contain any information about parents. In particular, I don’t
observe whether they also died during the genocide, and I don’t have any information
about their socio-economic status. Those are important limitations since ethnicity
and social status were important predictors for which families were targeted during
the genocide. Third, I don’t observe anything related to migration, although the
genocide lead to large scale displacement. Finally, I don’t observe any information
about a woman’s mental health, which is likely to be impacted by the loss of a sibling.
In Table 3.1, I provide summary statistics for the main variables of interest. Be-
cause all the women appearing in my sample were at most 49 years old at the time
5Recall bias should not be a threat to my empirical strategy as long as individuals make no
mistake when reporting whether a sibling died before, during, or after the genocide. That is, the
precise year of death doesn’t matter. Although this condition is untestable, it is likely to be met
given the sheer scale of the 1994 events.
6Although men are also interviewed in DHS, they are not asked for the birth and death history
of their siblings. This is why this study focuses on women.
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of the interview, and that the DHS waves I’m using occurred at least 11 years after
the genocide, the average woman in my sample was relatively young in 1994 (around
14 years old). Moreover, the typical women had slightly more than 2 brothers and 2
sisters when the genocide started, and lost around 0.18 brothers and 0.11 sisters in
1994. Slightly more than 17% of the women in my sample lost at least one sibling in
1994. This suggests that many of the women who indicate having lost at least one
sibling in my sample are Hutu, since the pre-genocide Tutsi population represented
around 10-12% of the total population, and that there was a 75% mortality rate
among Tutsis. Slightly more than 5% of the women in my sample report having lost
2 or more siblings, while around 2% report having lost 3 or more siblings. Finally,
the average woman in my sample spends around 4.4 years in school, and gets married
when she’s 21 years old, with a husband who is 25.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 OLS Specification
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the loss of siblings during the 1994 genocide
could have influenced human capital, and more particularly education. To tackle this
question, I estimate the equation
yi,d = β1DeadSiblingsi,d + β2Xi,d + δp + εi,d (3.1)
where yi,d is the education of woman i living in district d, DeadSiblingsi,d is the
number of siblings lost by woman i in 1994, and Xi,d is a vector of individual controls
including age, age square, altitude, a rural/urban dummy, the number of brothers, the
number of sisters, religion, and year of interview fixed effects. I also include district
fixed effects δd.
The estimate of interest, β1, is likely to be biased for several reasons. First,
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the specification presented above suffers from reverse causality. The direction of the
bias induced by this first source of endogeneity is ambiguous. On the one hand, more
educated and wealthier individuals seemed to have been targeted during the genocide.
This would lead to an upward bias of the estimate. On the other hand, those same
individuals might have had more opportunities to seek for help or refuge. Moreover,
poor individuals could also have had been the most impacted by the genocide. These
would lead to a downward bias.
Second, this empirical specification also suffers from an omitted variable bias. On
the one hand, the DHS data in Rwanda do not provide information on the ethnicity
of the respondent. This is also likely to bias my estimates since Tutsi were targeted
during the genocide, and were, on average, wealthier and more educated than the
Hutu. This would lead to an upward bias. On the other hand, women with a weaker
social network might have lost more siblings during the genocide and have weaker
prospects on the job and marriage market, which would lead to a downward bias.
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
In order to move toward a more causal interpretation of my main findings, I exploit
three features of the genocide: the sharp increase in mortality in 1994, the specific age
and sex patterns of excess mortality, and geographic variations in the intensity of the
genocide. This allows me to argue that women who had siblings with characteristics
in 1994 that were making them more likely to be victim of violence, and who were
living in a province where the genocide was particularly intense, were more likely to
lose siblings relative to other women.
The first feature of the Rwandan genocide that I use is the stark increase in the
number of deaths in 1994. In Figure 3·1, I plot the number of siblings that women
interviewed for the 2000-2015 DHS waves lost during each year from 1960 until 2010.
While the number of lost siblings steadily increases from the 1960s until the late
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1990s, it increases sharply in 1994 the year of the genocide. While the number of
deaths seems to be higher than usual in 1993 and 1995, I show in Figure 3·8 that
those seem to be irregularities coming exclusively from the 2005 DHS wave.7
The second feature of the genocide that I use is the demographic profile of the
individuals who died in 1994 relative to another year (de Walque and Verwimp, 2010).
While the individuals who died in 1994 mostly passed away from violent deaths,
those who died in other years mostly passed away from natural death. Hence, we
should expect different demographic characteristics for individuals passing away in
1994 compared to other years. To see this, I compute the probability of dying by
age in a given year based on the dates of birth and death of all the siblings reported
by women interviewed in the DHS 2005, 2010 and 2015.8 I plot those probabilities
for each year from 1990 until 1998 in Figure 3·2. While the mortality rate is the
highest for new-borns and quickly stabilizes below 0.02 prior to the genocide and
right after, we can observe a completely different mortality pattern in 1994, with the
mortality rate increasing with age from adolescence to adulthood. In Figure 3·3, I
plot the excess mortality in 1994 compared to 1992 by age and by sex, which I denote
P (age, sex).9 While the excess probability of dying during the genocide compared to
a typical year is constant and below 0.05 for children below 12, it steadily increases
between 12 and the mid-30s. After that, the excess mortality rate stabilizes itself at
high levels, before decreasing again for individuals who are older than 50 years old.
This pattern is also more pronounced for men than for women.10
7One might indeed be worried that the civil conflict between the Rwandan Armed Forces and
the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which started in 1990, could have lead to an increase in the death toll
before the genocide. If this was indeed the case, such trends should appear in all the DHS waves,
which is not the case. I therefore conclude that the increase in the number of deaths in the 2005
wave must come from inconsistencies.
8I exclude the 2000 wave since it is not geocoded.
9Because of inconsistencies in the 2005 DHS wave, the year 1993 cannot be used as a valid baseline
year. For that reason, I use 1992 as the comparison year.
10The higher mortality rate for men compared to women can also be observed in the 2002 Rwandan
census (La Mattina, 2017).
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I finally exploit geographic variations in the intensity of the genocide. In Fig-
ure 3·4, I plot the excess mortality by age and sex Pp(age, sex), where p is one of
the 12 Rwandan provinces.11 The estimates I obtain are consistent with the findings
of Verpoorten (2010), who uses records from local courts that were created to judge
the crimes committed during the genocide (Gacaca courts) to construct measures of
genocide intensity at the local level. Indeed, I find that the excess mortality is increas-
ing during teenage years and young adulthood in many provinces where the genocide
was particularly intense, such as Butare, Gitarama, or Kigali (both rural and urban).
On the contrary, the excess mortality rates are much smaller in provinces where the
genocide was less intense, such as in the northern provinces of Byumba, Ruhengeri,
and Gisenyi. The only region for which I find an excess mortality pattern that is not
in line with the findings of Verpoorten (2010) is Cyangugu, in the western part of the
country. While Verpoorten (2010) finds out that the genocide was relatively intense
in Cyangugu, I do not find high excess mortality rates for any age group or sex in
that province.12
Taken together, those three features of the genocide allow me to generate varia-
tions in the number of siblings lost by a woman in 1994. For each woman, I associate
an expected number of siblings lost because of the genocide based on the age-sex
profile of her siblings and the province she lives in.13 Denoting Pp(ages, sexs) the
excess probability for sibling s of dying in 1994 compared to 1992 in province p14 and
11In order to get stable estimates, I estimate only 13 probabilities by sex and province. Indeed, I
group individuals into 3 years age-groups from 0 to 29 years old, in 5 years age-groups from 30 to
39 years old, and in a single group for individuals who are 40 or older.
12I repeat the same exercise at the regional level in Figure 3·9, and I again find excess probabilities
that are much larger in the region of Kigali city than in the North and in the West of the country.
13Although the genocide lead to massive displacement of populations (Verwimp and Van Bavel,
2005), I’m not able to take that into account since the Rwandan DHS waves I’m using don’t contain
any information about migration history. In the Robustness Checks section, I show that the analysis
is robust to the exclusion from the sample of regions with high migration rates following the genocide.
14To be more precise, this excess probability at the province level also depends on the sector a
woman is from since I use leave-one-out mortality rates. For the sake of clarity, I don’t add any
subscripts for sectors.
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To see the intuition behind this instrument, consider two comparable women who
are both 10 years old in 1994. The first one has a brother who is 5 years old, while the
second one has a brother who is 15 years old. We should expect the second woman
to have a higher probability of losing a sibling than the first one. Now, consider that
same pair of women, but suppose that instead of being 10 years old at the time of
the genocide, they are 5 years old. The first one would thus have a new-born brother,
while the second one would have a 10 years old brother. In this scenario, we should
expect those two women to have similar probabilities to lose a sibling, since excess
mortality remains constant for children younger than 12. This is also the case if both
women are 40 years old, since excess mortality remains constant for adults. Finally,
suppose two identical women who are both 10 years old in 1994 and both have a
brother who is 15 years old. However, suppose that only the first woman lives in a
province where the genocide had a high intensity. We should here expect the first
woman to have a higher probability of losing a sibling than the second one.
I finally estimate
yi,p = β1DeadSiblingsi,p + β2Xi,p + δp + εi (3.2)
where DeadSiblingsi,p is instrumented by E[DeadSiblings]i,p.
3.5 Loss of Siblings and Human Capital
In this section, I start by documenting a strong and positive association between
education and the number of siblings a woman lost in 1994. I then estimate Equa-
tion 3.2, where the number of siblings a woman lost in 1994 is instrumented by the
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expected number of lost siblings based on the province where she lives, and the age
and sex profile of her siblings. I show that the loss of a sibling during the genocide
leads women to become more educated and that this effect is driven by women who
were sufficiently young to go to school. I then examine whether we should fear that
the exclusion restriction might be violated, and show that my results are stable when
controlling for some key characteristics of family structure. Finally, I show that the
loss of a sibling also has a positive effect on other proxies for human capital, such as
height and the quality of marriage.
3.5.1 OLS Results
In the first column of Table 3.2, I document a strong positive correlation between
education and the number of siblings a woman lost in 1994 when controlling for
the number of brothers and sisters. In column 2, we can see that this association
remains highly significant when controlling for additional individual characteristics.
When adding geographic characteristics such as the altitude of the cluster and an
urban dummy (column 3), the relationship remains highly significant, although the
coefficient becomes smaller. This is not surprising given that the genocide was more
intense in urban areas (de Walque and Verwimp, 2010), where educational attainment
tends to be higher. Finally, this result holds and remains highly significant when
including district fixed effects (column 4). Again, the coefficient of interest becomes
smaller in this last specification. This is not surprising neither given that the genocide
was more intense in some regions that tended to be more developed, such as Kigali.
Using this last specification, the loss of a sibling in 1994 is associated with a 0.1
increase in the number of years of schooling.
As underlined in the previous section, it is ambiguous in which direction the bias
of this coefficient should go. In a survey of households impacted by the genocide,
André and Platteau (1998) show that the two main categories of individuals who
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died during the 1994 conflict were persons with relatively large land property (mostly
old persons) and land-poor and malnourished people (mostly young individuals).15
Since my sample only contains women who were younger than 40 in 1994, and that
the average woman in my sample is relatively young, it is likely that a large proportion
of the siblings who passed away in my sample belonged to the second category. If this
is the case, we should expect the coefficients presented in the last column of Table 3.2
to be downward biased.
3.5.2 IV Results
Education:
I first examine what is the effect of losing siblings in 1994 on the number of years
of schooling of women. The results are presented in the first column of Table 3.3.
We can see in the bottom part of the table that the first stage works well, with the
expected number of lost siblings being an excellent predictor for the actual number of
lost siblings. Notice that the coefficient is slightly higher than one. This is because I’m
constructing my instrument by using excess mortality instead of the actual mortality
rate in 1994, in which case we should expect a coefficient equal to one.
The IV estimate is surprisingly high, with the loss of one sibling leading to slightly
less than one extra year of schooling. Several comments can be made on this result.
First, this positive effect on the number of years of schooling is remarkably high given
that the women in the sample spends an average of 4.5 years in school. Second, those
results indicate that the OLS estimate was downward biased. This is in line with the
argument made in the previous paragraph that the relatively young composition of
my sample probably gives more weight to poor and malnourished individuals relative
15In their sample, 32 individuals out of 596 died during the 1994 civil war. The first category
accounts for 10 individuals (of which 7 were older than 50). The second category, land-poor and
malnourished people, accounts for 11 individuals (of which 8 were children). The remaining victims
were persons considered to be trouble-makers and youth engaged in militias. See Table 16 of André
and Platteau (1998) for more details.
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to persons who accumulated wealth and land during their lifetime, hence leading to a
downward bias of the OLS estimate. Third, those results confirm that losing a sibling
during a conflict has totally different implications for education compared to losing
a father during a conflict, and compared to the loss of a sibling from a non-violent
death.
Of course, we could be worried that some of the family characteristics that are
driving the variations in my instrument could influence education through another
way than via the loss of siblings in 1994. In the following columns, I add controls
for key family characteristics that might be problematic. In column 2, I control for
a woman’s rank in her family. Indeed, it could be the case that parents invest more
resources in the education of their first child and fewer resources in the education
of younger children.16 Alternatively, being the youngest child of the family might
have a positive effect on education if older siblings work and can help to finance the
education of younger siblings (Alidou and Verpoorten, 2019). In column 3, I control
for the number of older brothers. While I already control for the number of brothers
and the number of sisters in the baseline specification, it might be the case that
having several older brothers is especially good or bad for the educational outcomes
of women. In column 4, I control for the number of older sisters for similar reasons. In
column 5, I control for the average space between the births of each sibling. Indeed,
parents that are able to space more the births of their children might have different
socio-economic characteristics than other parents. Finally, in column 6, I control
simultaneously for all those extra family characteristics. As we can see, the inclusion
of those additional controls does not have a significant effect on the IV estimates. In
section 8, I present a robustness check where I show that this baseline result is also
robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, I show that controlling
for the interaction between time trends and family characteristics doesn’t affect my
16See Kessler (1991) for a test of this hypothesis.
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results.
Given the high mortality rate during the genocide, another threat to identification
might also come from sample selection. Indeed, the IV estimate could be upward
biased if the women who lost many siblings were able to survive only because of an
unobservable which is correlated with education (such as political connections or the
strength of a woman’s social network). If this is the case, we would expect to observe
the IV estimate to be positive even for subgroups of women whose education was
already predetermined in 1994.
As a sanity check, I verify in Table 3.4 whether the positive effect on education
documented in the previous paragraphs is solely driven by women who were younger
than 12 in 1994.17 In Panel A, we can see that the loss of a sibling leads women who
were younger than 12 in 1994 to receive more than 1.5 extra years of schooling. On
the contrary, in Panel B, we can see that the loss of a sibling has no significant effect
on the education of women who were older than 12 in 1994. Again, those results are
robust to the inclusion of additional controls for family characteristics. These results
suggest that the IV estimates for the effect of losing siblings on education are unlikely
to be driven by sample selection.
In the rest of the chapter, I will use the specification used in column 6 as my
baseline specification.
Health and Marriage:
I now look at the effects on health and marriage to confirm that the loss of siblings
has a positive impact on human capital. In Figure 3·5, I show that the loss of a
sibling has a significantly positive effect on health, as measured by the height-to-age
z-score of a woman. Moreover, women who lost siblings are also getting married later,
17I choose 12 as the cutoff since children are supposed to finish primary school at 12 and that only
a small minority of women go beyond primary school.
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with a husband who is himself more educated. In Figure 3·6, I show that while the
increase in the education of the husband is driven by women who were sufficiently
young in order to go to school in 1994, this is not the case anymore when it comes
to the positive effects on health. This indicates that the increase in education alone
cannot be the only mechanism through which the loss of siblings impacts the life of
women.
3.6 Loss of Siblings and Wealth
Does the increase in human capital following the loss of a sibling translate into positive
effects on wealth? In Table 3.5, I test this by replicating Table 3.3 using as the
outcome variable a wealth index going from 1 (poorest decile) to 10 (richest decile).18
I find that the loss of siblings has a significantly negative effect on wealth. Again, the
estimate is stable throughout specifications.19
In order to know whether this negative effect on wealth leads to more poverty,
I run the same regression using a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a woman
is in decile i of the wealth distribution. As we can see in Figure 3·7, the loss of a
sibling has a strong and significant positive effect on the probability for a woman to
be in the first (poorest) decile of the wealth distribution. That is, losing a sibling
significantly increases the probability to be poor. This effect fades away as we move
up in the wealth distribution, and the sign of the coefficient flips starting from the 4th
decile (except for the 8th and 9th deciles). Finally, the loss of a sibling significantly
18The wealth index that I use is the one of the DHS dataset, which is constructed using vari-
ables on materials used for housing construction, ownership of some durable assets (such as bi-
cycle, television, radio, phone, ...), types of access to water and sanitation, type of cooking fuel,
ownership of a house/land, ... For more information on how the wealth index is constructed, see
https://www.dhsprogram.com/topics/wealth-index/Wealth-Index-Construction.cfm.
19In Figure 3·10, I check whether this effect is driven by a particular component used to build
the wealth index. The coefficients that are significant are those for whether the household has a
source of electricity, whether it has a television, and for the type of wall material, while only three
coefficients are (non-significantly) positive. Hence, it is likely that the negative effect on the wealth
index captures a real decrease in wealth.
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decreases the probability for a woman to be in the 10th (richest) decile. Those results
suggest that the loss of a sibling influences wealth at all the levels of the wealth
distribution.
In Table 3.8, I test whether this negative effect on wealth is driven by those
women who were sufficiently young to increase their education as a consequence of
losing siblings during the genocide. However, it appears that the decrease in wealth
is not necessarily driven by women who were younger than 12 in 1994. Note that
this doesn’t necessarily mean that there are no returns to education. Indeed, the set
of compliers is very likely to be different across the two sub-samples, and it wouldn’t
be surprising for women in the under-12 sample to be more likely to face a negative
income shock as a result of losing a sibling. This would partially cancel out the
positive effects of education on wealth.
In the under-12 sample, the results are mostly driven by women who had older
siblings. Indeed, the age and sex of younger siblings cannot drive my results as all
of those younger siblings were at most 12 years old in 1994, and were therefore part
of demographic groups with very similar excess mortality rates. Moreover, the older
siblings that are driving my results are likely to still live in their parents’ house.
Indeed, given that the oldest women in the under-12 sub-sample are 12 years old and
that the young men and women were increasingly living their parents’ house at a late
age at the eve of the genocide, we would need an important age gap between a woman
and a sibling for that sibling to live in his own house.20 Hence, the set of compliers
in the under-12 sample are women with older siblings who might be sufficiently old
to work, and who are likely to still live with their parents. Therefore, the negative
income shock channel is likely to play an important role for this set of women.
On the contrary, in the above-12 sample, the negative income shock channel is
20André and Platteau (1998), based on a survey in North-West Rwanda, show that in 1993, among
children in their sample aged between 20 and 25, all of the males and two thirds of the females were
still living with their parents.
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less likely to play an important role. First, many women might not live with their
parents anymore in 1994. For those women, the loss of a sibling shouldn’t lead to a
strong income shock. Second, for women who were still living with their parents in
1994, they also have a larger probability to have siblings who were not living with
them anymore in 1994.
3.7 Possible Mechanisms
What could possibly explain that the loss of siblings leads simultaneously to an in-
crease in human capital and to a decrease in wealth? In this section, I argue that
my results are consistent with a quantity-quality framework of fertility, with parents
having the choice between two alternative coping strategies: replacing the lost chil-
dren, or increasing their investments in the human capital of the surviving ones. I
then argue that scholarships distributed to genocide survivors after 1994 are unlikely
to explain more than half of the increase in education I’m documenting.
3.7.1 Quantity-quality tradeoff
Standard models of fertility choice predict that there is a tradeoff between the quality
and the quantity of children. Additionally, the optimal education level should be
increasing in the cost of raising children, while the optimal number of children should
be decreasing in the cost of raising children (Becker and Barro, 1988; Barro and
Becker, 1989; Doepke and Tertilt, 2016). This suggests that families have the choice
between two alternative coping strategies following the loss of a child. They could
either increase the number of post-conflict births (replacement effect), or they could
increase their investments in the education of the surviving children. Which coping
strategy will be adopted by a family ultimately depends on the relative cost of having
an additional child.
In Table 3.6, I start by showing that the increase in education seems to be driven
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by women who don’t have a sibling born after the genocide. Indeed, while the loss
of a sibling leads to a half additional year of education for women who don’t have a
sibling born after the genocide (column 1), there is no significant effect on the number
of years of education for women who do have a sibling born after 1994 (column 2).
The contrast between these effects becomes even sharper when focusing on women
who were younger than 12 in 1994. While women who don’t have a sibling born after
1994 have 1.5 additional years of schooling (column 3), those who do have a sibling
born after 1994 are (non-significantly) less educated following the loss of a sibling
(column 4). These results confirm the intuition that families had to make a choice
in the aftermath of the genocide between replacing the lost children and educating
more the surviving ones.21
Whether a family decides to replace the lost children or to invest more in the
education of the surviving children should depend on the cost of having an additional
child. In this paragraph, I argue that it is cheaper for a family to have an additional
child after the genocide if the parents were still in their reproductive phase in 1994.
Therefore, I use the age in 1994 of the youngest child in the family as a proxy for
the cost of having an additional child after 1994. Indeed, if the youngest child was
relatively young in 1994, having an additional one shouldn’t have a large effect on
the organisation of the family. On the contrary, if the youngest child was already at
school-age in 1994, having an additional one should have more pronounced effects on
the everyday-life and the organisation of the household.
In Panel A of Table 3.7, I show that women living in a household whose youngest
member was under 3 years old in 1994 are much more likely to have a sibling born after
21As underlined in section 6, the comparison of those two samples should be made cautiously as
the set of compliers is likely to be different. In particular, women in first sample (without siblings
born after the genocide) are likely to be older than women in the second sample (who have a sibling
born after the genocide). Therefore, women in the first sample might have a different probability to
be exposed to a negative income shock after the loss of a sibling.
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1994 as a consequence of losing a sibling during the genocide (column 1). However,
as the youngest member of the family becomes older, this effect vanishes. Indeed,
the coefficient of interest becomes slightly smaller (1.4), if the youngest member of
the family was between 3 and 5 (column 2). Interestingly, there is a large decrease
when the youngest child is at school age. When he’s 6-8, the coefficient drops to 0.4
(column 3), and it becomes undistinguishable from 0 if the youngest member of the
family was between 9 and 11 in 1994 (column 4). Therefore, there is indeed a strong
replacement effect, but only in families where the cost of having an additional child
after the genocide is relatively smaller.
In Panel B, I test whether the increase in education is larger for women living
in families where the replacement of the lost children would be too expensive. For
women whose youngest family member was 0-2 years old in 1994, the loss of a sibling
in 1994 leads to an non-significant increase of 0.85 years of schooling. This effect is
slightly larger if the youngest family member is 3-5 (0.98) and 6-8 (1.38), as shown
in columns 2 and 3. When the youngest family member is 9-11, the effect of losing
a sibling on the number of years of schooling decreases to 0.91. While the increase
in the coefficient of interest from columns 1-3 is in line with the quantity-quality
tradeoff, the decrease observed in column 4 could be explained by the fact that the
women in this sub-sample were, by definition, at least 9 years old in 1994, making
it more difficult for parents to change their educational attainments since they are
partly pre-determined. When I focus on women who were younger than 12 in 1994, I
observe the same patterns, with an increase in the size of the effect of losing a sibling
from 0.9 (col 5) when the youngest family member is 0-2, to 1.19 when he’s 3-5 (col
6), and 2.72 when he’s 6-8 (col 7). Again, the effect decreases when the youngest
family member is 9-11 (col 8). Note that those estimates tend to be noisy, especially
when I focus on women who were younger than 12 in 1994. Therefore, we should keep
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in mind that the coefficients presented in columns 1-4 and 5-8 are not significantly
different from each other.
In Panel C, I finally investigate whether the negative effect on wealth documented
in the previous section is mainly driven by women whose parents decided to have more
children after 1994 as a consequence of having lost a child. For women whose youngest
family member was 0-2, the loss of a sibling leads to a decrease of more than 1 decile
in their wealth index (column 1). This effect becomes smaller and non-significant as
the youngest member of the family becomes older (columns 2 and 3), and eventually
becomes positive and non-significant when he’s 9-11 (column 4). Similar patterns are
observed when I focus on women who were younger than 12 (columns 5-8), although a
non-siginificant decrease in the coefficient is observed in column 7. Again, the results
shown in the 4 last columns should be taken cautiously given how noisy the estimates
are, and how weak the first stage becomes.
Taken together, the results presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, although noisy,
do provide some suggestive evidence in line with the standard models of fertility
choice, and support the idea that in the aftermath of the genocide, parents who lost
a child had the choice between two coping strategies: replacing the lost child, or
increasing investments in the human capital of the surviving ones. Parents who faced
a higher cost of having an additional child after the genocide were more likely to go
for the latter, while those who faced a relatively small cost of having an additional
child were more likely to go for the former.
3.7.2 Relief programs
By 1998, the FARG (Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide), one of the
largest relief programs for genocide survivors that was launched in the aftermath of
the genocide, was awarding scholarships for secondary schooling to 24,000 students,
representing around 40% of (Tutsi) genocide survivors at schooling age (Guariso and
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Verpoorten, 2018). If the loss of a sibling was used by the FARG to determine whether
a Tutsi was eligible for a scholarship, it could be the case that the increase in education
that I observe as a consequence of losing siblings is partly driven by government aid.
In the following paragraphs, I suppose that the entire positive effect on education
is driven by individuals who received a scholarship, and I estimate the implied effect
of receiving a scholarship. In order to do so, I suppose that all the Tutsi who lost at
least one sibling received a scholarship, while none of the Hutu did.22 The effect of
receiving a scholarship should then be equal to the estimated effect on education of
losing at least one sibling, divided by the probability for an individual to be a Tutsi
survivor conditional on having lost at least one sibling.
Assuming a mortality rate of 75% for Tutsi during the genocide and a pre-genocide
share of the population that was Tutsi equal to 12%, one should expect a respondent
to the DHS survey to be a Tutsi survivor with a probability of around 3%. Assuming
that all the Tutsi survivors lost at least one sibling, and given that 17% of the women
interviewed for DHS declare having lost at least one sibling, we should expect 17% of
the women who declared having lost at least one sibling to be Tutsi (3/17 = 0.17).
Hence, the effect I’m observing should be driven by 17% of the observations.
Given the average treatment effect of 4.8 years that is observed in Table 3.9, this
would mean that women who received a scholarship as a consequence of having lost a
sibling should, on average, have an increase of 28 years, which is unrealistically large.
Therefore, I conclude that while relief programs are likely to play an important
role to explain my results, it is unlikely that scholarships could explain more than
half of the size of the effect of losing a sibling on education that I documented in the
previous sections.




In this section, I review some alternative mechanisms that could also explain my
results, but for which I do not find any supporting evidence in the data.
3.8.1 Delayed benefits from education
Investing in education and health could incur direct costs for delayed benefits. This
would explain why losing siblings has a negative impact on wealth, while also having
a positive impact on education and health. If this is the case, we would expect the
negative effect on wealth to disappear (and even reverse) with time. In Table 3.10,
I look at the effect of losing siblings on wealth when focusing on women who were
interviewed in 2005 (column 1), 2010 (column 2), and 2014-5 (column 3). As we can
see, the negative impact on wealth doesn’t seem to disappear as time goes by. Hence,
it is unlikely that the negative effects on wealth are caused by delayed benefits of
education.
3.8.2 Rural-Urban Migration of Educated Women
It could also be the case that as a consequence of getting more education, women
who lost siblings have a higher probability of migrating to urban centres. This could
in turn have an adverse effect on their wealth, and would explain why young women
who got more education as a result of the loss of siblings also ended up being poorer.
In column 1 of Table 3.11, I test whether women who lost siblings have a higher
probability of living in an urban area. In column 2, I restrict the sample to women
who were younger than 12 years old in 1994. In both columns, the estimates are
small and not significantly different from zero. Hence, my results are unlikely to be
explained by more educated women being more likely to migrate to urban areas.
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3.8.3 Worse husband
The negative effects on wealth could also come from worse outcomes on the marriage
market for women who lost siblings in 1994. This might happen if the loss of siblings
decreases the strength of a woman’s social network, hurting her prospects on the
marriage market. In what follows, I start by examining whether there is an effect
on age at marriage for women, whether they tend to marry an older husband, and
whether there’s a decrease in the age gap between the partners. I then proceed by
examining whether there’s an effect on the quality of the husband, proxied by his
education, his attitude toward spousal and parental violence, and whether the union
is polygamous or not.
When testing what is the effect of losing a sibling on age at marriage of women, age
at marriage of partner and age gap, I restrict the sample to women who were married
only once. I do that because the DHS datasets only contain information about age
at marriage for the last union. The exclusion of women who have been married more
than once could be problematic for two reasons. First, a woman might marry more
than once because her previous husband died during the genocide. This is a problem
since the death of the husband might be related to the death of a woman’s siblings.
Second, the loss of siblings during the genocide might have an effect on the probability
for a woman to divorce afterwards. However, I do not find strong evidence for the
loss of siblings having an effect on the probability of having been married more than
once (Table 3.12, column 1)
The rest of the table presents results related to age at marriage and to the quality
of the husband. In column 2, we can see that the loss of a sibling leads women to
marry on average around half of a year later, while there is no significant effect on
the age at marriage for the partner (column 3). As a result, the age gap between
the woman and her husband tends to decrease (column 4). When it comes to the
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quality of the husband, women who lost siblings during the genocide tend to marry
more educated men (column 5). However, they do not seem to marry husbands who
have different attitudes toward spousal violence (column 6) and parental violence
(column 7). Finally, the loss of a sibling tends to reduce the probability of living in a
polygamist household, although this effect is significant only at a 10 percent level. I
interpret those last three results as limited evidence that those women marry better
quality husbands.
Hence, the decrease in wealth following the death of a sibling is unlikely to be
driven by a negative effect on the quality of the husband.
3.8.4 Other conflict-related shocks
The loss of a sibling could itself increase the probability for a woman to be victim
of another conflict-related shock, such as the loss of a parent or the loss of land.
While the loss of a sibling might increase the probability of losing a parent, I cannot
directly test for this hypothesis using the DHS datasets since the questionnaires do
not contain any information about whether the parents of the respondent are still
alive or not. However, prior research suggests that the loss of a father during a civil
conflict has a negative impact on education. If the same result holds in Rwanda, the
loss of parents would lead to a downward bias in my estimate for the effect of losing
siblings on education.
3.8.5 Preferences for education and for ownership of physical assets
Experiencing a dramatic event such as the loss of a sibling during a civil conflict
could also lead to a shift of preferences away from material possessions and towards
investments in more mobile forms of capital, such as education.23 This mechanism
could explain why I observe that the loss of a sibling leads simultaneously to an
23Becker et al. (2020) provide evidence for such a mechanism following the forced displacement of
Poles after World War II.
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increase in the number of years in education and to positive effects on the marriage
market, and negative effects on wealth. Unfortunately, Rwandan waves of DHS do
not include any questions related to preferences that could be directly used to test
for this mechanism.
3.9 Robustness Checks
In this section, I show that the results presented in Table 3.3 are robust to the use of
alternative instruments and controls and that they pass a series of placebo tests. In
the following paragraphs, I check whether this is an issue by defining my instrumental
variable at different geographical levels, and by dropping regions with a high share
of migrants. I therefore test whether my results are robust to the use of alternative
instruments that do not exploit geographic variations, and to the exclusion of regions
that are likely to host a large share of migrants.
3.9.1 Selective Migration
Selective migration might lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction. For example,
if individuals who lost many siblings and who come from a privileged family are
more likely to migrate in certain districts, this would lead to mortality rates being
correlated with unobserved variables. To check whether this is likely to be a concern
for my empirical analysis, I first investigate how my results depend on the geographic
variations I use in my instrument. I proceed by looking at whether my results are
sensitive to dropping areas that welcomed a high share of displaced persons in the
aftermath of the conflict.
In order to understand how my empirical strategy relies on geographic variations,
I replicate the last column of Table 3.3 using instruments that are computed at
alternative geographic levels in the first column of Table 3.13. When computing
excess mortality rates at the country level instead of the provincial level, so that
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no geographic variation is exploited in the IV, estimates remain similar to the ones
presented in the baseline approach.
Moreover, I use the 2002 population census to identify sectors where a large part
of the population has migrated in the aftermath of the genocide. In particular, I
identify sectors that are in the top quintile in terms of the share of the population
having changed residence between 1990 and 2002. Table 3.14 shows that when ex-
cluding women living in such sectors, the estimated effect for the loss of a sibling
on education remains similar to the baseline estimate (columns 1 and 2). Moreover,
the Rwandan government established an important villagization program for reset-
tlers in the aftermath of the genocide. Column 3 shows that the main result of the
chapter is robust to the exclusion of women living in sectors that are in the top quin-
tile in terms of the population share living in these newly created villages (called
umudugudu). Finally, the main result is also robust to the exclusion of women living
in a sector characterized by either a high share of migrants or a high share of residents
in umudugudu (column 4).
3.9.2 Alternative Instruments
As shown in the previous section, the IV approach provides similar results when
geographic variations is omitted in the construction of the instrument (Table 3.13,
column 1). Moreover, when excluding variation from the gender composition in addi-
tion to geographic variation in the construction of the instrument also leads to stable
estimates. In this case, the expected number of lost siblings in 1994 relies solely on
the age patterns of siblings living in 1994 (column 2).
The excess mortality patterns presented earlier suggest a difference-in-difference
formulation of my instrumental variable approach. Indeed, controlling for the total
number of siblings and respondent’s age in 1994, we should expect the number and
the sex of older siblings to affect the number of lost siblings only for older women.
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The rest of the table shows that the main results of the chapter remain qualitatively
unchanged when using as an instrument the age of a woman in 1994 times the number
of older siblings she had before the genocide (column 3), and the age of a woman in
1994 times the number brothers she had before the genocide (column 4).
3.9.3 Imprisonment
During the years following 1994, a substantial share of the Rwandan population was
imprisoned for having taken part in the genocide. Given that the large majority of the
convicted individuals were young adult males, my instrument might partly capture
the effect of having a brother in prison. Since having a family member in prison is
considered as a burden, I might be underestimating the effect of losing siblings on
education.
However, relatively few women were sent to jail in the aftermath of the genocide.
Hence, while the excess mortality rates by age group are indeed correlated with im-
prisonment rates for males, this is not the case for females.24 We should thus expect
the loss of a sister to have a larger effect on education relative to the loss of a brother.
In Table 3.16, I estimate separately the effect of losing brothers and sisters, by using
the expected number of lost brothers/sisters as instruments. As expected, the coeffi-
cient for sisters is significantly larger than the one for brothers. This suggests that I
might be underestimating the effect of losing siblings on education.
24The 2002 Census provides information about whether an individual lives in an institution or not.
The two main categories of institutions are orphanages and prisons. In Figure 3·12, I plot the age
distribution of individuals who live in institutions. As we can see, most of the individuals who live in
instituions are males who are teenagers or young adults. In Figure 3·13, I plot the sex distribution by
age for individuals living in institutions in 2002. While there is a significant proportion of females
for children, which are more likely to be orphans, more than 95% of individuals aged 20-50 are
males. The smaller proportion of males for the oldest age groups is likely to come from the longer
life expectancy of women.
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3.9.4 Alternative Controls
I now show that my results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of alternative
controls. In Table 3.15, I first show that the estimated effect of sibling loss on educa-
tion remains stable when including DHS cluster fixed effects, of which there are 1446
(slightly less than 500 per DHS wave). I then show that using 5-year age-group fixed
effects instead of a quadratic specification doesn’t lead to different results (column
3). In column 4, I include month-of-birth fixed effects. The results are also robust to
the inclusion as controls of 42 variables indicating the number of brothers and sisters
a woman has that are older than her by x years, with x taking a value from -10 to
10 (column 5).
In column 6, I show that my results are robust to the inclusion as a control of
the interaction between age in 1994 and the number of siblings. Indeed, it could
be the case that having many siblings might have a more pronounced adverse effect
on education for younger generations than for older generations. For example, for
younger generations, having many siblings could reduce parental investment per child,
leading to less education. For older cohorts, having many siblings might not affect
education because going to school was a relatively rare event. This would lead my
instrument to be correlated with the education of women. Indeed, women that were
young in 1994 mechanically have younger siblings than women that were old in 1994.
However, the probability of death is much smaller for young individuals than for
older ones. This means that a young woman having many siblings should expect
to lose fewer of them than an older woman with the same number of siblings. For
the same reason, I also show that my results hold true when controlling for the
interaction between age in 1994 and other family characteristics: the number of older
brothers (column 7), the number of older sisters (column 8), average space between
births (column 9), and own’s rank in the family (column 10). Finally, my results are
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robust to the inclusion of the interaction between age in 1994 and district fixed effects
(column 11).
3.9.5 Placebo Tests
I now present several placebo checks and I show that my empirical strategy doesn’t
work in alternative contexts.
Placebo Outcomes:
The loss of siblings in 1994 should not have any effects on outcomes that were de-
termined before the genocide. In Table 3.17, I show that the loss of siblings in 1994
doesn’t have a significant effect on the number of births given by a woman before
1994 (column 1).25 In column 2, I show that the loss of siblings in 1994 doesn’t have
a significant effect on the height-to-age z-score of women who were at least 18 years
old in 1994. In column 3, I show that the loss of siblings in 1994 doesn’t have a
significant effect on age at marriage for women who were already married in 1994.26
Placebo Country:
As we could still be worried that my instrument might capture an unobserved variable
that is correlated with education, I apply my empirical strategy to women who were
not impacted by the genocide but who live in a region that has very close social struc-
ture and norms to the ones prevailing in Rwanda. More precisely, I assign the death
25In order to achieve more precise estimates, I restrict the sample of women included in that
regression to those who were at least 14 years old in 1994. I choose 14 as a cutoff because the
youngest woman in my dataset who gave birth in 1994 was 14 years old at that time.
26As explained in the previous section, the DHS datasets only contain information about age at
marriage for the last union, so I’m again restricting the sample to women who were married only
once. Since I showed in column 1 of Table 3.12 that the loss of a sibling doesn’t lead to a significantly
different probability in having been married only once, using age at marriage for women who were
already married in 1994 remains an interesting placebo check.
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probabilities calculated in Rwanda to the siblings of women living in Burundi.2728
Indeed, Burundi is an excellent candidate to serve as a placebo country because of its
shared history with Rwanda, and because of the similarities between those two soci-
eties. Both countries have similar ethnic composition, climate, topography, economy,
religion, language, and colonial experiences (Uvin, 1999).
While Burundi also faced high levels of ethnic conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi
since the independence of the country, it is important to notice that, contrary to
Rwanda where the death toll increased massively only in from April to July 1994,29
there have been multiple sharp increases in violence in Burundi since independence
(most notably in 1972 and in 1993-2005). For that reason, we should expect the first
stage and the reduced form to lead to coefficients that are noisier and much smaller
in magnitude than in Rwanda. In Table 3.18, I show that this is indeed the case.30
Permutation test:
Shift-share designs can suffer from a problem of over-rejection of the null hypothesis
when regression residuals are correlated across observations with similar initial shares
(Adão et al., 2019). To test whether my design suffers from such a problem, I generate
1000 placebo samples, each of them containing the same number of women. The
outcomes and controls are identical in all the samples. The placebo samples differ
exclusively in the excess mortality rates assigned to each sibling, which are randomly
permuted. In Figure 3·11, I show the empirical distribution of the obtained estimates.
27I use the Burundi DHS 2010 and 2016 waves.
28I use the excess mortality rates computed at the country level and not the ones that are computed
at the province level.
29There was also a spike in the death toll from 1959 to 1962. This shouldn’t be of much importance
for my empirical strategy since less than 3% of the women appearing in my sample were already
born at that time.
30Since the province is the smallest geographic unit in the Burundi DHS datasets, I have to use
province fixed effects instead of district fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the
province level. Given the small number of provinces in Burundi (18), I also present confidence
intervals based on the wild-cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008).
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The OLS estimates are centered around zero for both the first stage and the reduced
form. As it is clear from the graphs, the real estimates (represented by the red lines)
are extreme events compared to the placebo estimates. Column 1 in Table 3.19 shows
that the average of the OLS estimates is zero for all outcomes, and column 2 reports
the standard deviation of the estimated coefficients. Since the true value of β equals
0 by construction, a correctly behaved test with significance level 5% should have a
5% rejection rate. Column 3 shows that the clustered standard errors estimators do
not yield a higher rejection rate.
3.10 Conclusion
What are the mechanisms that lead civil conflicts to have long-lasting consequences
on human capital? In this chapter, I argue that changing family structures, and more
precisely the loss of siblings, is part of the answer. Using the age and sex profile of a
woman’s siblings to produce plausibly exogenous variation in the number of siblings
lost in 1994, I show that women who lost a sibling during the conflict were more
educated 10 to 20 years after the genocide, and were more likely to have siblings born
after the genocide. I provide evidence that those results are in line with standard
models of fertility choice.
The size of the results presented in this chapter suggests that the loss of a sib-
ling has large effects on the organisation of households and the investment decisions
within families. It also points to the fact that depending on their factor endowment,
different families adopt different coping strategies. These findings directly speak to
the previous literature that found no long-run aggregate effects of the 1994 genocide
on education, contrary to what has been observed in many other settings. I show
that this null result might hide important heterogeneities between families, and that
that this null aggregate effect could be explained by the high death toll during the
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genocide.
This study suffers from some important limitations. First, I have to limit the
scope of this study to women, although the effects of losing a sibling are likely to be
different for men and women. Second, the loss of a sibling is likely to have important
negative effects on mental health, which I am unable to consider in this work. Third,
the loss of a sibling might be related to other conflict-related events that might have
important consequences on the accumulation of human capital, such as the loss of
a parent. Future work using data allowing to leverage those dimensions might shed
























Figure 3·1: Evolution of Death Toll
Notes: This figure represents the total number of siblings who died in each year according























































































































Figure 3·2: Probability of Death (By Year)
Notes: This figure represents mortality rates (and the associated 95% confidence inter-
vals) by age of respondents’ siblings in each year from 1990 to 1998.
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Figure 3·3: Excess Probability of Death in 1994 vs 1992
(By Sex)
Notes: This figure represents excess mortality rates in 1994 compared to 1992 by age
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Figure 3·4: Excess Probability of Death in 1994 vs 1992
(By Province-Sex)
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Figure 3·5: Results on Human Capital
Notes: This figure plots the IV estimates and 95% intervals for Equation 3.2. The
outcomes are the height-to-age z-score of a woman, her age at first marriage, the age
gap between spouses, and the number of years of education of a woman’s husband.
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Figure 3·6: Results on Human Capital (Heterogeneity by
Age)
Notes: This figure replicates Figure 3·5 when sample-splitting along respondent’s age
dimension.
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Figure 3·7: Effect of sibling death on wealth distribution
Notes: This figure plots the IV coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the estimates
of the number of lost siblings on wealth. The dependant variable is a dummy taking a
value of one if a woman is in the n decile of the wealth index distribution.
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3.12 Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N. Obs Mean SD Min Max
Individual Chraracteristics
Age in 1994 34,455 14.13 9.419 0 39
Education (years) 34,438 4.509 3.595 0 20
Wealth decile 34,455 5.459 2.836 1 10
Height-age z-score 17,216 -1.142 1.082 -5.9 5.7
Catholic 34,446 0.421 0.494 0 1
Protestant 34,446 0.542 0.498 0 1
Geographic Characteristics
Urban 34,455 0.214 0.410 0 1
Altitude 34,455 1,720 295.2 0 2,768
Family Characteristics
N. of sisters before 1994 34,456 2.249 1.588 0 10
N. of brothers before 1994 34,456 2.184 1.546 0 10
Rank in family 34,456 2.361 2.084 0 14
N. of older sisters before 1994 34,456 1.205 1.322 0 9
N. of older brothers before 1994 34,456 1.156 1.277 0 9
Avg space between births (months) 33,294 36.60 16.67 0 269
N. of siblings born after 1994 34,456 0.738 1.390 0 10
Mortality in 1994
N. siblings lost 34,456 0.285 0.813 0 11
N. brothers lost 34,456 0.176 0.559 0 8
N. sisters lost 34,456 0.108 0.419 0 6
Lost 1 or more siblings 34,456 0.171 0.377 0 1
Lost 2 or more siblings 34,456 0.056 0.232 0 1
Lost 3 or more siblings 34,456 0.026 0.161 0 1
Education, Marriage & Fertility
Education of husband (years) 22,722 4.483 3.793 0 20
Age at marriage (if married only once) 20,133 21.16 3.637 10 44
Polygamy 18,738 0.084 0.278 0 1
Violence
Experienced any violence by husband/partner 7,806 0.429 0.495 0 1
Experienced any sexual violence by husband/partner 7,790 0.150 0.357 0 1
Beating justified by woman in at least one scenario 34,371 0.482 0.500 0 1
Forced to have sex by anyone other than husband/partner (last year) 5,090 0.151 0.358 0 1
Forced to have sex by anyone other than husband/partner (ever) 2,256 0.163 0.370 0 1
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Table 3.2: OLS Results
Dependent Variable: Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N. Dead Siblings 0.257*** 0.276*** 0.133*** 0.0984***
(0.0385) (0.0382) (0.0270) (0.0268)
Observations 34,104 34,095 34,095 34,095
R-squared 0.004 0.056 0.148 0.184
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes Yes
District FE No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I test Equation 3.1, where the dependent variable is the number of
years of education, and the explanatory variable of interest is the number of siblings a
woman lost in 1994. I control for the number of brothers and sisters before the genocide
in all the columns. The additional individual controls used in columns 2-4 are age, age2,
the year of interview, religions. In column 3 and 4, the additional geographic controls
include the altitude and a dummy taking a value of 1 if the respondent lives in an
urban area. I add district fixed effects in column 4. Standard errors are presented in
parenthesis and are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.3: Impact of Losing Siblings on Education
Dependent Variable: Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Estimates
N. Dead Siblings 0.838*** 0.878*** 0.929*** 0.816*** 0.843*** 0.898***
(0.168) (0.190) (0.193) (0.174) (0.169) (0.194)
Observations 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983
Rank in Family No Yes No No No Yes
N. Older Brothers No No Yes No No Yes
N. Older Sisters No No No Yes No Yes
Avg. Space No No No No Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.503 4.503 4.503 4.503 4.503 4.503
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 174.3 136.3 142.9 153.8 174.5 135
Test of Endogeneity, p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Stage
E[N. of Dead Siblings] 1.280*** 1.372*** 1.337*** 1.334*** 1.284*** 1.368***
(0.0970) (0.118) (0.112) (0.108) (0.0972) (0.118)
Observations 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983
R-squared 0.121 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.121 0.122
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I investigate what’s the effect of losing siblings in 1994 on the education
of women using an instrumental variable strategy. The upper part of the table presents the IV
estimates, while the bottom part of the table presents the results of the first stage. The unit
of observation is the woman. Only women who were born before the genocide are included in the
sample. The dependent variable is the number of years of schooling at the time of the interview. The
explanatory variable of interest is the number of siblings a woman lost in 1994, which is instrumented
by the expected number of siblings lost in 1994 based on the age and sex profile of a woman’s sibling.
All the regressions include controls for age, age square, religion, number of brothers and sisters before
the genocide, urban/rural area, altitude, year of interview, and district fixed effects. In columns 2-5,
I sequently add other controls (woman’s rank in her family, the number of older brothers and sisters
she has, and the average space between the births of her siblings) before using all of them in column
6. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Losing Siblings on Education (by
Age)
Dependent Variable: Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Younger than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings 1.524*** 1.488*** 1.625*** 1.436*** 1.701*** 1.638***
(0.362) (0.343) (0.377) (0.337) (0.352) (0.350)
Observations 14,891 14,891 14,891 14,891 14,891 14,891
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
Mean 4.826 4.826 4.826 4.826 4.826 4.826
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 92.73 107 91.20 105.2 86.88 97.39
Panel B - Older than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings -0.044 -0.082 -0.015 -0.100 -0.044 -0.060
(0.172) (0.184) (0.192) (0.173) (0.172) (0.188)
Observations 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
Mean 4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 97.80 64.42 72.31 77.06 97.98 63.88
H0: βPanelA = βPanelB, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications are the same as in Table 3.3. Only the IV estimates are presented. Panel
A includes all women who were younger than 12 in 1994, while Panel B includes all women who
were at least 12 in 1994.
Table 3.5: Impact of Losing Siblings on Wealth
Dependent Variable: Wealth Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N. Dead Siblings -0.291*** -0.210** -0.225** -0.252*** -0.269*** -0.218**
(0.098) (0.103) (0.105) (0.098) (0.097) (0.103)
Observations 32,999 32,999 32,999 32,999 32,999 32,999
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
Mean 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 175.1 136.9 143.7 154.5 175.4 135.7
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The DHS wealth index is constructed using variables on materials used for housing
construction, ownership of some durable assets (such as bicycle, television, radio, phone, ...),
types of access to water and sanitation, type of cooking fuel, ownership of a house/land, ...
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Table 3.6: Impact on Education and Replacement Effect
Dependent Variable: Education
All women Younger than 12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least 1 sibling born after 19994 No Yes No Yes
N. Dead Siblings 0.481* -0.337 1.596*** -1.271
(0.268) (1.269) (0.536) (1.858)
Equality test p = 0.508 p = 0.173
Observations 23,434 9,512 7,947 8,215
Family Structure Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.400 4.708 4.761 4.747
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 90.68 17.46 37.26 12.08
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I investigate whether the effects of losing a sibling on education depends
on the number of siblings born after the genocide. In columns 1 and 3, I restrict the sample
to women who don’t have any siblings born after 1994. In columns 2 and 4, I focus on women
who have at least one sibling born after 1994.
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Table 3.7: Effects of Losing a Sibling, by Cost for Parents
of Having an Additional Child
All women Younger than 12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age of youngest family member 0-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 0-2 3-5 6-8 9-11
Panel A: Dependent Variable: N. siblings born after 1994
N. Dead Siblings 1.644*** 1.423*** 0.407*** 0.130
(0.346) (0.293) (0.141) (0.119)
H0: β = 1, p-value 0.062 0.144
Equality test with col 1, p-value 0.639 0.000 0.000
Observations 9,489 7,197 3,952 2,771
Mean 1.586 0.816 0.238 0.0505
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 54.56 26.01 17.02 8.450
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Education
N. Dead Siblings 0.857 0.986* 1.380** 0.916 0.992 1.196** 2.723* 0.746
(0.896) (0.545) (0.570) (1.186) (1.065) (0.581) (1.467) (1.732)
Equality test with col 1 or 5, p-value 0.931 0.677 0.953 0.657 0.406 0.632
Observations 9,484 7,194 3,950 2,768 7,927 5,059 2,081 892
Mean 4.894 4.661 4.532 4.585 4.956 4.644 4.425 4.452
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 54.55 25.85 16.97 8.523 28.68 27.40 6.853 3.349
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Wealth decile
N. Dead Siblings -1.145** -0.350 -0.427 0.346 -0.853 0.100 -1.452* 0.307
(0.452) (0.344) (0.345) (0.652) (0.578) (0.510) (0.845) (0.857)
Equality test with col 1 or 5, p-value 0.239 0.206 0.082 0.201 0.897 0.894
Observations 9,489 7,197 3,952 2,771 7,931 5,061 2,082 892
Mean 5.575 5.541 5.480 5.511 5.597 5.551 5.520 5.437
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 54.56 26.01 17.02 8.450 28.67 27.37 6.901 3.349
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable are the number of siblings born after 1994 (Panel A), the number of
years of education (Panel B), and the wealth decile (Panel C). I restrict the sample to women for which
the youngest family member was aged 0-2 years old in 1994 (col 1), 3-5 (col 2), 6-8 (col 3), and 9-11
(col 4). In columns 5-8, I do the same except that I only use women who were younger than 12 in 1994.
All the specifications include family and individual controls, as well as district fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level. For columns 2-4, I report the p-value for the equality test
with the coefficient reported in column 1. I do the same in columns 6-8 for the equality test with the
coefficient reported in column 5.
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3.13 Appendix




































































Figure 3·8: Evolution of Death Toll (By Wave)
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Figure 3·9: Excess Probability of Death in 1994 vs 1992
(By Region-Sex)
Notes: This figure replicates Figure 3·4 by region.
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Figure 3·10: Effect of sibling death on components of the
wealth index
Notes: This figure plots the IV coefficients and 95% intervals for the effect of losing a






























Figure 3·11: Permutation Test
Notes: In this figure, I plot the frequency of the obtained first stage
and reduced form coe cients when permuting 1000 times the death
probability associated with each individual in the sibling dataset. The
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Figure 3·12: Age Distribution of Individuals Living in
Institutions
Notes: This figures represents the age distribution of individuals living


















0 20 40 60 80
Age
Figure 3·13: Sex by Age of Individuals Living in Institu-
tions
Notes: This figures represents the proportion of males as a function
of age amongst individuals living in institutions (orphanage or prison)
according to the 2002 Census.
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Table 3.8: Impact on Wealth (by Age)
Dependent Variable: Wealth decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Younger than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings -0.471** -0.233 -0.357 -0.353 -0.197 -0.109
(0.226) (0.228) (0.235) (0.224) (0.237) (0.239)
Observations 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,898
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
Mean 5.564 5.564 5.564 5.564 5.564 5.564
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 92.94 107.2 91.33 105.5 87.01 97.50
Panel B - Older than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings -0.229* -0.124 -0.139 -0.184 -0.229* -0.126
(0.118) (0.131) (0.126) (0.125) (0.118) (0.131)
Observations 18,101 18,101 18,101 18,101 18,101 18,101
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
Mean 5.372 5.372 5.372 5.372 5.372 5.372
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 98.27 64.57 72.74 77.17 98.44 64.11
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: Impact of Losing At Least 1 Sibling on Educa-
tion (by Age)
Dependent Variable: Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Younger than 12 in 1994
At least 1 lost sibling 5.054*** 4.720*** 5.140*** 4.745*** 5.427*** 4.832***
(1.134) (1.076) (1.184) (1.053) (1.276) (1.216)
Observations 14,891 14,891 14,891 14,891 14,891 14,891
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
Mean 4.826 4.826 4.826 4.826 4.826 4.826
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 70.14 76.94 68.01 77.38 58.70 64.90
Panel B - Older than 12 in 1994
At least 1 lost sibling -0.305 -0.613 -0.256 -0.583 -0.370 -0.599
(0.677) (1.011) (1.010) (0.775) (0.696) (1.116)
Observations 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
Mean 4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236 4.236
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 153.9 56.17 62.38 104.2 153.1 48.64
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications are the same as in Table 3.3. Only the IV estimates are presented. Panel
A includes all women who were younger than 12 in 1994, while Panel B includes all women who
were at least 12 in 1994.
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Table 3.10: Alternative Mechanisms - Delayed Benefits
from Education
Dependent variable: Wealth quintile
DHS Wave 2005 2010 2014
(1) (2) (3)
N. Dead Siblings -0.070 -0.009 -0.087
(0.118) (0.058) (0.099)
Observations 10,097 11,362 9,183
Family Structure Controls Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 24 113.2 46.91
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports IV estimates for the effect of losing a sibling on education.
While column 1 restricts the sample to women who were interviewed in 2005, columns 2
and 3 restrict the sample to women who were interviewed in respectively 2010 and 2014.




N. Dead Siblings 0.009 0.000
(0.011) (0.021)
Observations 32,999 14,898
Family Structure Controls Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.213 0.232
Sample All < 12
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 134.9 97.63
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the
respondent is living in an urban area. In column 2, I restrict the
sample to women who were younger than 12 in 1994.
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Table 3.12: Alternative Mechanisms - Quality of Marriage
Age at marriage Quality of husband
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES One woman partner Age Edu Beating Beating Polygamy
union gap partner wife child
N. Dead Siblings -0.007 0.472** 0.160 -0.765* 0.396** -0.024 0.005 -0.026*
(0.015) (0.202) (0.455) (0.439) (0.195) (0.025) (0.021) (0.015)
Observations 21,238 18,431 15,284 15,284 20,822 20,416 20,542 17,194
Family Structure Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.868 21.21 25.87 4.575 4.498 0.666 0.714 0.0844
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 89.98 74 56.06 56.06 86.30 150.5 151.6 79.05
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The specifications are the same as in column 6 of Table 3.3. For columns 2-4, only women
who have been married only once are included.
182
Table 3.13: Alternative Instruments
Dependent Variable: Education
Instrument Bartik style IV age in 1994 × n. of ...
no geo. var. no geo. var. older siblings brothers
no sex var.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A - Younger than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings 2.766*** 3.063*** 2.493* 1.408
(0.578) (0.647) (1.304) (1.035)
Observations 16,162 16,162 16,162 16,162
Family Structure Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.754 4.754 4.754 4.754
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 61.93 55.45 8.921 12.85
Panel B - Older than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings 0.726 0.618 -0.591 -0.628
(0.896) (0.867) (0.755) (0.815)
Observations 16,784 16,784 16,784 16,784
Family Structure Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.234 4.234 4.234 4.234
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 12.90 12.81 9.038 12.46
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I reproduce the main table using alternative definitions of the instru-
mental variable. In column (1), I report the estimates obtained when using the
baseline instrument. In column 2, I compute excess mortality by age group and
sex, therefore ignoring geographic variations. In column 3, I compute excess
mortality by age group only. In columns 4 and 5, I use as an instrument the
interaction between the age of a woman in 1994 and the number of older siblings
and brothers she had just before the genocide, respectively.
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Table 3.14: Effects on Education, Excluding Likely Mi-
grants
Exclude sectors in top-quintile for
VARIABLES baseline %migrants %umudugudu both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N. Dead Siblings 0.748*** 0.574*** 0.818*** 0.679***
(0.224) (0.203) (0.250) (0.233)
Observations 28,847 23,068 23,081 19,030
Family Structure Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.439 4.122 4.531 4.140
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 120.5 125.5 105.1 89.35
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I check whether my baseline results (column 1) are
robust to the exclusion of households who are likely to have moved after the
genocide. In column 2, I exclude households living in sectors that are in the
top quintile in terms of the share of the population that changed residence
between 1990 and 2002. In column 3, I drop women who live in sectors
that are in the top quintile in terms of the share of the population living in
umudugudu villages. In column 4, I drop women who live in a sector that
is in the top quintile in terms either of the share of the population that
changed residence between 1990 and 2002, or in terms of the share of the
population living in umudugudu villages.
Table 3.15: Alternative Controls
Dependent variable: Number of years of schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
N. Dead Siblings 0.898*** 1.103*** 0.684*** 0.884*** 0.720*** 0.691*** 0.915*** 1.044*** 1.021*** 0.955*** 0.489**
(0.194) (0.221) (0.179) (0.189) (0.199) (0.208) (0.201) (0.210) (0.213) (0.194) (0.194)
Observations 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983 32,983
Family Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No DHS cluster FE Age-Group FE Month of birth Siblings age Age in 94 × Age in 94 × Age in 94 × Age in 94 × Age in 94 × Age in 94 ×
n. siblings n. older bro n. older sis rank space district FE
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 135 119.4 140.5 134.7 118.5 129.5 136.4 132 133.6 131.7 140.9
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The first column of this table replicates the last column of Table 3.3. Column 2 includes
DHS cluster fixed effects, of which there are 1446. In column 3, instead of controlling for age
and age2, I include 5-year age-groups fixed effects. In column 4, I include month of birth fixed
effects. In column 5, I include a set of 40 variables, each of them corresponding to the number
of brothers and sisters a woman has who are x years older and younger than her, where x is
between 0 and 10. In the remaining columns, I control for the interaction between age in 1994
and the following variables: the number of siblings (column 6), the number of older brothers
(column 7), the number of older sisters (column 8), the average space between siblings’ births
(column 9), and the woman’s rank in her family (column 10). In column 11, I control for the
interaction between age in 1994 and district fixed effects.
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Table 3.16: Effects on Education by Sex of Siblings
Dependent Variable: Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - All
N. Dead Siblings (brothers) 0.635*** 0.666*** 0.753*** 0.626*** 0.638*** 0.756***
(0.239) (0.252) (0.256) (0.241) (0.239) (0.253)
N. Dead Siblings (sisters) 1.234*** 1.272*** 1.255*** 1.180*** 1.241*** 1.161***
(0.431) (0.445) (0.438) (0.426) (0.430) (0.424)
Panel B - Younger than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings (brothers) 1.256** 1.204** 1.407*** 1.213** 1.413*** 1.452***
(0.537) (0.522) (0.504) (0.531) (0.547) (0.502)
N. Dead Siblings (sisters) 2.258* 2.199* 2.269* 1.984* 2.476** 2.127**
(1.161) (1.140) (1.179) (1.023) (1.174) (1.041)
Panel C - Older than 12 in 1994
N. Dead Siblings (brothers) -0.208 -0.247 -0.195 -0.223 -0.207 -0.178
(0.304) (0.296) (0.301) (0.304) (0.305) (0.304)
N. Dead Siblings (sisters) 0.250 0.204 0.251 0.141 0.248 0.131
(0.464) (0.491) (0.467) (0.489) (0.465) (0.484)
Family Controls No Rank Brothers Sisters Space All
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I replicate Table 3.3. Instead of instrumenting a unique endogenous variable
(number of lost siblings in 1994) by the expected number of lost siblings, I instrument two endogenous
variables (number of lost brothers and number of lost sisters) by the expected number of lost brothers
and sisters (using the same methodology as in the baseline analysis).
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Table 3.17: Placebo Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES N. births before 1994 Height-age z-score Age at marriage (woman)
N. Dead Siblings -0.093 0.113 0.135
(0.072) (0.112) (0.260)
Observations 14,794 5,344 6,178
Family Controls Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Sample ≥ 14 ≥ 18 Married before 1994
Mean 1.250 -0.996 20.07
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 51.40 21.82 33.68
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I replicate the last column of Table 3.3 using variables that shouldn’t be affected
by the loss of siblings in 1994 as outcomes. In column 1, I use the number of times a woman gave birth
before the genocide. I restrict the sample to women who were at least 14 years old in 1994. In column
2, I use the height-to-age z-score as an outcome, and I restrict the sample to women who were at least
18 years old in 1994. In column 3, I use the age at marriage as an outcome, and I restrict the sample
to women who were married only once and who were already married in 1994.
Table 3.18: Placebo Country - Burundi
(1) (2)
VARIABLES N. Dead Siblings Education
E[N. Dead Siblings] 0.085* 0.518
(0.045) (0.737)
[-.01147, .1946] [-1.086, 2.387]
Observations 17,845 17,845
Family Controls Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: In this table, I apply the mortality rates computed at the country
level in Rwanda to siblings of women living in Burundi. I then construct the
variable E[N.DeadSiblings] in the same way I did in Rwanda and estimate
the first stage (column 1) and the reduced form (column 2). Standard
errors clustered at the province level are presented in parentheses. The
95% confidence intervals using the wild-cluster bootstrap are presented in
brackets.
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Table 3.19: Estimates and rejection rate of the hypothesis
H0 : β = 0 at 5% significance level.
Estimate (mean) Estimate (sd) Rejection rate
First stage 0.002 0.057 6.5%
Reduced form -0.009 0.199 5.4%
Notes: In this table, I report the results from a placebo test where I generate
1000 placebo samples where I permute the mortality rates associated with
women’s siblings. Columns 1 and 2 report the means and the standard
deviations of the obtained estimates for the effect of the placebo treatment
on the actual number of lost siblings (first stage) and on education (reduced
form). Column 3 reports the rejection rate.
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Laliberté, J.-W. (2019). Language skill acquisition in immigrant social networks:
Evidence from Australia. Labour Economics, 57:35–45.
Lazear, E. P. (1999). Culture and Language. Journal of Political Economy,
107(S6):S95–S126.
León, G. (2012). Civil Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation: The Long-term
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Conflict / Les évolutions de l’âge des femmes au premier mariage et le conflit armé
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